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Migration is a decidedly human condition that has influenced the development of all 
nations. Yet the cultural and demographic impacts upon the United States during the long 
nineteenth century brought about by the mass movements of peoples from Africa, Europe, and 
beyond were especially pronounced. Immigrants to North America brought with them more 
than linguistic and cultural artifacts, however; propelled by intellectual currents in their 
countries of origin, they often carried with them a sensibility of revolution, radical republican 
politics, and a moral suasion that they employed as they navigated the political and social 
realities in their new countries. Many immigrants would come to view America and the New 
World generally through a prism of their own making, and thus see opportunity to dismantle 
and remake the world – economically, socially, culturally, and politically – when conditions at 
home had failed them. 
Two fundamental events shaped this trans-Atlantic consciousness situated toward 
revolution during the nineteenth century: the European Revolutions of 1848-51, and an 
increasingly radical anti-slavery and abolitionist movement in the United States during the lead-
up to sectional conflict and the Civil War. Both events sought to upend the established order 
through political, social, and cultural revolution, and both came to reinforce one another 
intellectually and strategically. Both revolutions sought to attack the existing systems – 
monarchy, capital, and the legal institutions that upheld slavery – and replace them, in the spirit 
of revolutions prior, with more egalitarian and liberal structures. Immigrants were often the 
main vehicles of this transnational cooperation. When it became clear to freedom fighters on 
both sides of the Atlantic that moral and political gradualism toward parliamentary, democratic 
 iii 
systems of governance, or toward anti-slavery and abolitionist movements, were to be 
ineffective, they would turn to markedly more radical approaches, and sometimes to violence to 
enact the changes they sought. 
This paper investigates these broad trends through the individuals who personally lived 
them. One such figure, August (Anshl) Mendel Bondi, was a German-speaking, Hungarian Jew 
who participated in the revolutionary events in Vienna. Upon the restoration of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy, Bondi would be forced to flee with his family to the United States. Forging a new life 
in his new home, he would variously spend time in Louisiana and Texas, and work as a 
waterman on the Mississippi River. Eventually he would settle in Kansas Territory, where he 
became radicalized and joined Free Soilers in their fight against pro-slavery forces and Missouri 
border ruffians. Riding with John Brown during the Bleeding Kansas episode would inspire Bondi 
to a lifetime of freedom fighting; he and his eventual wife, Henrietta Einstein, another German-
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All this belongs to the severe fundamental experience of our epoch that all 
history is at the same time tragedy. The essence of tragedy consists above all 
else in the fact that the divine and the demonic in man are indissolubly linked 
together.  
 
–Friedrich Meinecke, German Catastrophe1 
 
 
[A]nother party has risen up, namely the Republican party. It is against slavery … 
All the free-thinking men who were leaders in Germany, here they are also for 
the good cause[.] […] The immigrants can do a lot and they will continue to work 
for the good cause and those who wallow still in error they will [one day] wake 
up and say, Long live freedom[!]”  
 
–Martin Weitz, Personal Correspondence2 
 
 
This is one of the truths of speculative philosophy: that freedom is the only truth 
of Spirit. 
 
–G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History3 
 
 
But Circumstances are sometimes stronger than we are, General. 
 




1 Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections, trans. Sidney B. Fay 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950), 108. 
2 Martin Weitz, German-speaking immigrant to America, in correspondence written to his family in 
Schotten in the Vogelsberg region of Hesse. Weitz immigrated to Connecticut in 1854 for lack of economic 
opportunity in Hesse to take up work in a wool factory in the mill town of Rockville. He was among the 
first wave of foreign immigrants to work in the mills there. His letter is dated 13 November 1856 and 
references the Bleeding Kansas episode: “In Kansas it is therefore a time of much murder and other 
shameful things have happened.” In Walter D. Kamphoefner, Wolfgang Helbrich and Ulrike Sommer, eds., 
News from the Land of Freedom: German Immigrants Write Home, trans. Susan Carter Vogel (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), 335-8, 356-7. 
3G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to The Philosophy of History, trans. Leo Rauch (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1988), 20, Kindle. Writes Leo Rauch in the translator’s introduction: “History, for Hegel, is therefore a 
process of emancipation and enlightenment, with the aim of enabling us to construct a system of society 
wherein everyone can be regarded as free and autonomous, simply by virtue of being a person – 
conscious and rational.”  
4 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage 







The Transnational Currents of Revolution 
 
In The Water Dancer, a novel of speculative fiction on the self-liberation of America’s slaves, 
abolitionist freedom fighters, and the creation and workings of the Underground Railroad, Ta-
Nehisi Coates’s narrator Hiram Walker includes the following short reference to German 
revolutionaries and the training regimens they inspired: 
After supper, we would return to our barracks and change from our dinner garb 
to the uniform of the night – flannel shirt, elastic-bound trousers, and light 
canvas shoes. Then we would report for the first phase of our training. We ran 
for an hour every night, covering, by my estimation, six or seven miles. Mixed in 
with these miles were breaks for all manner of calisthenics – arm raises, leaning 
rests, hops, etc. And then after our run there was more – sideways lunges, leg 
lifts, knee bends, etc. The regimen was derived from the German ‘48ers, men 
who’d fought for liberty in their old country, and found common cause here in 
the Underground. Whatever their origins, they made me stronger.5 
 
It is an only the briefest of allusions, and the only time the word “German” appears in the 
entirety of the text of the novel. Yet it is significant to those who are interested in the 
transnational roots of abolitionism and freedom movements more broadly. Coates suggests 
here the common cause for which political revolutionaries fought in the great upheavals of 1848 
in Europe, and for which freedom fighters and abolitionists fought in the United States during 
the American Civil War. It hints at the transnational dimensions of an increasingly radical urge 
toward freedom and political self-determination across continents and spanning the Atlantic 
world. 
 
5 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Water Dance (New York: One World, 2019), 163. A very special thanks to Dr. Dana 
Herman at the American Jewish Archives in Cincinnati for suggesting both this novel and for 




 Until recently, the import of transnational freedom movements, especially that of 
transatlantic abolitionism, was largely understood to be an Anglo-American phenomenon. 
During the eighteenth, and early- and mid-nineteenth centuries, former slaves would regularly 
cross the Atlantic to lecture about their life experiences to English audiences, and the 
intellectual currents of emancipation were exchanged liberally between abolitionists in Britain 
and the United States.6 “By the 1850s,” writes Mischa Honeck, “the Anglo-American abolitionist 
network had been in place for more than a generation. Petitions, capital, lecturers, pamphlets, 
and fugitive slaves traversed the Anglophone Atlantic.”7 Yet these influences were not the sole 
purview of English-speaking intellectuals and activists alone. The impacts on antebellum 
American society through transnational intellectual networks from across the New World and 
the Old is palpable. These ranged from French-speaking Haiti and across the Spanish-speaking 
Americas, to German-speaking lands, and indeed across all of mainland Europe. Further, the 
transfer of the ideals of revolution were complex and multidirectional. A revolutionary rhetoric 
derived from the American and French revolutions would wash across Europe and the Americas 
in the early years of the nineteenth century, and having crested, wash back again to the places 
of their origins.8 Writes Jonathan Israel, “Both the American and French revolutions, and all the 
 
6 Olaudah Equiano and Frederick Douglass are but two examples of former slaves who shared their stories 
with English, Irish and Scottish audiences during this period. See Olaudah Equiano, The Life of Olaudah 
Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African, Written by Himself (Boston: Isaac Knapp, 1837). Also, Frederick 
Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass (Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, 
2006). 
7 Mischa Honeck, We are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants & American Abolitionists after 
1848 (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 2. 
8 As a starting point see again Mischa Honeck, We are the Revolutionists; Caitlin Fitz, Our Sister Republics: 
The United States in an Age of American Revolutions (New York: Liveright, 2016); Don Doyle, The Cause of 
All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 2015); and 
Timothy Mason Roberts, Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism 




other supposedly ‘national’ revolutions, were essentially tussles between rival democratic and 
aristocratic variants of a single Atlantic Revolution.”9 If indeed, as Israel argues, the political 
revolutions from the late-eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries are one revolution 
that spans nations across the Atlantic world, then it is the people themselves carrying the 
animating Enlightenment ideals, those contagions of revolution, who become the primary 
propellants of freedom. Newspapers, broadsheets and personal were clearly strong currency in 
the roots of these intellectual currents; but moreover, as political migrants traversed the 
networks of the Atlantic, so too did their ideas travel with them. 
Seen in this light, migrants take the center stage of the story. If the nineteenth century 
is a period of great social upheaval and mass migration, then the individuals who traversed the 
Atlantic world in all directions would come to define the transfer of revolutionary ideas, 
strategies and tactics from one country, and on one continent, to another. This diffusion of 
revolutionary practice across borders is what Richard Stites dubs the “cross-national elements 
[of] revolutions and the regimes they created or tried to create,” among them, the “common 
intellectual sources, similar practices, outright mimicry, parallel biographies, physical movement 
of revolutionaries from one struggle to another, and other interconnections.”10 Baker and 
Edelstein, meanwhile, give name to this idea, calling it the “script of revolution.” “Revolutions 
do not occur ex nihilo,” they maintain. “Revolutionaries are extremely self-conscious of (and 
often highly knowledgeable about) how previous revolutions unfolded. These revolutionary 
scripts offer frameworks for political action. Whether they serve as models or counterexamples, 
 
9 Jonathan Israel, The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775-1848 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 4. 
10 Richard Stites, The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe (Oxford: Oxford 




they provide the outlines on which revolutionary actors can improvise.”11 Revolutionary ideas in 
the early modern era may have largely spread by books, newspapers, broadsheets and 
pamphlets (and later in the nineteenth century, by telegraph), but it is the migrants, the 
peripatetic revolutionaries themselves, who are the living embodiment of the ideals for which 
they fought. One considers some of the more famous examples. These were revolutionaries like 
the Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi, who honed his guerilla military strategies in the Latin American 
revolutions of the 1820s-30s before returning to his homeland to join in the pursuit of Italian 
unification during the European revolutions of 1848.12 Or Tadeusz Kościuszko, the Polish 
freedom fighter of the eighteenth century, who, along with the Marquis de Lafayette, would 
become among the most celebrated foreign military leaders for their contributions to the 
American Revolution. Decades later, Simón Bolívar would be heralded in the United States for 
his role in Colombian independence, and in the minds of many Americans, for spreading the 
ideals of the American Revolution onto a new, Southern American continent.13 Lajos Kossuth, 
the Hungarian statesman and freedom fighter (and contemporary of Garibaldi’s), would tour 
prominently in the United States and Britain in the 1840s-50s, sharing his vision for a free and 
democratic Europe, and in the process, earning the admiration of such mid-century American 
 
11 Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein, “Introduction,” in Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to 
the Comparative Study of Revolutions, 1-24, ed. Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2015), 2, ProQuest Ebook Central. 
12 Lucy Riall credits Garibaldi with importing the idea of a citizens’ volunteer army from Latin America back 
to Europe, a military tactic that would be put to use in defense of the Roman Republic against an invading 
French army in 1849. Lucy Riall, Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation State (London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 20-5. 
13 Perhaps most interestingly, Caitlin Fitz tracks and documents the names given to children in the United 
States in the early nineteenth century; from this data, an explosion of babies named “Bolivar” can be 
observed. See Liz Covart, host, “Episode 090: Caitlin Fitz, Age of American Revolutions,” Ben Franklin’s 





luminaries as William Lloyd Garrison, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
Horace Greeley, and Abraham Lincoln.14 These celebrated generals and politicians were certainly 
the face of liberal and transnational revolutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Less 
famous individuals – indeed, even entirely obscure ones, men and women both – are much less 
celebrated (if celebrated at all), but their contributions to liberal revolution in this era are no 
less relevant. To be sure, not all migrants were politically active, and of those who were, 
perhaps only a plurality held radical political views.15 But the political milieu across the Atlantic 
World at mid-century – following decades of revolution and independence in the Americas, and 
equally long periods of political upheaval, rebellion and insurrection in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic Wars – would come to instill a certain mentalité among the travelers. Thus, we see 
that immigrants from Europe to North America at the mid-nineteenth century carried with them 
more than the typical linguistic and cultural artifacts; propelled by intellectual currents in their 
countries of origin, they often brought with them a sensibility of revolution, radical republican 
politics, and a moral suasion that they employed as they navigated the political and social 
realities in their new homes. Many immigrants would come to view America and the New World 
generally through a prism of their own making, and thus see opportunity to dismantle and 
 
14 See, for example, “Address of Ambassador Geza Jeszenszky on the 150th Anniversary of the Visit to 
America by Hungarian Democratic Leader Lajos Kossuth,” Congressional Record, Volume 148, no. 59 (May 
10, 2002), accessed April 2, 2021, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2002-05-10/html/CREC-
2002-05-10-pt1-PgE771.htm/.  
15 Indeed, some of those radical views may have been decidedly illiberal. As we shall see, the sectional 
conflict in the United States increasingly pitted pro-freedom and pro-slavery immigrants against one 
another. August Bondi would become at great odds with one of his pros-slavery, German-speaking settler 
neighbors on Ottawa Creek in Kansas Territory, who was known as “Dutch Henry” Sherman. Infamously, 
John Brown and his sons would slay Sherman’s brother, William “Dutch Bill” Sherman, at the 
Pottawatomie Massacre. See Christopher Rein, "Pottawatomie Massacre," Civil War on the Western 
Border: The Missouri-Kansas Conflict, 1854-1865, The Kansas City Public Library, accessed Friday, April 9, 




remake the world – economically, socially, culturally, and politically – when conditions at home 
had failed them.16 
Surely this progression of liberal revolution was shaped by centuries of political thought 
and practice, as the migrants and revolutionaries of the Atlantic world were clearly not acting 
within a vacuum. As we shall see in Chapter Two, by the time of the Age of Revolution, the 
intellectual currents of freedom had been evolving in the Western world since at least late 
Antiquity. It is a decidedly modern outlook that allowed humans to view themselves as 
protagonists in a larger struggle against the status quo. In this way, few aspects of modernity are 
as important as the changing conception of humanity’s place in the Cosmos, and particularly 
toward an all-powerful God. Considering such questions vexed philosophers of the early 
Enlightenment. Questions of determinism, freedom and human agency loomed especially large. 
This was not the first generation to consider such topics. As we shall see, Augustine, Luther, 
Erasmus and others had interrogated what human freedom meant in a world that was variously 
ideal and determined on the one hand, or chaotic and free on the other. Immanuel Kant, when 
faced with a growing reliance on scientific certitude, posited that faith and science should not 
intermingle. He famously wrote: “Our faith is not scientific knowledge, and thank heaven it is 
not! […] Suppose we could attain scientific knowledge of God’s existence … all our morality 
would break down.”17 In what sense, Kant asks, can humans make moral decisions if their world, 
as organized by God, is already in its ideal state? Lacking free will, how can humans deign to 
 
16 See, for example, Karen Odahl Kupperman, “Introduction: The Changing Definition of America” in 
America in European Consciousness, 1493-1750, ed. Karen Ordahl Kupperman (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1995), 19-20. 
17 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology, trans. Allen W. Ward and Gertrude M. Katz (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986). As quoted in Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative 




challenge the status quo? If belief in an omnipotent God requires that humans accept the world 
as it is, then what good is engaging in speculative and normative ethics at all? How are questions 
of good and evil, or justice and injustice, or of human freedom and bondage even valid?18 
However intellectuals of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries set 
about answering these questions, what is clear is that their answers led increasingly toward an 
expanding conception of political freedom, and of universal emancipation. Among the 
intellectual currents of freedom, the American and French Revolutions loom especially large as 
formative events. But while these revolutions did much to promulgate revolutionary rhetoric in 
the years that followed them – indeed, most scholars consider these two revolutions as the 
those which ignited the so-called Age of Revolution – these revolutions were not of themselves 
concerned with freedom for all. Both events emerged in a political milieu across the Atlantic 
world that gave precedence to a select group of elites – namely the landed gentry and 
bourgeoise – at the expense of slaves, indentured servants, women, poor yeoman farmers, and 
immigrants. But both revolutions also framed their individual rhetorics of freedom within an 
embrace of universalism, in large part for the legitimacy that such principles would provide their 
cause. Perhaps not surprisingly, the rhetoric of universalist freedom also gradually came to 
include expanded rights for all people.19 Later revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century would 
take on an increasingly social tone. The seeds of abolition, the emancipation of slaves and serfs, 
of universal suffrage, and of feminism and civil rights had been sown.  
 
18 This section draws in part on Susan Neiman’s thinking about Kant’s ethics. See Susan Neiman, Evil in 
Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 57-
84. 
19 This encompasses at least rights for all citizens. Hannah Arendt argues that refugees, the stateless, of 
the twentieth century are the last group of humans to have not been granted rights of any kind. “The 
world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.” Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 




Thus, besides the American and French Revolutions, two other fundamental events 
specifically shaped this transatlantic consciousness situated toward freedom in the mid-
nineteenth century: the European Revolutions of 1848-51, and an increasingly radical anti-
slavery and abolitionist movement in the United States during the lead-up to sectional conflict 
and the American Civil War.20 Both of these sought to upend the established order through 
political, social and cultural revolution, and, espousing a certain universalism in their rhetoric, 
both came to reinforce one another intellectually and strategically. Both revolutions sought to 
attack the existing systems – monarchy, capital, and the legal institutions that upheld slavery – 
and replace them, in the spirit of revolutions prior, with more egalitarian and liberal structures. 
When it became clear to freedom fighters on both sides of the Atlantic that moral and political 
gradualism toward parliamentary, democratic systems of governance, or toward anti-slavery 
and abolitionist movements, were to be ineffective, they would turn then to markedly more 
radical approaches, and sometimes even to violence to enact the changes they sought.  
This thesis will look particularly at the German-speaking revolutionaries who were 
veterans of the revolutionary struggles of 1848, the so-called “forty-eighters,” who 
demonstrated an outsize role in their capacity to influence nineteenth century American 
abolitionism, and nineteenth century American political culture more broadly. The biography of 
one such immigrant, August (Anshl) Mendel Bondi (1833-1907), a German-speaking, Hungarian 
Jew who witnessed firsthand as a student the revolutionary events in Vienna, will serve as a 
vehicle for exploring these transnational currents of revolution. Bondi makes only semi-regular 
 
20 1848 as a revolutionary event becomes especially important for understanding the immense social, 
political and cultural changes that were underway in the nineteenth century. It straddles the divide 
between the early political revolutions of 1776 and 1789 and the social, communist, and democratic 




and fleeting appearances in the literature on 1848. Yet his is clearly a fascinating and compelling 
life story, and one worth exploring in more detail. After the barricades fell, upon the restoration 
of the Hapsburg monarchy in Vienna, Bondi would be forced to flee from his homeland with his 
family to the United States on a New Orleans-bound sailing ship, Rebecca, in September 1848. 
He and his family would settle initially in Saint Louis, a burgeoning frontier city and a bastion for 
German-speaking immigrants. A young man, inspired by the revolutionary events in Europe, 
politically engaged and determined, but lacking a clear direction for his life in a new country, 
Bondi, like many fellow immigrants, would move itinerantly from place to place around his new 
home in the southern United States. He sought employment and found it variously, first as a 
store clerk, errand boy, and saloon keeper in Missouri, and later as a waterman on the 
Mississippi River and along the southern coast of the Gulf of Mexico. Perhaps also like other 
young migrants, Bondi had about him a certain romantic streak. In 1851, seeking a return to 
revolutionary agitation, he volunteered with a local division in Saint Louis and declared to fight 
for the liberation of Cuba, though the group later disbanded before they could even depart the 
United States for the Caribbean. Next, the promise of signing on as a seaman aboard 
Commodore Matthew Perry’s expedition to Japan in 1853 drew him from Saint Louis back to 
New Orleans; but having found that enlistment rosters for the voyage had filled, he instead 
signed on as a clerk and translator on a commercial Texas-based steamship, The Brazos. His 
parents would ultimately settle in Louisville, Kentucky; but after returning from Galveston to 
Saint Louis, Bondi would be compelled to move again to the Kansas Territory, in no small part 
for its promise of land and opportunity. But more than these, Bondi professes that he was 
animated by an urge to fight for the cause of freedom. Heeding a call in the New York Tribune 




slavery,” is how Bondi’s own narrative about what ultimately drew him to Kansas Territory is 
framed.21 To be a new arrival in Kansas in the 1850s meant being at the epicenter of a growing 
American sectional crisis that violently pitted Free Soilers against pro-slavery forces. In an 
autobiographical manuscript written many years later toward the end of his life, Bondi would 
ascribe the formative impacts that both Judaism and of the legacy of his father, Herz Emmanuel, 
a Freemason interested in equality among all men, would have on him. “Even as a child,” Bondi 
writes, “I decided to dedicate my life to the ideals of progress and freedom. I never deviated 
from this decision during the course of my long life, a life rich in stormy events. I have remained 
faithful to the principles that I swore to uphold during the stormy days of the 1848 revolution.”22 
These are perhaps the words of man, at life’s end, concerned primarily with his legacy. 
But narrative matters; the very way one shapes the main events of one’s life to create a 
coherent pattern of meaning can illuminate as much as it can conceal. Whether or not Bondi 
was an abolitionist from the first, what is clear is that he was hugely inspired by his time as a 
student fighting on the barricades against Metternich’s imperial forces in Vienna. And however 
it was that he restlessly came to the decision to move once again to stake a claim in Kansas 
Territory, Bondi would be drawn into radical circles and would come to take up arms, to fight 
and to risk death, for the cause of abolition. Bondi and other German-speaking and Jewish 
immigrants in Kansas would join under John Brown’s banner of radical emancipation and would 
thus come to draw and shed blood in the first violent struggles of the Bleeding Kansas episode, 
that which served as the prelude to the American Civil War.  
 
21 August M. Bondi, Autobiography of August Bondi, 1833-1907, ed. Amanda M. Dooley (Galesburg, 
Illinois: Wagoner Print Co., 1910), 33. 
22 August M. Bondi, “Personal Reminiscences of August Bondi,” from August Bondi papers, 1883-1906, P-




This paper will argue that the political effects of 1848 were wide-reaching, and that the 
intellectual currents of revolution on one continent, in one place, would come to have great 
influence upon revolutionary events in another. It is through the stories of the revolutionaries 
themselves – the personal, lived experiences of men and women like August Bondi – where 
understanding these impacts is at its most compelling. 
 
Literature Review, Historiography, and Definitions 
In other sections of this paper, I will discuss in more detail the specific aspects of 
historiography associated with the topics of the 1848 European revolutions, antebellum 
abolitionism in the United States, and the experiences of German-speaking and German-Jewish 
migrants during this period, including, of course, those of August Bondi. For our purposes now, I 
wish to situate my research in the growing areas of Atlantic studies focused on transnational 
revolution, along with the circulation of migrants and of ideas (i.e., the migratory and 
intellectual currents), that formed the bases of transnational freedom movements. Perhaps the 
most important of these is Jonathan Israel’s enormous output of scholarship on the topic of, as 
he terms it, Radical Enlightenment. Israel dedicated much of his life’s work to this concept, and a 
trilogy of monographs and several thousand pages constitute the backbone of his study. I 
borrow liberally from Israel’s ideas, and to a limited extent, from the critical response to it. I 
largely draw on two of Israel’s books, The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited 
the World, and A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of 
Democracy, though others have been helpful to me as well.23 
 
23 Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern 




A collection of essays specifically addressing some of the national contexts of the 
question of revolution and freedom was also extremely formative to my developing ideas. This 
was Isser Woloch’s excellent volume, Revolution and the Meanings of Freedom in the 
Nineteenth Century. Especially useful in this collection were John M. Merriman’s essay, 
“Contested Versions of the French Revolution, 1830-1871,” James J. Sheehan’s essay, “The 
German States and the European Revolution,” István Deák’s essay, “Lawful Revolutions and the 
Many Meanings of Freedom in the Hapsburg Monarchy,” and Woloch’s own contribution to the 
collection, “The Ambiguities of Revolution in the Nineteenth Century.”24 
Several additional texts also informed my understanding of the transnational 
connections of political movements across the Atlantic World in the nineteenth century. The 
aforementioned Richard Stites monograph, The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-
Napoleonic Europe, helped define my own approach to the writing of transnational histories of 
freedom in the nineteenth century.25 Caitlin Fitz draws on the work of previous scholars, but I 
learned much from her book on the international history of the early Republic, Our Sister 
Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolution.26  Especially influential to Fitz 
 
American Revolution Ignited the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). Revolution of the 
Mind is a shorter volume (of only 276 pages) dedicated to succinctly summarizing his thesis on Radical 
Enlightenment; The Expanding Blaze, on the other hand, is a tome (775 pages) dealing with the 
transnational elements of the American Revolution. Other titles include Radical Enlightenment: 
Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); 
Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation of Man (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006); and Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights, 1750-1790 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For an excellent collection of essays responding to Israel and 
positioning his ideas against the German Aufklärung, see Carl Niekerk, ed., The Radical Enlightenment in 
Germany (Leiden: Brill Rodopi, 2018). 
24 All essays cited are included in Isser Woloch, ed., Revolution and the Meanings of Freedom in the 
Nineteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 
25 Richard Stites, The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 





seems to have been James E. Sanders’ The Vanguard of the Atlantic World: Creating Modernity, 
Nation, and Democracy in Nineteenth-Century Latin America and R.R. Palmer’s The Age of 
Democratic Revolution. Palmer’s scholarship was also quite illuminating for me in its treatment 
of the entanglements between American, French and Polish revolutionaries, and the further 
connections to democratic movements in places like Holland, England and Ireland.27 Similar in 
scope, but looking specifically at the mid-nineteenth century revolutions, Timothy Mason 
Robert’s excellent book, Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American 
Exceptionalism traces the American public’s encounters with European revolution, and the 
subsequent grappling with what it meant for the United States, steeped in the rhetoric of liberal 
revolution and rhetorical egalitarianism, to become a colonizing, imperial world power.28 Other 
important works about global, comparative and transnational contexts for revolution were two 
excellent collections of essays: David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s The Age of 
Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840 and Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein’s 
Scripting Revolution: An Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions.29 
Don Doyle’s book, The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American 
Civil War, was exceedingly helpful to me at the very earliest stages of planning my thesis, 
especially in its presentation of the diplomatic history of the American Civil War within a 
 
27 James E. Sanders, The Vanguard of the Atlantic World: Creating Modernity, Nation, and Democracy in 
Nineteenth-Century Latin America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014). R.R. Palmer, The Age of 
Democratic Revolution, 1760-1800, Updated Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
28 Timothy Mason Roberts, Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), ProQuest Ebook Central. Roberts and others point to 
the centrality of the Mexican-American War in this transition of the United States from republican to 
imperial modes. 
29 David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein, eds. Scripting Revolution: A 
Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 




distinctly international frame.30 Moreover, Professor Doyle was very generous with his time and 
correspondence about my topic. Speaking broadly, Doyle is interested in the personal 
experiences of those who lived through the tumultuous mid-century events on both sides of the 
Atlantic – and how they, as individuals, viewed the international affairs of the day. He argues 
that most historians approach the American Civil War through a decidedly national lens, 
whereas the people who lived through the sectional conflict were aware of its import in broader 
terms and thus approached it as part of the wider political events that were transpiring in 
European capitals simultaneous to the military events on American battlefields. The goal is not 
to “uncover some novel new view of our past,” he advises, but to “recover… the common 
experience of [historical] actors at the time.”31 If this is the goal, then Europeans observing and 
writing about Americans, and Americans observing and writing about Europeans, becomes 
incredibly useful for understanding the cross-national currents of revolution and abolitionism. 
Thus, turning to Karl Marx and his correspondence and newspaper columns about the American 
Civil War, or Heinrich Heine and his musings on American freedom; or conversely, reading what 
American newspapers, like Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune, had to say about the 
revolutionary events in Europe, become incredibly useful tools for this approach.32 
Specific studies relating to the experiences of German, German-speaking, and German-
Jewish migrants during this time period were all extremely formative. Identity of the migrants 
becomes an increasingly important theme: how the migrants viewed themselves as they crossed 
 
30 Don H. Doyle, The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War (New York: 
Basic Books, 2017). 
31 Personal email correspondence, Don Doyle to Matthew Long, May 17, 2020. My emphasis added. 
32 For just one example, see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Civil War in the U.S. (New York: 
International Publishers, 1971). The book contains most of their writing on the topic, much of which 





national boundaries and established new lives within new ethnic communities clearly 
conditioned their expression of political and social ideologies. Among the most useful of these 
books, I count Bruce Levine’s The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the 
Coming of the Civil War;  Alison Clark Efford’s German Immigrants, Race and Citizenship in the 
Civil War Era; Mischa Honeck’s We are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants and 
American Abolitionists after 1848; Andrea Mehrländer’s The Germans of Charleston, Richmond 
and New Orleans during the Civil War Period, 1850-1870; and Charlotte Lang Brancaforte’s 
edited collection of essays, The German Forty-Eighters in the United States. Other titles in this 
vein include Susannah J. Ural’s edited collection of essays, Civil War Citizens: Race, Ethnicity, and 
Identity in America’s Bloodiest Conflict.33Also extremely elucidating was general scholarship on 
European migration during this period, including Bade and Oltmer’s article “Germany,” in the 
Encyclopedia on Migration and Minorities in Europe from the 17th Century to the Present.34 
On the general nineteenth century intellectual milieu, I found most useful Hayden 
White’s Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, and John J.W. 
Burrow’s The Crisis of European Thought, 1848-1914.35 In Chapter Two, I will explore in great 
detail the intellectual history of the rhetoric of freedom at its intersection with liberal revolution 
 
33 Bruce Levine, The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992); Alison Clark Efford, German Immigrants, Race and Citizenship 
in the Civil War Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Mischa Honeck, We are the 
Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants and American Abolitionists after 1848 (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 2011); Andrea Mehrländer, The Germans of Charleston, Richmond and New Orleans during 
the Civil War Period,1850-1870 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011); Charlotte Lang Brancaforte, The German Forty-
Eighters in the United States (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); Susannah J. Ural, ed. Civil War Citizens: Race, 
Ethnicity, and Identity in America’s Bloodiest Conflict (New York: New York University Press, 2010). 
34 Klaus J. Bade and Jochen Oltmer, “Germany,” in The Encyclopedia of Migration and Minorities in Europe 
from the 17th Century to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
35 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). J.W. Burrow, The Crisis of European Thought, 1848-1914 (New 




and will cite much specific scholarship on these topics. But especially helpful to my organizing 
my thoughts on this topic were several works from Hannah Arendt, including her essay “What is 
Freedom?” and her monographs The Life of the Mind and On Revolution.36 Equally instructive 
was F.A. Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty.37 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define some of the more salient terms and topics 
with which I will engage and explore in my study. Among them: 
Liberal revolution – the liberal revolutionary tradition is one that spans centuries, 
having its roots in early modernity and finding expression in the English, American, and French 
Revolutions, and those which followed in the nineteenth century. It is that which focuses on the 
establishment of constitutions, and on an expansion of the franchise, and certain other political 
and economic rights for particular groups of individuals, namely a rising bourgeoise. 
Radical Enlightenment – As discussed, I borrow from Jonathan Israel on this topic. 
Radical Enlightenment is distinct from more moderate versions of Enlightenment and focuses on 
the universal application of rights and political engagement through representative government 
and enfranchisement for all humans, regardless of gender, race, ethnicity or background.38 
Freedom – As we shall see amply demonstrated in Chapter Two of this study, many 
philosophers and intellectual historians have approached the topic of human freedom, and 
delivered, through their pursuits, multitudinous definitions of the term. My own definition will 
 
36 Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom,” in Between Past and Future, 143-71 (New York: Penguin, 1968); On 
Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); The Life of the Mind, One-volume edition (San Diego: 
Harcourt, Inc., 1978). 
37 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition, ed. Ronald Hamowy (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2011), ProQuest Ebook Central. 




remain simple: freedom for the individual is the absence of coercion from other individuals, or 
groups of individuals. 
Political freedom – is the freedom I will primarily be considering in this study, especially 
as practiced in the liberal revolutionary tradition. The practice of political freedom is largely 
concerned with removing the barriers of coercion from a central state or other political 
authority. Civil rights, broadly, fall within this realm; but so too do the freedoms articulated by 
the liberal revolutionary tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: freedoms of 
assembly, association, movement and speech, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, 
freedom of the franchise to choose a representative government, etc. 
Transnational freedom movements – are those concerned with the expansion of 
political freedom within a universalist construct, the expression of which focuses on the transfer 
of revolutionary rhetoric, ideas, strategies and tactics from one state or geographic region to 
another. Within my study, this will largely focus on the transatlantic dimensions of the transfer 
of ideas on freedom stemming from the American and French Revolutions and their expansion 
in the following century to all corners of the Atlantic world and beyond. 
Slavery – is the physical and economic coercion of one individual, or group of 
individuals, over another individual, or group of individuals, such that the more powerful, or 
paternalistic, in the hierarchy is the sole or majority beneficiary of the arrangement. This might 
be differentiated, for example, from relationships between parent and child.39 
 
39 This definition borrows in part from Jeffrey Stout. See, for example, from among his Gifford Lectures at 
the University of Edinburgh, “Lecture 4: Abolitionism, Political Religion, and Secularism,” The Gifford 





Radical abolitionism – is the increasingly robust response of the anti-slavery movement 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as when policies of gradualism and reform failed to 
overturn the institutions of slavery and the movement began to embrace more extreme 
measures, including violence, to enact their goals. 
 
Thesis Framework and Outline 
This thesis is broken broadly into three distinct, but complementary sections. Chapter 
One will further introduce these topics by providing the historical context for the events of 1848 
and describe how revolutionary patterns in Europe came to influence and mirror a sectional 
conflict situated toward political emancipation and radical abolitionism in the United States. Of 
particular interest will be the historiography of revolution across the long nineteenth century, 
and the role that migrants played generally in expanding the revolutionary flames across 
borders, over the Atlantic, and around the world. Also of extreme interest is the development of 
new categories of Americans, and the enormous role that migrants played in the formation of a 
new, larger, and pluralistic American identity. In this respect, I will focus largely on the 
development and social impacts of the German-American community at mid-century. Chapter 
Two will explore in detail the life of August Bondi, using his biography as expressed through his 
personal papers and correspondence as a vehicle for exploring, in particular, the topic of 
freedom at the nexus of migration and transnational liberation movements. I will look 
specifically at Bondi’s character development through his evolving political ideology, and 
describe how his background, revolutionary politics, and Jewish faith came to align him with 
those of radical abolitionists and freedom fighters in the United States. If the biographies of 




becomes important next to understand the intellectual rhetoric that inspired the revolutionaries 
to fight in the first place. Chapter Three will therefore attempt to situate and analyze the 
intellectual currents of freedom during the long nineteenth century within a larger historical and 
intellectual framework. By so doing, I wish to explore the important ideas of freedom within the 
Western philosophical tradition by connecting them to the practice of freedom, that is, to the 
wider arc of political emancipation that began in the early modern era and continues in liberal 
and democratic revolutions that span from the eighteenth century through to the current day.40 
Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts which will serve to integrate these ideas into a 
satisfactory whole, and if successful, to tie these ideas to our current political moment in the 
twenty-first century. From our vantage today, it is increasingly evident that freedom is no less a 
salient topic of political discourse than it was for the revolutionaries who fought in freedom’s 
pursuit two centuries ago. 
  
 
40 These revolutions are part of a long tradition that span from the English Revolution in the seventeenth 
century, to the American and French revolutions in the eighteenth, to the Latin American and European 
revolutions of the nineteenth, to the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in the late twentieth, and 





1848 IN A WIDER CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
De Tocqueville’s Volcano: Europe at the Precipice 
In late January 1848, mere weeks before revolution would spasm and flare across the 
European continent, Alexis de Tocqueville was making something of a stir.41 Amidst the general 
unease that had greeted the New Year, de Tocqueville rose to give a speech in the Chamber of 
Deputies, the lower house of the French Parliament and major deliberative body during the 
Bourbon Restoration and July Monarchy. This speech delivered to his colleagues – the vast 
majority of whom were members of the landed gentry and thus had the right to vote and hold 
office – proved so incredibly prescient, so compelling, and so rancorous in its reception that he 
would ultimately decide to append it, in its entirety, to the thirteenth edition of his magnum 
opus, Democracy in America, in 1850.42 Writing ex post facto in his memoir, Souvenirs, de 
Tocqueville describes the French milieu of early 1848: “The country was at the time divided … 
into two unequal zones; in the upper one, which was meant to contain the entire political life of 
the nation, languor, impotence, immobility and boredom reigned; but in the lower one, an 
attentive observer could easily see from certain feverish and irregular symptoms that political 
life was beginning to find expression.”43  
 
41 There are some inconsistencies with the actual date of the speech. In his memoir, Souvenirs, de 
Tocqueville recalls giving the speech on 29 January, and quite a few historians accept this date. But Mayer 
and Kerr assert that he actually delivered it on 27 January given its publication the next day in Le 
Moniteur, the official public organ of the July Monarchy. Alexis de Tocqueville, Recollections, trans. 
George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer and A.P. Kerr (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1970), 13. 
42 Ibid., 15. 




Within a preparatory pamphlet he had penned during the days prior, and once again 
during the speech proper, de Tocqueville offered a severe warning to his colleagues, first about 
the unrest that was then fomenting among the working classes, but second, about the growing 
corruption, dysfunction, and torpor that had settled in among the ruling elites. His conclusions 
are worth quoting at length: 
  
The time is coming when the country will again be divided between two great 
parties. […] Soon the political struggle will be between the Haves and the Have-
nots; property will be the great battlefield; and the main political questions will 
turn on the more or less profound modifications of the rights of property 
owners that are to be made. […]  
 
Why is everybody not struck by the signs that are the harbingers of this future? 
Do you think it is by chance, or by some passing caprice of the human spirit, that 
on every side we see strange doctrines appearing which have different names, 
but which all deny the right of property or, at least, tend to limit, diminish or 
weaken the exercise of that right? Who can fail to recognize in this the last 
symptom of the old democratic disease of the times, whose crisis is perhaps 
approaching?44 
 
As de Tocqueville’s speech progressed, his tenor would become more dire, and his warnings 
more precisely pronounced: 
It is said there is no danger because there is no riot, and that because there is no 
visible disorder on the surface of society, we are far from revolution. 
Gentlemen, allow me to say that you are mistaken. True, there is no actual 
disorder, but disorder has penetrated far into men’s minds. […]  
 
[D]o you not see that their passions have changed from political to social? Do 
you not see that opinions and ideas are gradually spreading among them that 
tend not simply to the overthrow of [certain] laws, a [certain] minister, or even 
a [certain] government, but rather to the overthrow of society, breaking down 
the bases on which it now rests? Do you not hear what is being said every day 
among them? Do you not hear them constantly repeating that all the people 
above them are incapable and unworthy to rule them? […]  
 
 




Gentlemen, my profound conviction is that we are [sleeping] over an active 
volcano. […] [S]ooner or later (I do not know when or whence) this ill will bring 
into the land revolutions of the utmost seriousness: be assured that that is so.45 
 
De Tocqueville’s warning to his countrymen was not entirely unique. Among his 
contemporaries, others had also witnessed and commented on similar harbingers of the events 
that would unfold and which would come to define the year 1848 across Europe.46 However 
justified he may have felt after the fact, even de Tocqueville himself would concede that his was 
not a completely clear-eyed vision of the future. “No, I did not expect such a revolution as we 
were going to have; who could have expected it? I think I did see clearer than the next man the 
general causes that tilted the July Monarchy toward its ruin. But I did not see the accidents that 
were to topple it over. However, the days that still separated us from catastrophe slipped away 
fast.”47 As he spoke in the Chamber of Deputies, de Tocqueville’s volcano was in fact beginning 
to enter the earliest stages of activity that would culminate in enormous conflagration and 
catastrophe. Within weeks of his speech, seemingly incidental protest and tobacco riots in Milan 
would soon be followed by active revolution in Paris. The revolutionary fire, once sparked in 
France – and spurred in intense waves by a trifecta of new technologies of locomotive, 
 
45 Ibid., 13-4. Emphasis is mine. It is telling that de Tocqueville stresses the import of the sea change from 
political to social revolution. The “strange” new “doctrines” appearing “on every side,” are notable; a 
mere few weeks later, in late February 1848, Marx and Engel’s Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (The 
Communist Manifesto) would be published in London. It signifies a shift from the liberal bourgeois 
revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that largely benefited 
property-owning elites, from those of the social and communist revolutions that would occur after. 
Thanks also to Mike Duncan for introducing de Tocqueville’s speech to me. See Mike Duncan, host, “The 
Volcano,” Revolutions (podcast), July 16, 2017, accessed April 22, 2020, 
https://www.revolutionspodcast.com/2017/07/701-the-volcano.html/. 
46 Citing the recollections of Rémusat, Mayer and Kerr posit, “Tocqueville was not the only one to foresee 
the dangers for the régime in the climate of opinion prevalent among the underprivileged classes of 
French society.” De Tocqueville, Recollections, 16. Posits Mike Rapport: “Many of those who would 
participate in the events of 1848 awoke to the New Year with a nagging sense of foreboding.” Mike 
Rapport, 1848: Year of Revolution (New York: Basic Book, 2008). 42. 




steamship and telegraph – would not wane until it had spread to Vienna, Berlin, Frankfurt, 
Budapest, Bucharest, Krakow and Prague48. Not even Ireland, Denmark, Norway or the Low 
Countries were spared the political unrest which culminated in these mid-century challenges to 
absolutist monarchy and the existing social and political orders. 49 Seemingly an entire continent 
had become engulfed in what would be assigned by historians the next in a long series of liberal, 
political and social revolutions that spanned from 1776 to the twentieth century. Further, 
historians would imbue 1848 with equal import as an era of intense nationalism, a so-called 
“Springtime of [the] Peoples,” and an age of “national reawakening” and rebirth.50 
 
48 See, for example, Mike Rapport, “Chapter 2: The Collapse,” in 1848, 42-111. Rapport argues for the 
importance of the industrial revolution, in tandem with political revolution, in helping to engulf a 
continent in political upheaval. “Word of the February days spread like a dynamic pulse and electrified 
Europe, hasted by the wonders of the modern world: railway, steamboat and telegraph.” Quote appears 
on p. 57. 
49 Of the major, midcentury powers, perhaps only the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire would be 
spared from the convulsions of revolution, and for two diametrically opposing reasons. The British 
Parliament’s Reform Act of 1832 played an important role in helping curtail revolutionary forces by 
granting some liberal protections and offering constitutional reform; whereas in the Russian Empire, the 
singularly heavy hand of repression during Nicholas I’s reign squashed any political dissent before it might 
have taken root. Of Nicholas I prior to Russia’s invasion of Hungary, writes de Tocqueville: “Until then the 
Emperor Nicholas had stayed calm in his undisputed might. He had seen the agitation of nations from 
afar, secure but not indifferent. He alone of all the powerful governments represented the old society and 
the ancient traditional principle of authority in Europe. He was not only the representative but considered 
himself the champion of it. His political theories, religious beliefs, ambition and conscience equally urged 
him to play his part. He had therefore turned the cause of authority in the world into a sort of second 
empire even vaster than the first, encouraging by his letters and rewarding by his decorations all those 
who, in whatsoever corner of Europe, won victories over anarchy or even over liberty, as if they were his 
subjects and had helped to assure his own power.” De Tocqueville, Recollections, 237. See also Mike 
Duncan, host, “The Volcano,” Revolutions (podcast), July 16, 2017, accessed April 22, 2020, 
https://www.revolutionspodcast.com/2017/07/701-the-volcano.html/. 
50 See Mike Rapport, 1848, ix-x. Jonathan Sperber, meanwhile, cites Czech writer Karel Havliček’s 1846 
definition of nationalism, which Sperber maintains was widely accepted on the eve of revolution: “A 
people or nation means, in the purest and most ideal sense, a substantial proportion of the human race 
who share a common descent, possess their own particular language, form a distinct community (a state), 
adhere to a particular religion and are clearly differentiated by particular characteristics and customs from 
other nations.” Sperber argues convincingly that this project of nationalism drew upon a bucolic and 
pastoral sense of a nation that was grounded in the hardworking values of “the people,” especially those 
most tied to the land and its soil, the rural peasants. Yet it would be the largely urban, educated 
intellectual and professional classes who would advance these ideas of the nation, and who would be the 




 The historiography of revolution has long considered 1848 an important, if largely 
fruitless year in this progression of liberal and social revolutionary development. The failures of 
revolution – what the revolutionaries could not achieve immediately in terms of democratic and 
constitutional republican reforms, and the nearly universal restoration of the monarchy in all 
those places where its governments had initially fallen to the liberal and radical opposition – 
have been emphasized by historians and the revolutionaries themselves from almost the first. 
De Tocqueville set an early, wavering tone not long after the events of February 1848. Hindsight 
allows us to see his position as one of ambivalence and moderation: he both admired the 
American republican model and, seeing it as the future for France – indeed for all of Europe – he 
sought political reform to the existing system of King Louis Philippe’s government.51 Unlike the 
socialists and radicals, he did not wish to overthrow the monarch but was instead in favor of a 
gradualist approach that might end with a more liberal, constitutional monarchy.52 His 
 
1851, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 89-92, 99. Compare Havliček’s 
positivist conception with a mid-twentieth century interpretation of the historiography of nationalism, 
epitomized by Benedict Anderson’s thesis that all nations are Imagined Communities. Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006). For a 
similar construct, see also Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 
1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 96-101. Weber maintains that France’s 
peasants had to be convinced to discard regional loyalties and to accept the myth of an overarching 
French national identity. 
51 Jeremy Jennings summarizes, having just experienced a relatively peaceful revolution in 1830, de 
Tocqueville is now convinced that democracy is the future for France and for Europe: “The movement 
toward democracy is now unstoppable, it is a providential fact. It will come – not necessarily in the 
American form – but it will come.” Thus, de Tocqueville’s interest in America as a test case: a growing, 
pluralistic and republican society, deeply divided and marked by incredible inequality, and which may 
offer a hint at France’s future. See Melvyn Bragg, host, “Tocqueville: Democracy in America,” In Our Time 
(podcast), BBC4, March 22, 2018, accessed April 30, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09vyw0x/. 
52 De Tocqueville’s study of American democracy made him a proponent of the American model in the 
early nineteenth century, notwithstanding his reservations about the institution of slavery. Robert Tombs 
argues that de Tocqueville embraced a progressive interpretation of history, and that “equality and 
democracy on the American pattern was the inevitable future.” On de Tocqueville’s ambivalence, James J. 
Sheehan posits that overt optimism was not natural to him: “Tocqueville was deeply ambivalent about 




aspirations were therefore neither radical nor anarchist. Writing in 1850 as the tide had begun 
to shift from the early successes of the revolutionaries to those in the absolutist-legitimist and 
monarchist camps, de Tocqueville recalled, “We had won, but, as I expected, our real difficulties 
were now to appear. I had, moreover, always held to the maxim that it is after some great 
success that the most dangerous threats of ruin usually emerge […] We would have been much 
stronger if we had been less successful.”53 Alexander Herzen would be less sanguine than even 
de Tocqueville. A progressive member of the Russian aristocracy, Herzen was both a socialist 
and a member of the landed gentry, and thus straddled uncomfortable political and class 
divides. Writing from exile in London to his son Sasha after the successful counterrevolution, he 
emphasized the importance of the future after a stunning defeat: “Modern man … only builds a 
bridge – it will be for the unknown man of the future to pass over it. You may be there to see 
him.” He continued with a warning to his son: “But do not, I beg you, remain on this shore … 
Better to perish with the revolution than to seek refuge in the almshouse of reaction.”54 
Later historians would come to understand 1848 in a much broader perspective. This 
expanded framework necessarily includes a temporal shift in focus, a broadening of the time 
horizon to understand the actual long-term effects of revolution. In this revisionist model, the 
seeds of nation-building, political self-determination, increased political participation across the 
 
optimistic about the American experiment, he remained sceptical that France could escape from the 
despotic danger inherent in modernity.” Both quotes from The Short Oxford History of Europe: The 
Nineteenth Century: Europe 1789-1914, series ed. T.C.W. Blanning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
11, 143. 
53 De Tocqueville, Recollections, 214. One is reminded of George Washington’s admonishment to 
Alexander Hamilton: “Ah, winning was easy, young man / Governing’s harder.” Christopher Jackson, 
“Cabinet Battle #1,” in Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Hamilton: An American Musical, directed by Thomas Kail, 
Atlantic Records, 2015, CD. 
54 Alexander Herzen, From the Other Shore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). Quoted in Mike 
Rapport, 1848, 400. See also Francis B. Randall, “Herzen’s From the Other Shore,” Slavic Review 27, no. 1 




citizenry, and liberal constitutional reform are all sown within the context of a “failed” 
revolution. 1848 thus comes to be understood more favorably when one considers the impacts 
upon later societal and political developments across Europe. In spite of a return to absolutist 
monarchy and military rule in most countries, there is little doubt that the actual 
accomplishments of 1848 are broader and deeper than at first recognized. When one views 
1848 in this way, it is no longer simply a failed revolution, an historical moment when Europe 
reached a “turning point [and] failed to turn,” as suggested by British historian George Macaulay 
Trevelyan, and an oft-repeated maxim in subsequent years.55 Instead 1848 becomes an impetus 
and accelerant toward modernity – toward liberal and nationalist movements and political 
integration in the German-speaking lands and on the Italian peninsula; toward nationalist 
movements and disintegration among constituent parts of the Hapsburg Monarchy and Austrian 
and Ottoman Empires; toward emancipation of the serfs across central Europe and the abolition 
of slavery in France’s Caribbean colonies of Guadeloupe and Martinique; and toward increased 
suffrage amid an outpouring of political consciousness and engagement across lines of gender, 
class, religion and race.56 On this shift in historiography from failed revolution to that of sowing 
 
55 G.M. Trevelyan quoted in Antony Polonsky, “The Revolutionary Crisis of 1846-1849 and Its Place in the 
Development of Nineteenth-Century Galicia,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 22 (1998): 443-69, accessed April 
28, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41036752/. G.M. Trevelyan’s assessment of 1848 may be one of 
the most frequently cited by historians ever sense. A very similar quote comes from A.J.P. Taylor on 1848 
and its relation to German history. Per Taylor, were it but for a different outcome in that revolutionary 
year, Europe, in Taylor’s mind, would have missed the horrors of Nazism and the Holocaust: “1848 was 
the decisive year of German, and so of European, history: it recapitulated Germany’s past and anticipated 
Germany’s future. Echoes of the Holy Roman Empire merged into a prelude of the Nazi ‘New Order’ […] 
the German people stepped on to the centre of the German stage only to miss their cues once more. 
German history reached its turning-point and failed to turn. This was the fateful essence of 1848.” Taylor’s 
pronouncement has largely fallen out of fashion these days for its rather reductive and positivist 
approach. A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of German History 
since 1815 (New York: Howard-McCann, 1946), 68. 
56 For more on the various forces – centrifugal and centripetal – of nationalism, see again Eugen Weber, 
Peasants into Frenchmen, 96-7. Sperber neatly summarizes the political and social legacies of 1848 in The 




the seeds of future success – the so called “Seed-plot thesis” – Jonathan Sperber summarizes: 
“In recent decades [historians] have come to look at 1848 not as an example of failure of politics 
so much as an example of an explosion of political participation, of an opportunity for all sorts of 
people to become involved in [the political sphere].”57 This is today, with the hindsight of nearly 
two centuries, and with the historical context of additional revolutionary movements, the nearly 
canonical view. 
However, more than just an extended temporal framework of revolution is needed to 
see the import and long-term impacts of 1848. The relatively confined experiences of relatively 
small numbers of activist revolutionaries across even a majority of European countries does not 
fully capture the significance of 1848 toward the advancement of republicanism, transnational 
freedom, and a sense of modernity worldwide. This argument is a natural outgrowth of the 
historical interest in recent years of placing regional histories into wider, or even global contexts 
– and indeed in the development of the subfields of Atlantic history, trans-regional studies, 
thematic global history, and “big history” more broadly.58 But it is also an argument that 
seemingly has little purchase among the preeminent scholars on 1848. Jonathan Sperber, for 
example, who wrote the authoritative English language textbook on the 1848 revolutions, 
 
57 Neil MacGregor, host, “1848: The People’s Flag and Karl Marx,” Germany: Memories of a Nation 
(podcast), BBC4, October 17, 2014, accessed April 28, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b04k6rm5/. The Seed-plot thesis is attributed to British historian 
Lewis Namier, whose 1948 lectures commemorating the centennial of the 1848 revolutions were titled, 
“1848: Seed-plot of History.” See, for example, the impacts of 1848 on a burgeoning Ukrainian 
nationalism: Roman Szporluk, “The Making of Modern Ukraine: The Western Dimension,” Harvard 
Ukrainian Studies 25, no. 1/2 (2001): 57-90, accessed May 3, 2020, 
https://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/801_szporluk1_01.pdf/. 
58 For context and just a small sampling of these trends, see “Atlantic History,” Oxford Bibliographies, 
accessed May 1, 2020, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/page/133#/. See also Katja Naumann and 
Matthias Middell, “Bibliography of Global History: Introduction,” Transnational, Cross-Regional and Global 





downplays the global significance of the event when compared to other waves of revolution 
that followed in the twentieth century. He asserts: “[The] 1848 revolutions were very distinctly a 
Eurocentric affair. They had the widest spread in Europe of any revolution. […] But [they] had 
very few effects outside [of] the European continent.”59 Sperber is not entirely incorrect in 
making this claim. Indeed, no governments fell outside of mainland Europe, and few 
experienced widespread protest as an immediate effect. The seismic waves of European 
revolution were therefore contained in 1848, especially when compared with the previous 
French Revolution of 1789 and the ensuing European revolutions of 1917 and 1989, as Sperber 
does. Nevertheless, it is precisely when considering the effects of 1848 within a wider context 
that one notices the outgrowth of a particularly radical strain of revolutionary ideology. This 
paradigm is one that would draw upon the ideas of the American and French Revolutions, and in 
so emphasizing the important political documents of those conflicts – Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence, and Sieyès and Lafayette’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen – 
would be employed to challenge the existing social order in places far removed from Paris, 
Naples and Berlin. It is the very spirit of the 1848 Revolution that would be carried by those 
radical revolutionaries who would mount the barricades in cities across Europe, and who would 
subsequently flee political persecution after a successful counterrevolution and restoration of 
 
59 Jonathan Sperber, “Tidal Waves of Revolution, 1848-2011,” Saturday Morning Science (podcast), 
October 29, 2011, accessed April 27, 2020, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/tidal-waves-of-
revolution-from-1848-to-2011/id525505899?i=1000115026414/. Sperber compares 1848 with the 
communist and republican revolutions arising out of World War I during 1917-23, the post-Soviet 
democratic revolutions of 1989-91, and the Arab Spring of 2010-12. 1848, he suggests, though signifying a 
wave of revolution with enormous geographical and political spread and of major consequence within 
Europe, was still an almost entirely European event, with limited worldwide reverberations. He bases this 
on the relative paucity of European colonies during the revolution, as well as for the fact that there was 
no intervention from outside of Europe during the ensuing conflict. I would at least partially challenge this 




the monarchy to locales as far removed as the antebellum United States, Latin America and 
beyond. Were it not for the rapid spread of the revolutionary ideas of 1848, carried as they were 
by the revolutionaries themselves around the world, future political thought may not have 
developed as it had; and indeed, it is hard to imagine the revolutions of 1917 or 1989 without 
1848 as their precursor and at least partial inspiration. These Enlightenment ideals informing 
egalitarianism, abolition of serfdom and slavery, universal suffrage, feminism, and civil liberties 
were all infused into the political space wherever the 1848ers went. This is in part, therefore a 
story of migration, of immigrants and their ideologies, revolutionary tactics, and a political 
sensibility they carried with them. But it is also a story about freedom more broadly, and how 
political revolution and freedom movements intersect across national borders in sometimes 
intriguing and unexpected ways. It is my hope in this essay to situate the movements of 
transnational freedom – particularly that of Abolition movements in the Americas – against a 
backdrop of international revolution, and to explore how historians have come to understand 




60 The scholarship of two historians who have helped to clarify my ideas around transnational freedom 
and the international scope of revolution and abolition are especially noteworthy. Don Doyle’s The Cause 
of All Nations is an excellent study of the international dimensions of the American Civil War, and 
especially on that of European engagement with the conflict as a microcosm of the struggle between 
liberty and freedom on the one hand, and tyranny and despotism on the other. Prof. Doyle was also 
incredibly gracious with his time and suggestions for further research. See Don H. Doyle, The Cause of All 
Nations: An International History of the American Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 2015). A slightly 
different, but equally compelling take on the topic of transnational revolution is Caitlin Fitz’s Our Sister 
Republics, which traces the connections between the struggle for independence and revolution in both 
the United States and Latin America, with particular interest in the abolition movements that were forged 
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To American Shores: European Migration in the Nineteenth Century 
 
Amerika, du hast es besser  
Als unser Kontinent, das alte, 
Hast keine verfallenen Schlösser 
Und keine Basalte. 
  
–Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1823-2861 
 
O ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose, not only the tyranny, but the 
tyrant, stand forth! Every spot of the old world is over-run with oppression. 
Freedom hath been hunted round the globe. Asia, and Africa, have long expelled 
her. – Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given her warning to 
deport. O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind. 
 
–Thomas Paine, Common Sense, 177662 
 
Migration is a hallmark of the human condition; its influence has touched all nations. Yet 
the cultural and demographic impacts upon the United States during the long nineteenth 
century brought about by the mass movements of peoples from Africa, Europe, Asia and beyond 
were especially phenomenal. Immigration has thus come to define the American experience not 
only of this era, but also of an American identity writ large. On this evolving conception of 
national identity, Rudolph J. Vecoli emphasizes the recurrent debate between nativist and 
cosmopolitan elements of American society, between those who have an innate distrust of the 
new arrivals and those who welcome them. For Vecoli this debate is an ongoing public discourse 
on immigration, naturalization, borders, and national security, and how each of these elements 
interplay to inform evolving national identities. The debate spans nearly two hundred years and 
flares occasionally into the public sphere during waves of immigration generally, but especially 
 
61 My translation: “America, you have it better than our old continent, / no falling castles, and no basalt.” 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “Den Vereinigten Staaten,” in Goethe Gedichte (Frankfurt am Main: Insel 
Taschenbuch, 1992), 1139. 
62Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, Common Sense, and Other Political Writings, Oxford World’s Classics, ed. 




during times of economic downturn.63 It is but one portion of the culture wars that have come 
to define American political life since the founding of the Republic. And while the more nativist 
elements have not disappeared – indeed they have been emboldened in recent years – there is 
nevertheless a strong consensus among Americans that, as asserted by Oscar Handlin in the 
mid-twentieth century, “the immigrants were American history.”64  
Any American story is by definition incomplete without considering the contributions of 
immigrants. The country’s motto, E Pluribus Unum – out of many, one – has become shorthand 
for this decidedly American ideal. It is a tradition reinforced repeatedly throughout the history 
of the Republic through cultural totems that span across literature and political discourse. 
Wrote Walt Whitman in this vein in 1855:  
Do I contradict myself?  
Very well then I contradict myself,  
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)65  
 
Even more steeped within this tradition of America’s embrace of immigrants is Emma Lazarus’ 
sonnet of 1883, “The New Colossus:”  
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she  
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
 
63 Rudolph J. Vecoli, “The Significance of Immigration in the Formation of an American Identity,” The 
History Teacher 30, no. 1 (November 1996): 9-27, accessed April 30, 2020, 
https://www.doi.org/10.2307/494217/.  
64 On Lost Causes and a resurgence of populism in the US since 2015, see Susan Neiman, Learning from 
the Germans: Race and the Memory of Evil (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019), 180-1. Oscar 
Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People (New York: 
Grosset and Dunlap, 1951), 3. As quoted in Bruce Levine, The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor 
Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 1. 
65Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself 51,” in Leaves of Grass: The Complete 1855 and 1891-92 Editions (New 




I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”66 
 
This rhetoric quite possibly belies the reality that newly arrived immigrants were often viewed 
with suspicion and met with xenophobia for much of the nation’s history. Even as one group of 
immigrants would grow toward integration, acceptance and Americanization, another wave of 
migrants, with another group of protagonists, would start the cycle anew.67 But whether 
America’s inclusive rhetoric matched the actual welcome that immigrants felt upon their arrival 
to the United States is almost moot. What did matter were the expectations and imaginations of 
the immigrants prior to their decision to leave their homes – perhaps permanently – and to 
endure the difficult Atlantic transit as they placed their lot in an American future. Wherever 
their countries of origin, the 1848 revolutionaries – like other groups of immigrants before and 
since – looked aspirationally to the American model they had forged in their minds and found 
 
66 Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” The Poetry Foundation, accessed April 30, 2020, 
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46550/the-new-colossus/. It is fitting that Lazarus wrote and 
published the poem to raise money for the building of the base of Lady Liberty in New York City Harbor. 
See again Rudolph J. Vecoli, The Significance of Immigration,” 9, 12. 
67 Consider the case of the Irish. In a now famous study, Noel Ignatiev details how Catholic Irish 
immigrants, at first met with resistance and confined to the lowest rungs of American society, gradually 
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University of Georgia Press, 2011), 15-8. Meanwhile, Stephen D. Engle highlights how anti-German 
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there an expectation of the United States and its fertile soil for their ideologies. Many would 
thus choose to make their way to American shores. 
Immigrants to North America brought with them more than language and cultural 
artifacts; they often brought a political sensibility with them as well. Propelled by intellectual 
currents in their countries of origin, the 1848ers often carried with them a sense of revolution, 
radical republican politics, and a moral suasion that they employed as they navigated the 
political and social realities in their new homes. Many immigrants would come to view America 
and the New World generally through a prism of their own making, and see opportunity to 
dismantle and remake the world – economically, socially, culturally, and politically – when 
conditions to do so in their former homes had failed them. Although it has risen to the level of 
pervasive popular myth, there is still something of an ethos, an overarching sensibility among 
immigrants in the nineteenth century that America was a new world, a place of economic and 
social opportunity, and a place where they might enact the societal changes that had eluded 
them in Europe.68 The United States during this period of great migration was and continued to 
be a destination where one could, as described by Karen Odahl Kupperman, “break out, both 
physically and intellectually,” from Old World models and assert their ideals in the New World – 
in short, “making or accepting a choice to become American.” She continues: “Thus, consciously 
or unconsciously, emigration meant rejection of Old World relationships, and especially of the 
 
68 For a recent example of this ethos in the popular culture, consider Alexander Hamilton’s grand 
introduction in Hamilton: An American Musical. “How does a bastard, orphan, son of a whore, and a 
Scotsman / dropped in the middle of a forgotten spot in the Caribbean by Providence / impoverished in 
squalor, grow up to be a hero and a scholar? / The ten-dollar founding father without a father / got a lot 
farther by working a lot harder / by being a lot smarter / by being a self-starter / […] Headed for the 
future, / see him now as he stands on the bow of a ship headed for the New Land / In New York, you can 
be a new man!” “Alexander Hamilton” in Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Hamilton: An American Musical, directed 




greater dependence to which those at home were condemned.”69 This choice to become 
American, argues Kupperman, was no less of the migrants’ own volition whether or not they 
were driven to their decisions due to economic, social or political circumstance at home.70 
“Because of this massive transplantation,” she concludes, “by the middle of the eighteenth 
century America became an accepted part of Europe’s mental landscape.”71 
 So too was it for European migrants to America a century later. If anything, this image of 
America in the European imagination loomed even larger by the time that the revolutionary 
fires had flared across the continent in 1848. Politically, the revolutionary and liberal ideals of 
both the American and French Revolutions had by the 1840s nearly fifty years to solidify within 
the zeitgeist – an allusion to that “disorder” which had “penetrated deeply in the minds of 
men,” as asserted by de Tocqueville in his January 1848 speech to the Chamber of Deputies. Yet 
it was more than liberal ideology alone that animated Europeans in their views and dealings 
with America. By the time of the outbreak of revolution, a number of complementary and even 
countervailing visions of the United States had taken hold among the European intelligentsia, 
 
69 Karen Odahl Kupperman, “Introduction: The Changing Definition of America” in America in European 
Consciousness, 1493-1750, ed. Karen Ordahl Kupperman (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995), 19-20. 
70 Kupperman posits that the degree of indentured servitude and the involuntary movement of debtors 
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Independence and informed the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Given these assumptions regarding the 
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Significance of Immigration,” 9. 




and these ideas had percolated down into a wider public imagination. Jeremy Jennings describes 
this European consciousness which viewed America of the 1830s within a variety of frameworks, 
among them, America as a “philosophical paradise,” comprised of “yeoman republicans of virtue 
and simplicity.” Some alternately considered “America, the great wilderness,” a concept that 
had been put into wide circulation by François-René de Chateaubriand and his conception of the 
North American noble savage in his 1801 novella, Atala. Still others viewed Americans 
themselves as backward and uncultured “Philistines,” incapable of producing a new, meaningful 
culture of their own. And finally – perhaps most pressingly – many Europeans viewed America as 
the ultimate contradiction. To them the United States was an experiment in building a new 
liberal order based upon Enlightenment ideals of freedom and individualism – the salutary 
effects of which Europe’s liberals greeted with profound enthusiasm. Yet American society was 
simultaneously founded upon an institutional establishment that condoned and pardoned 
human bondage and the horrors of chattel slavery as a fair tradeoff for the unfettered pursuit of 
the rights and property of an elite landed minority, as well as to all those who benefitted 
economically from the trafficking and sale of human lives.72 Thomas Jefferson himself could 
serve as symbol and allegory for this foundational American contradiction; author of American 
liberty, “leader of the American Enlightenment,” and supporter of the French Revolution, he 
failed in both life and death to ameliorate the lives of his slaves, or of those owned by his fellow 
planters. Paul Finkelman poses a fundamental question when considering Jefferson’s legacy: 
was he “able to transcend his economic interest and sectional background to implement the 
ideals he articulated[?]” Finkelman concludes that Jefferson “failed to fulfill the promise of his 
 
72 For Jennings’ full remarks, see Melvyn Bragg, host, “Tocqueville: Democracy in America.” Interestingly, 




rhetoric.”73 It is not a huge leap to draw the same conclusions about the United States more 
broadly in its early republican form. These diverse intellectual currents, in sum, created a 
complex, sometimes contradictory conception of the New World that largely informed the 
decisions of those who would ultimately embark for American shores. 
Yet why did they take leave when they did? Why indeed did Europeans emigrate from 
their homelands in such massive numbers so as to fundamentally alter the demographics on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and to subsequently change the course of history? The answer comes 
in part from the very conditions that helped to foster revolution in the first place. Although 
there is often disagreement among historians about the legacies of 1848, the historiography 
finds much more convergence on the event’s causes. Moreover, that recent historiography also 
suggests that there is much overlap in explaining both the impetus toward mass migration – 
within Europe and external to it – as there is to the social, economic and political conditions that 
helped to spur the events that led to protest, upheaval, revolt, turmoil and finally violent 
revolution. The narrative on the root causes of revolution in 1848 that has found the most 
traction among historians is something akin to this: Demographically, the early nineteenth 
century saw an explosion of population growth across Europe, just as technological change vis-
à-vis the Industrial Revolution was having enormous impact on both the availability of jobs and 
the very way people worked. The phasing out of the guild systems and the nascent beginnings 
of free market economies only hastened the pace of economic change. As manufacturing 
become more prevalent in cities, particularly in the north – with closest proximity to Britain, 
 
73 Paul Finkelman, “Jefferson and Slavery: ‘Treason Against the Hopes of the World,’” in Jeffersonian 
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places like Lille in France, large portions of Belgium, and the German Ruhrgebiet were all 
impacted – rural artisans and peasants moved into these growing urban areas to look for work 
and better wages. The infrastructure was hardly ready to accommodate the surge, however. 
Indeed, scourges of disease and pandemics of cholera often ravaged the major urban areas, and 
many who suffered turned to mutual aid societies and private charities for relief when public aid 
failed them. Incidental to this, a number of major crop failures, most notably the Irish famine, or 
Great Hunger of 1845-49, along with poor yield in wheat production across mainland Europe all 
combined with a series of economic crises during 1846-7, which in sum caused a massive 
increase in the cost of food and a great strain on the social fabric. Also incidental, but no less 
pivotal, were transportation and communications revolutions that not only accelerated the 
spread of the news, but that also helped to foster a greater political consciousness among the 
citizenry, and a growing voice for those who lacked political agency – namely a growing 
educated professional class – under the old absolutist regimes. Changes in nearly every aspect 
of people’s lives were hurtling ahead at an unbelievable pace, particularly when these societal 
changes are juxtaposed against a relatively static model of European society that had seen very 
little social or economic change for literally centuries prior. Summarizes Colin Heywood: 
To live in nineteenth century Europe was to witness social change on a scale 
that was both exhilarating and disturbing. It was exhilarating in that the 
developments associated with the Industrial and French revolutions encouraged 
hopes of conquering some of the age-old scourges of humanity, such as food 
shortages, ignorance, and oppression. At the same time, it was disturbing, in 
that those same revolutionary forces appeared to threaten the whole fabric of 
society.74  
 
74 Colin Heywood, “Society,” in The Short Oxford History of Europe: The Nineteenth Century, ed. T.C.W. 
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Moreover, circumstances begged the “social question”: How would a changing European society 
contend with growing inequality, and how might it help to improve the lives of the ever-growing 
masses of urban and rural poor? Wrote Frédéric Ozanam in 1837: 
The question which divides men in our day is no longer a question of political 
forms, it is a social question – that of deciding whether the spirit of selfishness 
or the spirit of sacrifice is to carry the day; whether society is to be a huge traffic 
for the benefit of the strongest, or the consecration of each for the benefit of 
all, and above all for the protection of the weak.75  
 
When it became clear that the Ancien Régime – and indeed all absolutist monarchies across the 
continent – were incapable of addressing these urgent questions, conditions quickly 
transformed into creating a crisis of legitimacy whose nearly inevitable end was both 
widespread revolution and mass migration. It was thus that revolutionary rhetoric traversed 
continents, carried in large part by the revolutionaries themselves. 
 
 
“America’s Freedom-Loving People”: German-Speaking Immigrants in the United States 
 
A German has only to be a German to be utterly opposed to slavery. 
 
–Frederick Douglass, Douglass’ Monthly, August 185976 
 
 
Niall Ferguson calculates the amazing exodus of those who left Europe during the long 
nineteenth century. By his calculations, fully 38.1 million Europeans emigrated from 1800 to 
1891. Of these, an unbelievable proportion, nearly 33 million, were bound for the United 
 
75 As quoted in Colin Heywood, “Society,” 47. For more on the social and political circumstances that 
helped create the heady stew of revolutionary currents, see also Jonathan Sperber, The European 
Revolutions, 5-55, 109-16. 




States.77 These European emigres came from all corners the continent in truly staggering 
numbers – from the British Isles they came, from Scandinavia, Germany, Italy, Russia, and 
beyond. Yet among this Europe-wide deluge, there is one group that both illustrates, and stands 
out from, nineteenth century immigration more broadly: the Germans. By sheer volume – in 
terms of both number and percentage – ethnic German and German-Jewish immigrants 
comprised an enormous contribution to the nineteenth century American mosaic, and these 
German-speaking migrants would prove to leave an indelible imprint upon the American 
psyche.78 More than 5 million German-speaking immigrants would make their way to American 
shores during the long nineteenth century, second only to Irish emigres among European ethnic 
groups.79 To assess the import of German immigration on the United States might begin with 
the simple observation that in 1855, Kleindeutschland, New York City’s ethnic, German-speaking 
enclave, comprised more German speakers than any city in the world outside of Berlin and 
Vienna. At approximately 184,000 German-speaking inhabitants within the current-day 
boroughs of New York City (Brooklyn at the time was its own incorporated city), ethnic German 
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69. Bade and Oltmer articulate that transatlantic migration networks during the mid-nineteenth century 
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(followed by Brazil, Argentina and Australia). “Between 1816 and 1914, about 5.5 million Germans 
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and German-speaking Jews far outnumbered those in even Hamburg – the next largest 
concentration at 148,754. Based on U.S. census records, the neighborhood of Kleindeutschland, 
if considered its own city, would be the fourth largest American city, after New York, Brooklyn, 
and Philadelphia, during the years from 1860 to 1880.80 Bruce Levine summarizes the impact 
this sudden infusion of immigrants had on American cities in the middle of the century:  
Between 1840 and 1860, more than four million people entered the United 
States … equal to about 30 percent of the total free population of the nation in 
1840. In proportional terms, this influx of immigrants was the largest in the 
nation’s entire history. […] By 1860 the foreign-born accounted for upwards of 
half the population of Chicago, St. Louis, Milwaukee, and San Francisco; at least 
40 percent of the residents of New York, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Cleveland, and 
Detroit; and imposing minorities in nearly all other major population centers.81  
 
This entry of new blood and workers, and of new cultures and languages into American society, 
would have an incredibly profound and long-lasting impact. Not surprisingly, German-speaking 
immigrants would shoulder a large portion of these developments. It is out of this practice that 
a new ethnic identity, that of German-American, would come to be formed.82 
And yet the creation of new identities – of a national identity vis-à-vis the United States, 
and of communitarian and personal identities vis-à-vis the immigrants themselves – would 
prove to be a mutually codependent arrangement. Both parties, the society at large and the 
groups of migrants who entered, came to reflect and condition one another. In this way, 
German and German-Jewish immigrants underwent transformation of their own during this 
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process of assimilation into American society. Far from homogenous, the immigrants came from 
literally scores of different backgrounds, countries of origin, classes, political affiliations, 
religions, and confessions. Some German-speaking immigrants were Catholic, others Lutheran, 
Calvinist or Freethinker, and still others Jewish. Many came from rural areas in the small duchies 
and minor kingdoms in western and southern Germany, while still others came from the large 
and cosmopolitan imperial capital cities of Berlin and Vienna. Some came from German-
speaking areas in current-day Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Many were among the 
poor working classes with very few skills, though some brought with them the skilled blue-collar 
and artisan trades of woodworking and carpentry, tanning, brewing and textile production; still 
others were of the professional classes, educated teachers, lawyers, writers and doctors. 
Indeed, some were full-time revolutionaries and agitators. All of them, having undergone the 
transformative process of leaving one country and negotiating a new reality and identity in 
another, found that, in spite of distinctive differences in their backgrounds, a common language 
and a distinctly German-American culture knit them together in the New World. Their 
similarities in the United States, what made them distinctly “German” in American minds (or 
“Dutch,” as it was in the confused lingo of the time), drew them tightly together in ways that 
clearly transcended their eclectic and often divergent European identities. Further hastening 
this dynamic, John Hawgood argues that of critical import was immigrant experience and its 
engagement with Know-Nothing nativism and xenophobia, outlooks that were commonly held 




encourage an inward turn among the immigrants.83 In Little Germany, Stanley Nadel 
summarizes: “[T]he processes of emigration and resettlement had broken down the regional 
divisions of the Old World and dissolved them in the new ethnicity of German-America.”84 
 
 
American Progress, American Freedom: A New Adam 
 
As Adam early in the morning, 
Walking forth from the bower refresh’d with sleep, 
Behold me where I pass, hear my voice, approach, 
Touch me, touch the palm of your hand to my body as I pass, 
Be not afraid of my body. 
    
–Walt Whitman, “Children of Adam,” 185585  
 
Mid-century immigrants to the United States were steeped in the Old World 
revolutionary milieu, and sudden societal change was thus not foreign to them. But the world 
that greeted the immigrants in German-America was undergoing its own radical and dramatic 
changes. Increasingly, the early- and mid-nineteenth century social and economic conditions in 
North America began to mirror those that were occurring in Europe. Perhaps not surprisingly, as 
those two sets of conditions began to more closely resemble one another, the subsequent 
political crises on both sides of the Atlantic also began to take similar shape. David Blight 
describes the incredible pace of foundational change that came about as a result of the market 
revolution beginning during the Jacksonian period and extending through to the end of the 
century. Just as it had in Europe, the market revolution joined with revolutions in industry, 
commerce, transportation, and communication – and just as they had abjectly transformed 
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European society, they were doing the same in America. How people worked and made a living, 
how they shopped and spent their leisure time, how they interacted with one another in their 
daily lives – all of these had been transformed within a generation. Blight describes a new 
American mentalité that emerged, one wherein an increased sense of social mobility, 
opportunity, and optimism was ingrained.86 Free market ideology reigned, and fortunes in new 
industries like textiles and the railroads were seemingly made overnight. It also fixed an 
expansionist westward gaze among the American psyche, one that was fixated on conquering a 
continent, and fixated as well on taking the ideals of America to Pacific shores and beyond. A 
boundless optimism for the future had set in. But also, out of this maelstrom of new ideas and 
practices, a deep uncertainty occurred in equal measure. Economic cycles of boom and bust left 
an increasingly divided and unequal populace. As fortunes were made for some titans of 
industry, many more, especially the urban poor, faced food shortages, unfettered disease, 
bankruptcy and despair. Just as in Europe, increasingly radical solutions were introduced to 
grapple with these problems. And all of this occurred as an approaching sectional conflict 
became clearer to the average American; a conflict, per Blight, that was set as against an 
American backdrop of “a deep and abiding white supremacy.” American Progress bred American 
exceptionalism; We are the hope of humankind, it seemed to suggest, we are the hope of earth. 
Blight again: “Manifest destiny was the fuel of the American imagination, and fuel for the 
American civilizing mission: that to spread liberty, democracy, Christianity and an Anglo-Saxon 
 
86 This optimism might be contrasted with other, competing narratives about the social mood in 
nineteenth century America. Others, like Barbara Ehrenreich posit a mentalité of depression, a lingering 
after-effect of the Puritanical and Calvinist roots of the early settlement of the continent. This religious 
inheritance, guided by predeterminism, stresses a static, unchanging society, and beyond Providence, no 
hope for a markedly different future. See Hari Kunzru, host, “It’s Always Sunny in the Dialectic,” Into the 





white supremacy around the earth.”87 That this vision could be interrupted was evident to 
some; indeed, that same white supremacy fed further into that which was becoming 
increasingly evident to all, that the United States in this age of expansion and fervent innovation 
was moving headlong toward civil war. 
 
 
An Impending Sectional Conflict and a Move to Radical Abolitionism 
 
His zeal in the cause of freedom was infinitely superior to mine. Mine was as the 
taper light; his was as the burning sun. … I could live for the slave. John Brown 
could die for [him]. 
   –Frederick Douglass, 188188 
 
 
Doing The Lord’s work with sabre 
 sharpened on the grindstone 
 of the Word: 
   Bleeding Kansas: 
  
the cries of my people the cries 
 of their oppressors harrowed 
 hacked – poison meat for Satan’s  
 maw. 
  I slew no man but blessed 
 the Chosen, who in the name 
 of justice killed at my command. 
  
Bleeding Kansas: 
     A son martyred 
 there: I am tested I am trued 
 made worthy of my servitude. 
  
 
87 See David Blight, “Lecture 4: A Northern World View.” Thanks to David Blight for providing this 
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civilizing missions of empire, see Kenneth Pomeranz, “Empire & ‘civilizing’ missions, past & present,” 
Dædalus 134, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 35-6, accessed December 14, 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/0011526053887428/. See also Civilizations, Season 1, episode 8, “The Cult of 
Progress,” dir. Simon Schama, Mary Beard and David Olusoga, aired June 26, 2018 on PBS, Netflix, 
accessed October 28, 2018, http://www.pbs.org/civilizations/episodes/episode-8/.  
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Oh the crimes of this guilty 
 guilty land: 
        let Kansas bleed. 
 
–Robert Hayden, “John Brown”89 
 
The 1830s in the United States saw an increase in both activity and intensity in radical 
abolitionism at just the time that the revolutionary fire was spreading in Europe. William Lloyd 
Garrison’s The Liberator was founded and ran weekly throughout the 1830s, and Nat Turner’s 
rebellion played a prominent role at the decade’s begin. Yet as radical abolitionism became a 
greater force in the United States, so too did pro-slavery advocates gain ground during this 
period. The American contradiction seemed to be headed to all-out confrontation, and by the 
1850s, the crisis was imminent. Wrote John Brown in a note to his jailor from his prison cell in 
Harper’s Ferry, Virginia: “I, John Brown, am now quite certain that the crimes of this guilty land 
will never be purged away but with blood.”90 Brown, who had already spilled blood and killed 
with a righteous anger in Kansas and Virginia – and all in the name of freedom for America’s 
enslaved peoples – recognized what was coming. Though he would not live to bear witness to it, 
his was a civilization that was hurtling toward civil war. As certain as the battle lines were that 
were being drawn in the United States around the issues of the expansion of slavery into the 
western territories, there was nevertheless a profound confusion on the part of those 1848ers 
who arrived to find the country anything but a land of freedom. This marked ambiguity was 
expressed by many a German-speaking revolutionary upon his or her arrival to the United 
 
89 Robert Hayden, “John Brown,” in Collected Poems, ed. Frederick Glaysher (New York: Liveright, 1996), 
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States, only to find in it a deeply divided, and deeply unequal country. It was in fact a moral 
question for those immigrants who arrived to the United States: how did they hope to enact 
social change in their new homes? Many found, at least initially, that their efforts had been 
thwarted by a republican system whose systemic predilection was situated toward conservatism 
and stasis. A young Carl Schurz, who would famously befriend Abraham Lincoln and serve as 
Ambassador to Spain during the Civil War, summarized this reaction among the 1848ers: “The 
democrat just arrived from Europe who has so far lived in a world of ideas and has had no 
opportunity to see these ideas put into actual, sound practice will ask himself, hesitatingly, Is 
this [America], indeed a free people? Is this a real democracy? Is this my ideal?”91 
Not all of the 1848ers were freedom fighters immediately upon arrival, of course. Some 
would evolve to become freedom fighters during the course of their newfound American lives. 
August (Anshl) Bondi provides a fascinating case study of one such immigrant who grew to 
radicalize, to fight – and ultimately to risk death – for the goal of an expanding conception of 
freedom in America. Bondi was among the 1848ers who took to the cause of transnational 
freedom. A German-speaking Hungarian Jew, and among the youngest radical revolutionaries in 
Vienna – he was 15 and a student at the time that protests against the Hapsburg Monarchy 
broke out there – he would be forced to flee the empire with his parents after the restoration of 
the monarchy during the counterrevolution. Arriving in America, his parents would settle in 
Louisville, Kentucky. Bondi would take to several lines of work in Louisiana and Texas, including 
as a waterman on the Mississippi River, before finally settling in Kansas. There he met John 
Brown and joined in Free Soil political protest, and eventually in Free Soil political violence 
 




against pro-slavery forces and Border Ruffians in the Bleeding Kansas episode of 1855-57. He 
and his abolitionist wife, Henrietta Einstein, would together create stops along the Underground 
Railroad, including in their own home, until the outbreak of the Civil War. Much later, ever 
focused on the incredible historic moments he experienced firsthand, he served as a President 
of the Kansas Historical Society.92 
A young Bondi might not have seen his life’s trajectory in quite the way that his older 
self would. He was deeply divided on many topics, as will become clear. One of them was on 
equality between the races. Wrote Bondi in a particularly telling excerpt from his manuscript: 
“Every good-looking young man from the north could have his pick of southern young ladies. I 
was only eighteen years of age, yet if I had been willing, several young ladies of first families 
would have fallen in love with me.” At 18, Bondi already expresses a distaste for the institution 
of slavery. “I disliked the idea of marrying a woman who owned slaves.” Yet his was yet not a 
high-minded call to freedom just yet. “Had I stayed south, I would have joined the Confederate 
army, but while I really did not have much sympathy with [blacks], I felt that my father’s son was 
not to be a slave driver.”93 An older Bondi would see things a little differently. In 1903, he mailed 
this very manuscript and his assorted papers to the American Jewish Historical Society in New 
York City, stating the importance of “his narrative as a valid record of Jewish participation in the 
agitation for human freedom in America in the days preceding the Civil War.”94 Like the country 
in which they agitated, the contradictions of the freedom fighters were then also apparent. 
 
92 See Mischa Honeck, We are the Revolutionists, 65. See also Bruce Levine, The Spirit of 1848, 208-9, 220-
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I will be looking closely at the life and times of August Bondi in Chapter Two of this 
paper, interrogating the ideals – and indeed the contradictions – of those transnational freedom 
fighters who would agitate on two continents for democracy and freedom. In this way, August 
Bondi becomes a vehicle for exploring a larger narrative about transnational freedom. Bondi’s is 
likely not an isolated experience. Something occurred in him – and similarly occurred in others – 
between that moment of fighting on the barricades in Vienna in 1848, and in joining John 
Brown’s guerilla band of anti-slavery activist fighters in Kansas in 1856. What indeed led a white 
man, a German-speaking immigrant and Hungarian Jew from Vienna to cast his lot with a 
fledgling radical Republican politics and the Free Soil cause – and ultimately turn to violence to 
overturn a society’s bedrock institution of slavery? Understanding these questions will help us 







AUGUST BONDI AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CURRENTS OF REVOLUTION 
 
 
Only where this pathos of novelty is present and where novelty is connected with 
the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution. […] But violence is no 
more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; only 
where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to 
constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the 
formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at 
least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution. 
       
–Hannah Arendt, On Revolution95 
 
 
August Bondi and the Legacy of 1848 
On 23 November 1897, toward the end of a long and momentous life, August Mendel 
Bondi lodged for the first time an application for his United States passport, and in so doing 
swore allegiance to the country that had been his home for the past 49 years. His application 
having occurred in the days prior to photography’s widespread use in government identification, 
Bondi wrote out the required “Description of Applicant” in his own hand: 
 
Age: 64 years 
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Bondi had come first to the southern United States in 1848 as a political refugee, having fled at 
the age of fifteen with his family – his father, mother and younger sister – after the 
commencement of revolutionary events which had flared and swept across nearly all of Europe 
during that and the following years. Having witnessed firsthand and participated directly in the 
student-led uprising against the Hapsburg Monarchy in March 1848, and thereafter spending his 
intervening years in the United States, Bondi was now set to return to Vienna for the first time 
since his youth, nearly a half century later, to participate in the celebration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the mid-century European revolutions. 
Bondi recognized the impact of European political upheaval, and more broadly, of the 
major political events occurring on both sides of the Atlantic – among them hemispheric 
revolution, civil war, and abolition and freedom movements – in shaping his life story. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, he inscribed that importance into the grand narrative arc of his life’s events. 
Writing ex post facto in the manuscript of his memoir which would be published posthumously 
by his children as the Autobiography of August Bondi, he affirmed: 
I had made up my mind when yet a boy to devote my life to the furtherance of 
progress and liberty. These resolutions remained unshaken throughout my 
eventful life. I have throughout remained faithful to the principles to which I 
have pledged allegiance in the stormy days of ‘48.97 
 
This allegiance to a universalist egalitarianism, to the tenets of democratic Enlightenment, and 
for freedom and emancipation for all, might be contrasted with the particular and national 
allegiances Bondi swore to the United States when signing to affirm his passport application. Yet 
in sum, Bondi’s life might indeed be construed as emblematic of a lifelong commitment to 
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transnational freedom. On the surface, this certainly seems the case. As if to head off future 
criticism, Bondi himself goes to great lengths to address the authenticity of his narrative in the 
early pages of his Autobiography:  
My children, and whoever else may read these lines, let me impress on you my 
assurance that in this, my autobiography and memoirs, I have not described nor 
mentioned anything which my ears have not heard or my eyes not seen – 
except where I state the events from hearsay, and so declare. Some historians 
or memorialists may contradict some of my accounts … but remember, I was on 
hand at times and places where others were not. I have never favored that 
embellishment and romanticised tradition should take the place of history, 
which should be nothing else but true description of the actual happenings and 
events during the different epochs of humanity as they passed and were 
acted.98 
 
These assertions of Bondi’s, though seemingly genuine, might be met with at least some 
skepticism. One considers that an historical actor reflecting upon his life, and particularly at the 
end of that life, far removed from the major events of his youth, to be an exercise in selective 
memory and perhaps even self-hagiography. Bondi might have been tempted in writing his 
memoirs to emphasize those events of which he was most proud, or to burnish them with a 
positive, progressive sheen. It is important that we historians and students of the past do not 
carelessly engage in deification of our historical subjects; we ought to be as critical of their 
actions and statements – even from those for whom we have great affinity – as we might during 
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any other analytical endeavor. Surely such skepticism was at play in 1942 when James C. Malin 
wrote “Bondi lived to a ripe old age and wrote voluminous reminiscences and letters. Without 
documentary support, little credence can be given Bondi’s statements, but they have become 
the principal foundation for articles on the Jewish associations of John Brown.” Elsewhere, Malin 
calls Bondi’s stated memories “not disinterested,” “lurid,” and “unreliable.”99 
Healthy skepticism aside, one may choose to weigh the evidence and conclude that 
Bondi’s claims to an “eventful” life, and of devotion to the “furtherance of progress and liberty” 
is merited. Bondi’s was an incredible life. At fifteen he mounted the barricades in Vienna to fight 
against Metternich’s imperial forces; his young adulthood was spent traveling the American 
South as a steamship waterman on the Mississippi River and along the Gulf Coast; in an unlikely 
development, he befriended John Brown and fought alongside him in Kansas against pro-slavery 
forces and border ruffians; in the years just prior to the American Civil War, he would come to 
organize stops along the Underground Railroad in Kansas with his wife and fellow abolitionist 
Henrietta Einstein, another German-speaking Jewish immigrant from near Augsburg, Bavaria; 
and when war did break out, he enlisted and fought in Company K of the Fifth Kansas Volunteer 
Cavalry Regiment, the operations of which would take him to battles and skirmishes in Arkansas, 
Missouri, and back again through Kansas. Through all of these and more, Bondi demonstrated, 
as many young people do, a romantic streak, an inclination toward adventure and excitement, 
but also a strong idealism at his core, and a willingness to fight for that which he believed. But 
more than this, Bondi’s narrative also cements a lifelong commitment toward egalitarianism and 
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freedom for his fellow woman and man, a willingness to engage politically, and with violence 
when necessary, to overturn the institutions that upheld tyranny and slavery. 
For Bondi, this commitment to freedom was inspired by his family and their traditions. 
His father, Herz Emanuel Mendel Bondi, loomed large in this respect. The younger Bondi cites 
his father’s commitment to Freemason principles, his activity with secret societies generally, and 
his unwavering respect for Napoleon’s emancipation of European Jews. Bondi was thus 
inculcated from the earliest years with respect for “mental improvement,” “mutual aid and 
assistance,” and “religious liberty.”100 But perhaps most significantly, Bondi was steered by his 
faith. By his own words he stayed firm in the practice of Judaism throughout his life, and he 
repeatedly cites his lifelong commitment to the religion as among his guiding tenets. Among the 
more significant of his life’s events, from a confessional standpoint – his marriage, the marriage 
of his daughters, his own funeral – all of these were officiated by rabbis.101 Among the most 
memorable entries of his Civil War diaries is one wherein he chanced upon a Southern Jewish 
family while fighting in Arkansas, and broke bread with them for Rosh Hashanah.102 Yet even as 
a faithful Jew, Bondi eschewed sectarianism, as a certain ecumenical universalism also seems to 
have guided him. He wrote: 
While keeping a strictly Jewish house, my parents favored my knowledge of 
other religions. I had read the New Testament before I was eight years old. […] 
My parents always impressed upon their children that Jews or Christians, high 
or low, all are children of a common Father. These principles affected my 
conduct all through life.103 
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In this chapter, I intend to explore the shape of transnational freedom movements, 
particularly those connecting Continental Europe to the United States, using the revolutionary 
life of August Bondi as a vehicle to do so.104 Bondi and other Forty-Eighter emigrants would 
come to view America and the New World generally through a prism of their own making, and 
thus see opportunity to dismantle and remake the world – economically, socially, culturally, and 
politically – when conditions at home had failed them. When it became clear to freedom 
fighters on both sides of the Atlantic that moral and political gradualism toward parliamentary, 
democratic systems of governance, or toward anti-slavery and abolitionist movements, were to 
be ineffective, they would turn to markedly more radical approaches, and sometimes to 
violence to enact the changes they sought. The formative idealism and eventual radicalization of 
Bondi thus becomes a fascinating study for understanding these wider events.  
 
A Short Historiography: August Bondi in the Literature 
American Jewish historiography has in recent decades become re-engaged on the topic 
of Jewish identity in the nineteenth century generally, and in the American South particularly.105 
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The lives of individual Jewish men and women and their stories naturally play prominently in 
this literature, but there remain noticeable lacunae for many less well-known actors. For a 
historical figure whose life story is seemingly so compelling – Jewish or otherwise – it is 
surprising how obscure August Bondi remains to this day. Indeed, few outside a select group of 
scholars interested in American Jewry, or those familiar with nineteenth century abolitionism in 
Kansas, might have even encountered his name. Not long after his death, his children published 
the aforementioned Autobiography of August Bondi (1910), which sowed the seeds, albeit in a 
limited fashion, for future historical inquiry. His living memory and legacy had remained strong 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Kansas counties where he had 
resided just before and again after the American Civil War. Bondi’s political engagement and 
community ties would thus remain fixed throughout his life. He owned a successful law practice 
in Salina and served as judge, land office clerk and postmaster there.106 A fixture of Saline 
County, Bondi served on various boards and community groups, including the Kansas board of 
state charitable organizations in 1885.107 Throughout his public life, Bondi seems to have earned 
the respect and devotion of his fellow Kansans, especially among those who resided in 
Republican-leaning quarters. The target of erstwhile political attacks from more conservative 
elements, his fellow citizens often came to his defense. When defamed by a Kansas City 
newspaper in 1884, editors of The Atchison Globe issued their formal reply: “The rot and ruck 
(as the Champion would say) recently published in the Kansas City Journal with reference to 
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August Bondi, of Salina, is pronounced a miserable low flung lie.”108 A testament to Bondi’s 
influence in Kansas to this day, numerous historical markers across the state, and a street in 
Greeley, a Free Soil town that he founded in 1857, all bear his name. 
But Bondi’s memory would be less pronounced geographically outside of Kansas and 
temporally in the years following his death in 1907; he would thereafter fade to near obscurity 
by the end of the twentieth century. It was not for lack of trying on Bondi’s part that his memory 
would diminish. As a member of the board of directors of the Kansas State Historical Society 
until 1905, Bondi was certainly attuned to matters of historical memory and preservation.109 
Understanding the historical significance of his life’s events, he donated his papers to the 
archives of the Kansas State Historical Society, and further, sent mimeographed typeset copies 
of his manuscript under the title “Personal Reminiscences of August Bondi” (1903), along with 
select personal correspondence, to the American Jewish Historical Society in New York City.110 
Both collections are incredibly rich in their presentation of Bondi’s life and the pivotal moments 
of America’s history through which he lived. 
But the reach of these archival collections would ultimately prove limited. Historians of 
American Jewry in the nineteenth century, and of the 1848 revolutions, especially those with 
particular focus on its transnational dimensions, do include short, passing references to Bondi in 
their work. His life is certainly not absent from the historical record within these specific 
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research areas. Bondi receives treatment of up to several paragraphs each in works from 
Bertram Wallace Korn and Bruce Levine, two important scholars of nineteenth century American 
Jewry and German migration, respectively. In using Bondi, Korn focuses on the wartime 
experiences and relative isolation of observant Jews, while Levine employs him when 
referencing the Bleeding Kansas episode, and in assessing the impact of radicalizing German 
influences on antislavery rhetoric.111 At the intersection of these disciplines, Jewish abolitionism, 
Bondi naturally gets the most attention, and twentieth century scholars such as Jayme Sokolow 
and Leon Hϋhner go into great detail on Bondi’s exploits in Kansas.112 But more recent 
scholarship, such as Mischa Honeck’s 2011 study of German-speaking revolutionary immigrants, 
We are the Revolutionists, offers only a modicum of coverage. Typically terse vis-à-vis Bondi is 
Honeck’s solitary sentence in the book about the freedom fighter: “Charles Kaiser and August 
Bondi, two Forty-Eighter emigrants who joined John Brown’s guerilla band to fight proslavery 
settlers, deeply impressed Hale.”113 
If traditional academic interest in him would be less than overwhelming, Bondi would 
find more purchase among cultural and popular media sources, especially those from Jewish 
publications and organizations. A poet and librettist, Aaron Kramer published A Ballad of August 
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Bondi in 1955.114 Commissioned for “the tercentenary of Jewish life in North America,” the work 
would eventually be set to the music of Serge Hovey and performed by the Jewish Young 
Folksingers along with Pete Seeger at the Brooklyn Academy of Music.115 Also in 1955 appeared 
the first biography of Bondi, in Yiddish, written by Abraham Bick.116 Meanwhile a novelist, Lloyd 
Alexander, wrote a Bildungsroman for Jewish young adults celebrating Bondi’s life several years 
later in 1958. The book is quite clearly a work of fiction and renders Bondi in the most virtuous 
of terms, but it does hew quite closely to Bondi’s memoirs as published in Autobiography.117 If 
these represent a cultural highwater mark for Bondi at the middle of the twentieth century, a 
full twenty-five years would pass before the first and only full-length English language biography 
of Bondi would be published, by Martin Litvin, in 1981.118 At over 400 pages, the work is 
engaging, comprehensively researched, and well-written. But its publication with a minor 
historical press in Illinois, the Galesburg Historical Society, is indicative of the sort of attention 
Bondi continues to receive by historians.119  
Most recently, in the last ten years, Bondi and his associates in Kansas have seen a small 
resurgence in popularity. Bondi in particular has garnered attention from at least one 
newspaperman-cum-novelist, and a filmmaker. Aaron Barnhart of the Kansas City Star wrote an 
 
114 Aaron Kramer, The Ballad of August Bondi, AJHS Monographs, PS3521.R29 B32, American Jewish 
Historical Society, New York, United States, January 16-17, 2020. 
115 Donald Gilzinger, Jr. and Cary Nelson, “Aaron Kramer: American Prophet,” in Wicked Times: Selected 
Poems by Aaron Kramer (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), xivi. 
116 Abraham Bick, August Bondi (New York: Jewish Publications and Research Committee, 1955). 
117 Lloyd Alexander, Border Hawk: August Bondi (New York: Covenant Books, 1958). An original dust jacket 
heralds the Covenant imprint as “a new and fascinating series designed to take young people, eleven to 
fifteen years of age, on an adventurous expedition into the realms of Jewish experience.” Moreover, 
Covenant offers “Stories of Jewish Men and Women To Inspire and Instruct Young People.” 
118 Martin Litvin, The Journey (Galesburg, Illinois: Galesburg Historical Society, 1981). 
119 Galesburg is noteworthy for being the imprint that published Bondi’s Autobiography in 1910, and 
several generations of Bondi’s offspring would also settle and live in this corner of Illinois. Interestingly, 




adaptation of Alexander’s Border Hawk, which, like Alexander’s book, is a historical novella for 
young adults, and simply titled Firebrand. Published by Quindaro Press, a publishing house 
interested in local Kansas history and co-founded by Barnhart and his wife, Dianne Eickhoff, the 
book hews closely to the original tale written by Alexander nearly seventy years prior.120 2020, 
meanwhile, saw what was billed by its creators as “the first feature-length documentary” on the 
topic of mid-nineteenth century transnational Jewish freedom fighters: The Jewish 48’ers, a 
well-researched film that attempts to fill a historical gap, but in so doing, borders on 
hagiography of its subjects. “[It] is the story of revolution failed and redeemed,” asserts a teaser 
on the film’s website, which is included among other bits of inspiring uplift. Bondi does make an 
appearance in the film, albeit a fleeting one. Even in this, a study of the formative Jewish figures 
of transnational freedom, he remains only a minor character; just two of the film’s fifty minutes 
contain the entirety of Bondi’s life.121 Also in 2020, The Good Lord Bird was released. A fictional 
television miniseries from Showtime about John Brown’s exploits in Kansas Territory and leading 
up to his eventual attack on Harper’s Ferry, West Virginia, it is inspired by a James McBride 
novel of the same name. Though based upon John Brown’s public life in Kansas and West 
Virginia, it is almost entirely fictive.122 It is fitting (and mostly accurate) when the show’s 
narrator, Onion, offers this rejoinder in the opening episode of the series: “John Brown’s 
fearsome [Kansas] army weren’t nothing but a ragtag assortment of the scrawniest, saddest-
looking individuals I had ever saw: bushwhackers, sticky-roped cattle rustlers, an Indian — even 
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a Jew.”123 With only a few exceptions, and even in fiction, Bondi remains obscure. Perhaps a 
twenty-first century public increasingly interested in the history of abolitionism and civil rights 
will learn something more of his story in the coming decade. Bondi’s biographer, Martin Litvin, 
makes plain his rationale for writing about Bondi in his selection of top epigraph for the book, 
which references a quotation attributed to Studs Terkel: “[T]he lives of obscure or forgotten 
figures are often more significant than we realize.”124 One easily imagines the truth of this 
statement in considering the life of August Mendel Bondi. 
 
“From smallest acorns / Largest oaks do grow”: Bondi and Revolution in Vienna125 
A standard historiography of 1848 emphasizes the amalgam of social, technological, 
economic, and political developments which had coalesced across Europe by the mid-1840s. 
Most prominent among these were social instability, major crop failures of potato, wheat and 
rye, a resultant severe economic downturn, spreading intellectual contagion of revolutionary 
rhetoric, and an explosion in new technologies, among them in industry, communications, and 
transportation. These would all combine to set off the revolutionary events that reverberated 
across the entirety of Europe, and in so doing, inspire an awakening of nationalisms across the 
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continent, what would come to be called by later historians the “springtime of the peoples.”126 
Once set into motion, these effects caused political agitation and the fall of governments from 
Paris, Budapest and Vienna to Sicily, Naples, Krakow, Berlin and Prague. As incredible as these 
developments were, they would also prove to be rather short-lived. Indeed, by late 1848, with 
support from Tsar Nicholas in Russia, the monarchist counterrevolution would mobilize, and 
ultimately prove more formidable than the revolutionary forces unleashed earlier in the year. 
The short-term revolutionary and democratic gains thus proved ultimately elusive. But even 
amid failure, the revolutionary reverberations would nonetheless be felt in incredible ways and 
have profound and lasting effects on the peoples living across all of Europe during this period. 
So, too, was it for the Bondy family in Vienna.127 In Autobiography, August Bondi 
describes how in 1846 his father’s firm, Emanuel Bondy Söhne (Emanuel Bondy and Sons), went 
bankrupt after “severe losses through mercantile failures in Italy, Galicia and Hungary.”128 
Bondi’s father, Herz Emanuel, would serve time in a debtor’s prison while the bankruptcy 
proceedings unfolded, and would subsequently become seriously ill. Bondi describes this period 
of two and a half years without his father as a time of great tribulation and hardship for his 
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family. But if the years 1846-48 were challenging to him, they would also prove equally 
inspiring; it was a for the young Bondi a time of intellectual and political awakening. He excelled 
in his studies in a Catholic Gymnasium and later at university, learning along the way rhetoric, 
poetry, Latin, and several modern languages. During this time, his professors would have an 
especially profound influence upon him. One of his teachers, a Prof. Podlaha, introduced Bondi 
to the writings of Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, along with myriad other primary 
documents from the American Revolution in German translation.129 It is significant that, outside 
of referencing De Ista Rustica, an Ode from Horace that he memorized, recited and analyzed in 
front of his rhetoric class, the documents of the American Revolution are the only ones from his 
philosophical and literary education which he identifies by name.130 His education, he maintains, 
was “of the best,” and “far ahead of the American high-school humbug,” but still “yet infinitely 
inferior to the [educational system]” in Prussia at that time.131  
This comparison is notable, for it would be a call to “Freedom to teach and learn,” in the 
Prussian style which would, in part, animate the student uprisings against Prince Metternich and 
the Hapsburg Monarchy in early March 1848. This demand would be joined by others on a 
petition circulated by students from Vienna’s universities. Inspired by events in revolutionary 
France and Hungary, the students called for the formation of a national guard (a check to an 
imperial hegemony on state violence); a redress of grievances around corruption in the 
government, courts, and Catholic Church; and for basic freedoms to be enshrined in a new 
constitution: the “Freedom of conscience; Freedom of the press,” and the aforementioned 
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“Freedom to teach and learn.”132 By Bondi’s estimation, nearly 10,000 students from the 
“faculties [of] Philosophy, Medicine and Law; the students at the Polytechnical School, and the 
students at the Academy of Arts,” gathered and agitated “with youthful enthusiasm” for these 
reforms of the Austrian imperial government for several days starting on March 12.133 The 
protests grew markedly and came to embrace demands for Metternich’s resignation. Violence 
and barricades fighting ensued, with Bondi’s own Academic Legion taking a leading role in 
confronting the Viennese city police and Austrian imperial troops. Bondi, present when his 
company in the Academic Legion allegedly constructed the city’s first barricades, and with 
perhaps only some embellishment, writes: “My children, it was your father, who not yet 15 
years old, had lifted the first granite paving block to start the first barricade in Vienna.”134 In one 
brief, but violent encounter with imperial troops, Bondi survived a volley of musket fire shot into 
the unarmed crowds, one which felled one of his close friends, “Heinrich Sptizer, 18 years old, a 
Jewish student of the Technical school, an only son of his parents, from Voisenz.” Sptizer and 
another dead student fell onto Bondi, “bring[ing] me down with him, and [yet] another student 
of the same school [fell] over us both.” In the scuffle that followed, Bondi, attempting to crawl 
free from his dead classmates, receives from one of the soldiers a rifle butt to his head and a 
glancing bayonet wound to his back.135 It was the first of many such encounters, close calls or 
near-death experiences while fighting, that greeted Bondi throughout his life. That he continued 
fighting demonstrates in him a great deal of resilience and determination in character. After 
several days of such protest and fighting in the streets, the imperial authorities seemingly lost 
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their nerve. Indeed, already distracted and weakened by revolutionary events occurring across 
the empire – in Italy and Hungary, particularly – Metternich’s government lost control of the 
situation in the metropole. The government ultimately fell, Metternich himself fled in exile to 
London, and the Emperor instated a new cabinet of liberal ministers, acceding to the protestors’ 
demands and sowing the seeds for a new constitution.136 
The revolutionaries’ gains in Austria would prove fleeting, however, as they would 
across much of Europe. Indeed, by late summer, the imperial counterrevolution was to be in full 
force, and in large measure, revolution and uprisings across the continent were ultimately and 
bloodily put down, and monarchies restored. The revolutions had failed.  
Yet as we have seen in the preceding chapter, the seeds had been sown for future gains. 
The revolutionaries themselves would be so inspired, even in their failure to enact meaningful 
democratic and liberal reforms within Europe. Looking toward the future, they would come to 
apply and instrumentalize these lessons in other places, and in other facets of their lives. Recall 
Alexander Herzen plea to his son from his exile in London: “Modern man … only builds a bridge – 
it will be for the unknown man of the future to pass over it. You may be there to see him. … But 
do not, I beg you, remain on this shore … Better to perish with the revolution than to seek 
refuge in the almshouse of reaction.”137 Bondi, too would affix his gaze to the future, as these 
formative revolutionary experiences imbued within him the egalitarian principles that would 
come to define his politics for the rest of his life. He and his fellow revolutionaries, many of 
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them, like Bondi, forced to flee after the successful counterrevolutions had taken hold, would 
continue to seek ways to spread a revolutionary rhetoric and an expanding political 
emancipation to an ever-growing list of countries around the world. For Bondi and his family, 
this meant doing so in what many European liberals considered a beacon freedom, the United 
States. 
 
“Thence to the United States, where others had preceded them”138 
As we have seen in Chapter One, amazing numbers of German-speaking migrants 
representing countless nationalities, religions, confessions, classes, and backgrounds made their 
way to North America in the wake of 1848. Bade and Oltmer, Niall Ferguson, and others 
describe both the sheer numbers and incredible cultural influence of these migrants in the New 
World, and particularly in the United States. Per Bade and Oltmer, transatlantic migration 
networks connected “relatives, acquaintances, and communities of shared origin” on both 
continents. Especially influential were the so-called “‘emigrant letters’ that circulated within the 
circles of relatives and friends back home,” connecting regions and communities in Europe with 
corresponding regions and communities in America. It is in this way that “the exodus began to 
follow in its own tracks,” and how American cities across the country – New York, Philadelphia, 
Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Saint Louis, New Orleans, and Galveston – came to have a distinctly 
German flavor.139  
 
138 Quote from August Bondi, Autobiography, 16. 
139 Klaus J. Bade and Jochen Oltmer, “Germany,” in The Encyclopedia of Migration and Minorities in 
Europe from the 17th Century to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 69. Fully 90% 
of these German-speaking emigrants were bound for the United States, with Canada, Brazil, Argentina 
and Australia comprising most of the remaining 10%. Write Bade and Oltmer, “Between 1816 and 1914, 
about 5.5 million Germans emigrated to the USA, and since then, another 2 million. […] Between 1820 




Regardless of their origin or destination, all migrants carry with them distinct cultural 
artifacts and practices which they employ as they navigate the complex social and cultural 
realities of immigrant life in their new homes. But among the 1848ers, especially, many also 
carried with them a certain political sensibility – a sense of revolutionary and radical republican 
politics, a moral suasion, and a commitment to egalitarian principles – which they would apply 
upon arrival to their new home. It is hardly surprising that these revolutionaries who fought for 
Enlightenment ideals across Europe would find in the United States a political and social 
situation that was ripe for engagement. As we have seen, many immigrants saw in the United 
States an opportunity to enact the reforms and social changes that had largely eluded them 
back home.140 But so too for the 1848ers was America a complication, an ambiguity, and a 
contradiction. To them the United States was an experiment in building a new liberal order 
based upon Enlightenment ideals of freedom and individualism – yet it was also one that most 
decidedly did not live up to its aspirational creed. While asserting in its founding documents that 
all men are created equal, the United States simultaneously embraced chattel slavery and the 
attendant subjugation of humans for the benefit of a few, something European liberals found 
hard to square with their most optimistic ideas about America. Despite such ambiguity – or 
 
and from 1861 to 1890 it was even the largest.” Niall Ferguson posits similar figures of the mass exodus 
from Europe during these years, attributing the huge influx to economic and political refugees. Niall 
Ferguson, “The European Economy, 1815-1914,” in The Short Oxford History of Europe: The Nineteenth 
Century, ed. T.C.W. Blanning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 108-111. For primary and epistolary 
sources exemplifying migrant letters and chain migration networks, see Walter D. Kamphoefner, 
Wolfgang Helbrich and Ulrike Sommer, Editors, News from the Land of Freedom: German Immigrants 
Write Home, trans. Susan Carter Vogel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). See also Stanley Nadel, 
Little Germany: Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in New York City, 1845-80 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1990). 




perhaps because of it – German and German-Jewish immigrants continued to pour into the 
United States in the middle years of the nineteenth century.  
For the Bondy family, in particular, the destination of their journey was New Orleans. 
German deluge notwithstanding, the ties between New Orleans and Europe, especially its 
northern major port cities of Bremen, Hamburg, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Liverpool, were 
particularly robust from even the earliest years of the nineteenth century.141 By the mid-
nineteenth century, New Orleans had become one of the most cosmopolitan cities in all North 
America, defined also by a small, but growing Jewish population.142 A major port city, and the 
largest and most important city in the southern United States, it was second only to New York in 
terms of net immigration between the years 1837-60. New Orleans attracted 52,011 immigrants 
during 1851, which was equal to new arrivals that year in Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore 
combined. Between 1820 and 1860, over half a million newcomers made their way to America 
via the Port of New Orleans. Leslie Gale Parr describes how, "by 1850, the mixture of older and 
newer arrivals – French, Spanish, Africans, English, Germans, Irish, Greeks, Swiss, Portuguese, 
Italians, Cubans, Filipinos, Mexicans, Croats, Slavs, Chinese, Sicilians, and others – produced the 
fifth largest and one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the United States."143 
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In her paper “The German Secrets of New Orleans,” Patricia Herminghouse vividly 
describes quotidian city life which greeted German and German-Jewish immigrant arrivals to 
Louisiana from northern Europe.144 Herminghouse emphasizes both economic and public health 
challenges that were manifest. Extreme competition in the labor market resulted from a paucity 
of jobs due to slave labor, and also from the intense competition between newly arrived 
immigrants and free black labor for the jobs that remained. Equally problematic was the abject 
rates of morbidity that immigrants encountered through outbreaks of yellow fever, typhus, 
cholera, ship fever, and other tropical disease. Yellow fever was among the more startling in its 
terrible effects. “Statistically speaking,” she writes, no less than “one out of every five Irish and 
one out of every eight Germans in the city succumbed to [yellow fever at mid-century].”145 To 
the latter point, Elizabeth Wisner agrees. In her seminal work, Public Welfare in the South, 
Wisner positions New Orleans as a “major port in a semitropical climate near the mouth of the 
Mississippi River,” where “shipping and epidemic disease [were] closely associated.”146 New 
Orleans thus typified a location where waterborne and mosquito-borne illness proliferated; dirty 
water and open reservoirs meant that scourges of disease regularly wreaked havoc on the city, 
as they did in similar port cities across the South, like Natchez, Mobile, and Galveston. On 
keeping healthy and avoiding waterborne illness from the filthy piped drinking water within New 
Orleans proper, one German language newspaper instructed its readers in 1853: “Trink kein 
Wasser – Trink Bier! (Don’t drink water – drink beer!).”147 
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Even in a public health crisis so dire, the city's efforts were yet unable to keep pace with 
the large influx of immigrants. Prevailing attitudes around the topic of social aid and welfare 
stifled public investment in relief programs for the poor and destitute of New Orleans and 
resulted in the widespread adoption of mutual aid and benevolent societies. Immigrant 
communities thus found safety and security by turning inward and helping one another when 
governments otherwise would fail them. For Jews in New Orleans, these included The Hebrew 
Benevolent Association, The Howard Charitable Organization, and the B’nai B’rith Lodge of New 
Orleans.148 Wisner posits that this outlook largely arose out of the Roman Catholic beliefs of the 
city's earliest settlers, who considered the church and private charity to be the primary 
caretakers of the city's poor. Even as yellow fever ravaged the city in 1822, the city's mayor, 
while acknowledging the desperate situation, nevertheless professed that "in circumstances so 
grave and injurious, public benevolence is much less effective and less powerful than private 
charity." Relative to neighboring southern states, Louisiana did not pass legislation requiring 
public aid for the state's impoverished until very late, in 1880, and in subsequent years, New 
Orleans would lag behind nearly every other major city in the amount spent per capita on public 
welfare.149 Despite these challenges, the German-speaking population of New Orleans would 
nevertheless grow markedly during the mid-nineteenth century, mirroring similar developments 
across the entire United States. Still, precisely because of these challenges, German and 
German-Jewish immigrants in the main used New Orleans as a point of embarkation for 
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destinations further inland – and they did so by employing the major shipping and 
transportation routes along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, landing in cities as far removed as 
Saint Louis, Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. Each of these cities would see large influxes of 
German and German-Jewish immigrants during this era.  
This ultimately was the route taken by the newly arrived Bondi family. They arrived at 
New Orleans on November 10, 1848 after a three-week voyage from the Free Hanseatic City of 
Bremen on the steamship Rebecca. As a testament to their relative affluence, the passenger 
manifest identifies the Bondis as four of the eight passengers who took passage on Rebecca in 
private cabins, as compared to the many dozens of others, among them farmers, carpenters, 
weavers, butchers, tailors, shoemakers and servants, who stayed below in steerage. By the 
manifest, Herz Emanuel, 48, Martha, 38, Henriette, 13, and August, 15, comprised the entirety 
of their party. Others aboard the ship hailed from Bavaria, Polish-speaking Eastern Prussia, and 
various other German principalities. Bondi’s recollections of the transit are generally supported 
by the available documentary evidence, including official immigration and shipboard 
documents. He writes, “The vessel had 180 steerage and three cabin passengers, besides us. We 
occupied one on the upper deck, a small cabin with two large berths.”150 Bondi does not make 
plain in Autobiography how his parents ultimately decided to continue their journey onward 
into America’s interior, but one suspects that poor job prospects and the lingering threat of 
disease in New Orleans, as well as possible familial ties to Missouri compelled them to continue 
their journey into the country’s interior. Like others on their ship, the Bondis headed inland, this 
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time on the steamship Buena Vista, and they disembarked in Saint Louis; others on board were 
bound variously for Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, and Ohio. 
Bondi would prove restless in the first years in the United States, splitting his time 
between Saint Louis, New Orleans, Galveston, and Louisville, where his parents eventually 
settled and opened a department store. His early, wandering lifestyle on the western frontier is 
emblematic of what Shari Rabin describes as the experience of many nineteenth century Jews in 
the United States. These “wandering sons of Israel” sought economic opportunity and religious 
and political freedom; the fluidity of the American frontier, and its opportunity for one to 
remake oneself created a brand-new reality for many Jews across the southern and western 
reaches of the country. Mobility and freedom of movement in the United States was an entirely 
new social construct for Jewish immigrants from Europe. Where they had before been taxed and 
harassed by the authorities, they could now move about the country, relatively unmolested, and 
seek out new identities and opportunities in their new home. Writes Rabin,  
Jews and their fellow migrants came from places in Europe where religious 
identity was a bureaucratic category that determined one’s possibilities for 
residence, travel, economic opportunity, and religious life. In the United States, 
by contrast, such regulations were almost nonexistent for those who were 
determined to be white and male. […] Their identity – and that of anyone they 
knew – could be a product of their own creation as much a fact of personal 
history.151 
 
Bondi, perhaps responding to and emulating the practices of others, and perhaps intuitively 
seeking out opportunity and excitement his own way, adopted this very lifestyle. He tried his 
hand for a time as a shopkeeper in Saint Louis but found the work too pedestrian for him. “I 
hired with the Ruthenburg Bros., dry goods, one door south of the old theater […] I staid with 
 




them at $8 per month from Dec. 1 to March 1. When first ordered to sweep the store I broke 
out in tears. A late member of the Vienna Legion to do such menial work – but soon I came to it, 
but never became a proficient sweeper.”152 He tried his hand at printing, hiring on at the 
German language periodical Anzeiger des Westens to learn typesetting and printing, and spent 
time besides teaching, learning to garden, and working in a tavern.153 Owing to his connections 
to Anzeiger des Westens and its editor, Henry Boernstein, a fellow Austrian radical, Bondi 
became engaged with American politics from nearly the first. His father meanwhile took to 
peddling and cigarmaking, and his mother and sister to needlework – but Bondi himself felt 
called to something more. Saint Louis in 1849 clearly offered excitement and variety aplenty; in 
the words of Steven Rowan, it was “a raw, expanding boomtown, burgeoning on the trade of 
the American river system and from the overland trade to the opening of the West and 
Southwest,” full of potential, “amoral energy” and “entrepreneurial spirit.”154  
But Bondi seemingly became tired of the city and fixed his view again to foreign shores. 
He joined in 1851 the second of two Saint Louis divisions of “a liberating army” bound for Cuba, 
whose aim was to aid in the Cuban independence movement against the Spanish. “When news 
of the defeat and annihilation of the first division reached St. Louis, … the second division 
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disbanded.”155 Not one to be discouraged, he nevertheless returned to New Orleans in October 
of that year, seeking to join Commodore Matthew Perry’s naval expedition to Japan. When this, 
too, failed – he reports: “they had just closed the recruiting office; I had reached it too late” – 
Bondi elected, finally, to enlist on Brazos, a steamship that operated reliably between New 
Orleans and Galveston, Texas. The skipper of the ship, a certain captain named Thomas Henry 
Chubb, was in Bondi’s words, “a Boston Yankee, afterwards a Commodore in the Confederate 
service, and one of the most successful Confederate smugglers and blockade runners.”156 Bondi, 
down to his last $1.15, contented himself with his new employ, and “having purchased a big bag 
full of wormy crackers for my supper and breakfast for 5 cents,” settled down and “slept nicely 
on some sacks of grain on deck.”157 
Such was Bondi’s life over the next four years: adventurous wandering about the 
American Southwest, untethered to any one location, and largely independent of the 
expectations of others (save perhaps from those of his employer). He sought and took 
opportunity when he found it and tried his hand at nearly any trade that was presented to him.  
He considered variously moving to California or settling again in Saint Louis; but his politics led 
him eventually to Kansas. In this he claims to have been inspired by Horace Greeley’s clarion call 
to Free Soil advocates across the country. Writes Bondi, “About the middle of March [1854], I 
happened on a Greeley leader in the New York Tribune, appealing to the freedom loving men of 
the states to rush to Kansas and save it from the curse of slavery to be fastened on it by the 
‘squatter sovereignty’ principle contained in the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.”158 Whether this 
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represented for Bondi an altruistic overture guided by principle, a chance to stake out land and 
opportunity in Kansas Territory, or simply was for him another adventure is unclear. Perhaps 
most likely is that various interests compelled him. But whatever his exact motivation, the end 
result is that he immediately went west to Kansas, arriving on 2 April 1854, and made once 
again a new life for himself. This new life included meeting John Brown and his sons, riding and 
fighting with them against pro-slavery, “border ruffian” forces from Missouri, meeting and 
marrying his wife, Henrietta Einstein, and fashioning a home with her that secreted as a stop 
along the Underground Railroad. The Civil War, when it broke out, took him east again, but at its 
conclusion, he finally settled down in again in Kansas, where he would live the rest of his (mostly 
uneventful) years.  
 
“Enthusiastic Jew and Lover of Humanity”: Bondi, Judaism and the Slavery Question 
August Bondi’s professed commitment to Judaism was to him a lodestar his entire life. 
Like other Jewish revolutionaries who emigrated to the United States, his religion was the 
Reformed Judaism of his parents that in large measure guided his egalitarian principles. That 
Napoleonic Enlightenment, Freemasonry principles, and Judaism all played prominent roles in 
Bondi’s identification and political outlook is self-evident. But it is precisely the articulation of his 
religious upbringing that Bondi emphasizes, indeed, that which he returns to again and again 
during the narrative of his life’s events. One early memory stands out. In Autobiography, Bondi 
recounts how, during his youth in Vienna, he would take long walks with his tutor, discussing 
theology and its intersection with politics. Writes Bondi, “My tutor, Moritz Stern, was liberal 
minded, yet an enthusiastic Jew, and whenever we walked for an airing, conversed with me on 




help forming my mind according to the command of Moses, ‘Thou must love the Eternal, thy 
God and thy neighbor as thyself.’” He ends this paragraph with a simple, if fragmentary, 
conclusion: “Enthusiastic Jew and lover of humanity.”159 Whether he is speaking only of his tutor 
in making this pronouncement or means to suggest that he adopted this ethos for himself out of 
his conversations with Stern is unclear. But Bondi’s tutelage under Stern clearly left its mark. 
Bondi’s humanitarianism and its connection to Judaism is demonstrably clarion in his 
writing. Bondi, himself a “lover of humanity,” takes great pains to express the universalism that 
undergirded his values and beliefs. Within this universalist approach, it might be tempting to 
think that such a stance would dilute his own ethical and religious precepts. But his religion was 
by no means agnostic, nor was it a perfunctory religious practice devoid of personal meaning 
and communion with God. On the contrary, his Jewish faith was reportedly among the most 
important aspects of his identity. Yet he equally maintains never having wavered from a 
profound belief that the traditional tenets of all religions were to be respected, and that 
tolerance and pluralism in the public square was a symbol of a progressive, enlightened society. 
During Bondi’s upbringing, European Jews were hardly treated as equals, nor even as citizens in 
most countries. Theirs was not an unalienable right to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness,” as articulated by the Declaration of Independence, the translation of which he had 
found so compelling in his youth.160 Even after emancipation in the wake of the Napoleonic 
Wars, Jews were routinely discriminated against. In the Hapsburg monarchy, for instance, they 
were subject to special taxes payable to the throne for the right to be “tolerated” and to live 
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unmolested in the empire. Non-resident Jews were prohibited from conducting business within 
Vienna, and taxes, whether paid in full or not, did little to protect many from the pogroms and 
other violence directed at them. Indeed, pogroms were routine occurrences, especially among 
the working-class neighborhoods and suburbs of the city, and particularly during the periods of 
intense economic hardship that wracked the continent during the mid-1840s. Mike Rapport 
suggests that it is precisely because of the limited rights of Jews that led many of them to rally 
under the banner of revolution, and to promulgate the social and egalitarian changes that a 
successful revolution might have wrought.161 
Yet to Bondi, the treachery of some Christians was not reason to reject Christian 
theology, nor to discount the religious among his gentile classmates and comrades. Instead, he 
stresses that which joined them together in their struggle for freedom. During his last days in 
Vienna, with the revolution continuing apace, Bondi recounts an anecdote that is illustrative. On 
Corpus Christi Day, a holy feast day for Catholic Christians, Bondi found himself in the city 
center, by Saint Stephen’s Cathedral, in formation with the rest of the fighters of the Academic 
Legion. He writes: “The Jewish students, with one voice, decided to do just as their comrades 
did, so we Jewish members of the Legion knelt with our Catholic and Protestant comrades 
before the Christian Host. We did this also at a field mass celebrated in honor of our martyred 
dead, July 29 ’48, by the Legion Chaplain, Father Fϋster.”162 One imagines that more than 
egalitarian camaraderie guided Bondi and his Jewish friends when deciding to honor the 
Catholic feast day traditions. Indeed, pressure on Jews to conform must have been incredible, 
especially within the general milieu of antisemitism present in Vienna. But time and again, Bondi 
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returns to a humanistic interpretation of his Judaism in defining that which he had in common 
with his fellow woman and man. 
If an expanding conception of humanity brought him closer to practitioners of other 
religions, Bondi would also be confronted by the humanity of those of another race upon his 
arrival to the New World. Slavery and the direct subjugation of humans based on racial 
hierarchy was largely a theoretical construct at home in the metropole. Most Europeans in the 
imperial capitals of Europe would scarcely have encountered slavery and its horrors firsthand. At 
a brief stopover at La Balize, a fort at the mouth of the Mississippi River, and just a day before 
their planned arrival to New Orleans, Bondi bore witness to African slaves for the very first time. 
“On [November] 9th the tug stopped at a plantation for wood; I went ashore and there saw, for 
the first time, negroes at the sugar mill. They were late imports from Africa, men and women 
clad only in coffee sacks, open at both ends, slipped on and tied around the waist.”163 Bondi 
reserves direct comment on the plight of these particular slaves, but one cannot help but feel 
that he is stunned to encounter his fellow humans in bondage. Did it perhaps call to mind the 
Torah and its story of the Israelites, wandering and enslaved in Egypt, a foreign land? Bondi does 
not say, and he may have meant for the image to speak for itself.164 Practicing Jews of this 
period would have been most attuned to the image of the wandering, enslaved, and homeless 
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Israelites in bondage in Egypt.165 But a complication in his developing thoughts on black slaves 
and the institutions that enslaved them would ensue. It is not clear that Bondi felt a true 
connection to African-born slaves; his principled egalitarianism, extended so effortlessly to 
white Christians, may not have extended fully to black slaves at this stage in his life. For Bondi 
did indeed fight against slavery and took up arms to defeat it in Kansas.166 And overall, he found 
the practice to be abhorrent. But his was not a consistently virtuous rendering of the slaves he 
encountered through his early adult life. While in Texas, on the steamship Brazos, Bondi 
recounts speaking harshly against a white southerner who was cruel to his slave: “… on the first 
trip of the Brazos to the Trinity River, the bay was black with swans, pelicans, geese and ducks.” 
Bondi explains that the slave, a young boy, while assisting his master, dropped an oar into the 
water, thus scaring away the ducks his master intended to shoot. Instead,  
Young Morgan, mad, his gun ready for the ducks, deliberately emptied the load 
into the shoulder of the colored boy. I loudly condemned such cruelty (of course 
I put into my remarks all the vinegar of an eighteen year old smart aleck) when 
an old man, Reverend Roach, a minster of the Southern M. E. Church … 
reproved me …  and finished his remarks thus: “We have no use for northern 
abolitionists, and only your age protects you from deserved punishment.”167 
 
Bondi continues, matter-of-factly, on a seemingly unrelated matter, but perhaps means to 
highlight the cruelty of the slave system: “In February, 1852, three free mulatto sailors, citizens 
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of Boston, were, according to Texas law, sold into slavery for attempting to run off three slaves 
by hiding them in their outgoing vessel.”168 Again, he does not condemn this development 
outright, instead seemingly reserving his judgement. These appear not to be the words of one 
who approves or condones of slavery, but neither are they the words of one who is bounded by 
egalitarian principles enough to see the common humanity of those who are actually enslaved. 
 On this same trip to the Trinity River, the reader encounters perhaps the most 
complicated and challenging segment in all of Bondi’s writing. It is worth quoting at length: 
During my stay in Texas I gathered a great deal of information on southern life. 
When in Galveston the howlings of the slaves receiving their morning ration of 
cowhiding waked me at 4 o’clock a.m. I found the yankees the most cruel 
masters. The native southerner had the full knowledge of the negro character 
and treated slaves with regard to their disposition, so different from whites. 
Hospitable to any white man, no matter how poor, they yet had no 
consideration for the poor white laborer. The sick slave received attention, the 
sick white laborer none. I make these statements from my personal experience 
and observations. Every good looking young man from the north could have his 
pick of southern young ladies of first families. I was only 18 years old, yet if I had 
been willing, several of these young ladies would have fallen in love with me. I 
disliked to marry a woman with slaves. Had I staid south I would have joined the 
Confederate army, but while really I did not have much sympathy for the 
negroes, I felt that my father’s son was not to be a slave driver.169 
 
The argument here is redolent of those, southern sympathizers, who argue that slavery, based 
upon an inherent difference among the races, is good for the black slave, but bad for the white 
slave owner. Here Bondi does not suggest that whites and blacks are equal, or that slavery is 
repugnant and worthy of toppling as an institution. Nor is he here guided by his erstwhile 
universalist, egalitarian principles. Instead, he seems to suggest that he might just as easily have 
served in the employ of the Confederate Army, or have married a gentile Southerner, if only 
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circumstances had been slightly different. Only an internal compulsion that his father would not 
have approved of his being a slave owner seems to sway him from this possible course. This 
contextual and relativist outlook is greatly at odds with the picture Bondi is trying to present 
about the course of his life’s commitment to freedom. Yet one cannot diminish that which Bondi 
accomplished in freedom’s employ. Despite these complications to his character, it is clear that 
he nevertheless put himself at great risk, and repeatedly did so, to fight for freedom for black 
Americans; and despite his ambivalence on the idea of equality between the races, he and his 
wife, Henrietta Einstein, helped actual slaves to escape to their freedom, designating their own 
Kansas home as a stop along the Underground Railroad in the years before the war. It is perhaps 
in Bondi’s writing about John Brown wherein this commitment to egalitarian principles and a 
rejection of unjust laws and institutions, all embodiments of that which he calls “a free 
Commonwealth,” is at its strongest. He writes: 
Southern Kansas regarded John Brown as an emissary from God and an 
instrument of His revenge. Brown regarded the institution of slavery as the 
biggest roadblock in the march to civilization. […] We were united in a fraternal 
bond by love, reverence, and devotion to a man who, with tender words and 
wise counsel, prepared a handful of young men, in the depths of the wilderness 
at Ottawa Creek, to lay the foundation of a free Commonwealth. He always 
preached against slavery and hammered home to us that we should never 
accept existing laws and institutions if our conscience and reason told that they 
violate human rights.170 
 
This is indeed Bondi, honoring Brown and channeling his vision. But Bondi does this eloquently 
and approvingly, and it further serves to form a connective, intellectual bulwark against tyranny 
 
170 Quotation taken from Abraham Bick’s Veker un Kemfer: Amerikaner Yidn in Kamf kegn Shklaferey, 
1848-1865 [Wakers and Fighters: American Jews in the Fight against Slavery, 1848-1865] (New York: A 
Komitet, 1955). Quote translated from the Yiddish by Yankl Stillman in Yankl Stillman, “August Bondi and 





and illiberalism. It does so by integrating his stated religious tenets of the sacredness of human 
life, the universal political rights of all men and women, and the imperative of political 
engagement, agitation and even revolution, when necessary, to overturn unjust laws and 
institutions. Even with fleeting evidence to the contrary, this encapsulates the wider arc of 
Bondi’s intended legacy. 
The outbreak of The American Civil War, and Bondi’s participation in it, would only 
heighten the internal sense of his Jewishness. A sense of duty to country, passed onto him by his 
mother, Martha, was yet another important aspect of his religious practice. Bondi states that 
Martha inspired him thus: “as a Jehudi I had the duty to perform, to defend the institutions 
which gave equal rights to all beliefs.”171 Bondi’s mother would further support his son’s family 
during the war, allowing Bondi to enlist and fulfill his sacred duty. “[Since] I must defend my 
homeland, she would take care of my wife and [one-year-old] child. She kept her word for the 
entire period that I was in battle.”172 But as a Jew, far from home, it would also prove to be 
lonely in Company K of the Fifth Kansas Calvary. Bondi recounts a telling anecdote about his 
fellow soldiers:  
To my knowledge there were three Jehudim in the 5th K’s – Marcus Wittenberg, 
Co. F; Simon Wolff, of Co. E; and myself. Some time in July I accosted 
Wittenberg, asking if he was a Jehudi; he seemed first not to understand, then I 
repeated my inquiry, “Are you not a Jew?” He answered, “I’m Hungarian, my 
folks live near Lawrence.” There were several Hungarian Jew families settled on 
farms near Lawrence. A few days after that Wittenberg fell sick […] He was sent 
to Mound City hospital where he died [of blood poisoning on] August 31st. A 
few days after … his chum, John Emile, brought me some letters addressed to 
the deceased to interpret, as they were written a language unknown to him. 
There were letters from his parents, written in Hebrew, among others, 
informing him of the date of Rosh hashono and Jom-Kipur. Now, if Wittenberg 
had not denied his being a Jew I would have done all in my power to have 
 





treated for his ailments in post hospital and had seen him daily and had possibly 
saved him. The other Jehudi, Simon Wolff, would likewise not acknowledge 
being Jehudi. He was Sergeant of Co. E. and on the Colonel’s staff. I let him 
alone.173  
 
Bertram Korn suggests that, “It was unfortunate that he had no Jewish companionship because 
he was such a devout and loyal Jew. […] He felt keenly … his separation from Jewish activities 
and synagogue services. The closest he came to satisfying his intense Jewish loyalties was a Rosh 
Hashanah dinner with a [Confederate] Jewish family in Pine Bluff, Ark.”174 At least some of this 
seems projection onto Bondi by Korn. Bondi does not write extensively about his feelings of 
isolation. But it is also not a great leap to suggest the loneliness of a practicing Jew among a sea 
of gentiles in the Union Army, especially when the Jews he did know from Kansas largely seem 
to have either denied their Jewishness outright, or at minimum were inclined to have kept quiet 
about it. This isolation as a Jew would be a recurring theme throughout Bondi’s life. Even as a 
child, he noticed it well. The Catholic friars, his teachers in the Viennese Gymnasium, “paid no 
attention to the creed of their scholars. They were impartial educators.” But, he continues, “[i]n 
Parva the class numbered 106 students; when we reached Rhetoric we were but 96. In the First 
Grade there were six Jews. There were but two left when we entered the 6th grade.” 175  As an 
adult in the United States, living on the frontier in a strange new country, his Judaism was 
indeed challenging to practice. Jews had been living in the United States from the earliest days 
of colonial life and had only increased their presence in the intervening centuries. But organized 
religion was not a given anywhere outside of the larger, typically east coast cities. For Korn, 
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Bondi’s commitment to his faith, especially in the face of nearly insurmountable obstacles, “in 
the midst of death and danger,” is itself a remarkable achievement.176 
 
August Bondi’s Legacy 
The question of where the actual, documentable and verifiable life of August Bondi 
ends, and where the myth of August Bondi begins, does not have a definitive answer. James C. 
Malin may have been astute to call Bondi’s own narrative of his life’s events “unreliable,” 
“lurid,” and “not disinterested.”177 Yet nearly as important as the facts surrounding Bondi is his 
intended legacy, particularly where that legacy intersects with the symbolism he adopted for 
himself as a figure of transnational freedom. What is certainly clear about Bondi’s life is that by 
participating in revolution on one continent, and continuing that fight on another, Bondi 
ultimately embraced, defended and fought for that which he believed – namely, freedom and 
equality for all – and by so doing, he undertook the necessary, sometimes violent steps to enact 
the freedom he so sought. Moreover, he is representative of those transnational freedom 
fighters who demonstrate the international currents of revolution, emancipation, and freedom 
writ large. For many reasons, Bondi remains a complicated figure. However, when his narrative 
is distilled to its essence, his legacy begins to emerge. About this legacy, and on the legacy of 
those alongside whom he fought in Vienna, Bondi is at his most eloquent. In Autobiography, he 
considers those who participated in the revolutionary events in Vienna and elsewhere across 
Europe, and he writes meaningfully, even poetically, about their collective fate: 
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Very few of the young men of 1848 concluded their studies. Once engulfed in 
the whirlpool of the stress and storm of this revolutionary period they could not 
concentrate their minds on studying for a livelihood. 
 
Hundreds fell in the October days of ’48; some were executed by court’s 
martial, more had the death sentence commuted to imprisonment in the 
dungeons of Brϋnn and Spielberz. Hundreds joined the Vienna legion of the 
Hungarian Revolution and fell in the battles of 1849. Hundreds more were 
pressed in to the Austrian army and perished in battle or deserted into Turkey 
or Italy, and thence emigrated to the United States, where others had preceded 
them. Many went down, even in this free land, in the struggle for bread, and of 
the survivors many died on the battlefields of the Civil War in the ’60’s. […] A 
very few yet survive, proud of the memories of their youth. None have ever 
regretted their share in the great drama commenced that fateful day of March, 
’48, whose last act has not been reached.178 
 
Contradictions and complications of character are clearly there for a figure like Bondi. But this 
call toward the incomplete struggle for freedom for all might indeed serve as the distilled 
essence of Bondi’s legacy. 
 Having considered carefully the life of one international freedom fighter, we turn now, 
in Chapter Three, to the intellectual currents within the Western philosophical tradition which 
undergird the formation, development, and practice of freedom. 
 






FREEDOM: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
I have a sense that I am no longer in charge of my life. I know that none of what 
I am doing can touch me, not at my core. My memory is a mystical conspiracy of 
connections. Everything has already happened. I am merely a man, sitting in a 
chair, listening to a recording made long ago. The needle is travelling in a 
predetermined track. Eventually, sooner or later, it will hit the run-out groove at 
the end.  
–Hari Kunzru, White Tears179 
 
Die Menschen machen ihre eigene Geschichte, aber sie machen sie nicht aus 
freien Stücken, nicht selbstgewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar 
vorgefundenen, gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen. Die Tradition aller 
todten Geschlechter lastet wie ein Alp auf dem Gehirne der Lebenden. Und wenn 
sie eben damit beschäftigt scheinen, sich und die Dinge umzuwählzen, noch 
nicht Dagewesenes zu schaffen, gerade in solchen Epochen revolutionärer Krise 
beschwören sie ängstlich die Geister der Vergangenheit zu ihrem Dienste herauf, 
entlehnen ihnen Namen, Schlachtparole, Kostüm, um in dieser altehr-würdigen 
Verkleidung und mit dieser erborgten Sprache die neue Weltgeschichtsscene 
aufzuführen. 
  –Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte180 
 
No idea is so generally recognized as indefinite, ambiguous, and open to the 
greatest misconceptions (to which it therefore actually falls a victim) as the Idea 
of Liberty. […] When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the 
abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable 
strength.  
–G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind181 
 
179 Hari Kunzru, White Tears (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2017), 154. 
180 Karl Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, 1869, accessed March 20, 2021, 
https://www.deutschestextarchiv.de/book/view/marx_bonaparte_1869?p=13/. The English translation: 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-
selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. 
The tradition of all dead generations weighs like [an Alp] on the brains of the living. And just as they seem 
to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, 
precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in 
world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language.” Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte, accessed March 2, 2021, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-
brumaire/ch01.htm/. Emphasis added. 





Chapter Introduction: Freedom’s Origin 
Whence freedom? Attempting to articulate the origin of human freedom – indeed to 
provide even a compelling and succinct definition of the concept – has proven to be a 
longstanding and problematic pursuit of thinkers within the Western tradition. The importance 
of the concept and its relationship to the greater arc political revolution is clear. Indeed, the 
liberal political tradition has had much impact on the rhetoric and practice of freedom over the 
centuries; and moreover, these aspects of freedom have themselves had much impact on the 
course of political history. Both have conditioned and reinforced one another. John Stuart Mill 
recognizes accordingly that the “struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous 
feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar[.]”182 Considering the vast 
history of political revolution and its relationship with the rhetoric of freedom, spanning as it 
does from at least seventeenth century England to the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe 
and beyond in the 1980s, and even to the Arab Spring in the early twenty-first century, R.W. 
Davis states, “A clear-eyed look at any of [these political revolutions] … reminds us that 
freedom, liberty, rights, and democracy are words into which many different and conflicting 
hopes have been read. The language of freedom is … inherently difficult.”183 In her aptly titled 
 
182 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. David Bromwich and George Kateb (New Haven: Yale University Press), 
73, ProQuest Ebook Central. 
183 R.W. Davis, general ed., “Series Forward,” in Revolution and the Meanings of Freedom, ed. Isser 
Woloch (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), v. The events of the Arab Spring in 2010-12 occurred 
after Davis wrote these words, but I am taking liberties with their inclusion in this wider arc of revolution. 
Jonathan Sperber argues for this connection in “Tidal Waves of Revolution, 1848-2011,” Saturday Morning 
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Europe and the Middle East, see also Silvana Toska, “The Multiple Scripts of the Arab Revolutions,” in 
Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions, 325-44, ed. Keith 




essay, “What is Freedom?” Hannah Arendt suggests as much when she laments, “It is as though 
age-old contradictions and antimonies were lying in wait to force the mind into dilemmas of 
logical impossibility so that, depending on which horn of the dilemma you are holding on to, it 
becomes as impossible to conceive of freedom or its opposite as it is to realize the notion of a 
square circle.”184 Arendt is right to be discouraged. As important as the concept of freedom is to 
political history, philosophers have nevertheless long grappled with, and struggled to find 
common ground on the topic. Another twentieth century thinker, Isaiah Berlin, begins his own 
study on the topic by commenting at what centuries of western political philosophy have failed 
to ascertain: a succinct, canonical definition of freedom, suggesting that there are “more than 
two hundred senses of this protean word recorded by historians of ideas.” He further laments: 
“Like happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, the meaning of this word is so porous that 
there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist.”185 
It might not be such a difficulty. Berlin attempted to theoretically simplify the concept of 
freedom in an important lecture he gave at Oxford University in October 1958, the text of which 
was later published as an essay under the title, “Two Concepts of Liberty.”186 At its most 
elemental, the seemingly amorphous concept of freedom can be distilled for Berlin into its 
 
184 Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom,” in Between Past and Future, 143-71 (New York: Penguin, 1968), 
143. 
185 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 121. 
186 For our purposes, liberty and freedom remain essentially the same concept, and will therefore be used 
interchangeably in this essay. The linguistic roots of the two words stem from the French liberté and 
German Freiheit. Both terms are the only words meaning freedom in their respective languages, and both 
have parity with the Latin libertas. Among European languages, only English has two separate words, 
liberty and freedom, for what is largely considered the same concept. Some recent scholarship has been 
done attempting to differentiate freedom and liberty, but this remains a murky pursuit. See Ian Carter, 
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elemental, constituent parts: freedom from and freedom to. Berlin draws here on Kant, 
describing these as positive and negative liberties.187 (Though Berlin does not describe this, at t 
the next order of complexity we might expand our categorization to include a third form: from 
positive liberty we might also extract freedom as, for example in terms of self-determination or 
autonomy, either of an individual or of a collective.)188 Berlin further explores in his essay, 
among other topics, the fundamental difference between those humans who have secured, 
purposefully or happenstance, some level of freedom in their lives, versus those other humans 
who have not. Historically, human inequality has been a given. That this maxim holds true when 
considering who is free, and who is not, is not a startling conclusion. F.A. Hayek, drawing on Max 
Pohlenz, asserts: “Man, or at least European man, enters history divided into free and unfree; 
and this distinction had a very definite meaning.”189 Indeed, it is hard to imagine one’s freedom 
outside of a comparison to the unfreedom of others. Arendt notes this fact when she observes, 
“We first become aware of freedom or its opposite in our intercourse with others, not in the 
intercourse with ourselves.”190 But it precisely one’s response to this freedom differential 
among humans that is most instructive. Berlin observes, 
What troubles the conscious of Western liberals is not, I think, the belief that 
the freedom men seek differs according to their social or economic conditions, 
but that the minority who possess it have gained it by exploiting, or, at least, 
averting their gaze from, the vast majority who do not. They believe, with good 
reason, that if individual liberty is an ultimate end for human beings, none 
 
187 See also Ian Carter, “Positive and Negative Liberty.”  
188 See Órla O’Donovan, Fiona Dukelow and Rosie Meade, eds., “Introduction,” in Freedom? By Two Fuse 
(Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 2018), ProQuest Ebook Central. 
189 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition, ed. Ronald Hamowy (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2011), 59, ProQuest Ebook Central. Pohlenz, as quoted in Hayek: “Historically [in Ancient 
Greece], it was the existence of the unfree, the slaves, that first gave the others the feeling that they 
themselves were free.” 




should be deprived of it by others; least of all that some should enjoy it at the 
expense of others.191 
 
Most fundamentally, negative freedom, freedom from, is what most political theorists 
mean when they are thinking about freedom – that is, the removal of barriers, physical, legal, 
political, and social, which allow for one’s unfettered action within various spheres of life. In 
terms of the liberal tradition, negative freedom as individual liberty is primarily concerned with 
political freedom from overreach by a pernicious, coercive central state into the lives of its 
citizens. However, it might also be construed more broadly into freedom from coercion of any 
kind, from any other individual or group of individuals. Freedoms of assembly, association, 
movement, and speech, or from unreasonable search and seizure, along with other political 
inheritance from the liberal revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are all 
contained within this realm. Less emphasized in current parlance is positive freedom – the 
freedom of an agent to be able to act positively and autonomously toward his or her own self-
actualization, “in such a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental 
purposes.”192 There is much debate in current political discourse on the effects of this practice of 
freedom and the implementation of policy surrounding it. Indeed, where one falls on various 
political spectra – however liberal or conservative, however libertarian or authoritarian one 
might be – has much to do with one’s views on human nature, freedom, the import of 
safeguarding that freedom, and the degree to which governments ought to act in the lives of 
their citizens to do so. It is scarcely a new debate. Berlin calls this question of how to reconcile 
an individual’s desire for liberty with the necessity for authority a “natural,” and “familiar” 
 
191 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 125. 




question of political thought, one that has consumed Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and 
other political philosophers for centuries.193 In the contemporary sense, traditional liberals 
might wish to enact strong laws to protect the individual from an overreaching and coercive 
central state; radical libertarians, meanwhile, might focus instead on creating conditions which 
allow individuals to seek their own positive freedom, to flourish outside of any influence from 
government whatsoever. 
This practice of freedom is significant. O’Donovan, Dukelow and Meade make a 
distinction between freedom as philosophy or abstract concept, and freedom as practice – that 
is, how it is employed by individuals in their quotidian lives. The same phenomenon of the 
practice of freedom might be observed in the collective for various groups, or even entire 
nations. What is important here is attempting to identify the means that individuals are inspired 
by the rhetoric of freedom – and thus inspired, how it is that they decide to engage actively, and 
sometimes violently, in freedom’s pursuit. Put simply, O’Donovan, et al pose the question this 
way: “What is it that motivates people to act and struggle in the name of freedom?” Getting to 
the root of this particular inquiry allows us to access “the substance” of freedom, moving 
beyond the theoretical and into the practical realm as “something that we [humans] experience 
 
193 Hobbes had an overwhelmingly pessimistic view of humanity, and thus sought to constrain humans 
from destroying one another in the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” lives they might otherwise 
have endured without an assertive political authority; Locke, more optimistically, erred on the side of 
liberty, that which he felt was man’s natural state, and therefore maintained that it was authority that 
needed to be constrained. Where one draws the border line on this “frontier between liberty and 
authority” says much about their approach and working assumptions. Isaiah Berlin, “Freedom and Its 
Betrayal: Jean-Jacques Rosseau (1952),” Isaiah Berlin Centenary [podcast], Oxford University Podcasts, 
April 14, 2009, accessed March 26, 2021, https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/isaiah-berlin-centenary/. See 
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… in everyday life.”194 My own research interests coalesce at this intersection of the practice of 
freedom within the liberal revolutionary tradition. This chapter is therefore an attempt to 
situate revolution as an expression of individual liberty within the Western intellectual canon. 
In a political sense, liberal revolution since the seventeenth century has been concerned 
with an expanding conception of negative freedom, that which removes barriers imposed by 
political, religious or social organs which might otherwise dictate, coerce or control the lives of 
individuals. Revolution has clearly been a propellant of this expanding freedom. But while 
important to this conversation, revolution is not of itself concerned with freedom per se, but 
rather in the creation of a new political or social order wherein freedom might have opportunity 
to flourish.195 Stated another way, revolution is an instrument employed by individual actors to 
create new political conditions that are completely unlike those which preceded them. In this 
way, novelty is the most important attribute of revolution, and expanding freedom through 
violence is thus ancillary, and not fundamental to it. This is described by Hannah Arendt in her 
1963 treatise, On Revolution: 
Only where this pathos of novelty is present and where novelty is connected 
with the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution. […] But violence 
is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; 
only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is 
used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about 
the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims 
at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution.196 
 
194 Órla O’Donovan, et al, Freedom? 
195 While the script of revolution nearly always appeals to freedom, it is very important to distinguish that 
not all revolution is concerned with expanding freedom for all, and not all revolutions are strictly 
egalitarian in this sense. Indeed, an important question of revolution is to ask: with whose freedom are 
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than will American, Haitian and French revolutionaries in the eighteenth, or Latin American and European 
revolutionaries in the nineteenth, or Russian, Indian, Iranian and South African revolutionaries in the 
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I will return to Arendt and her emphasis on novelty as it relates to political revolution and the 
rhetoric and expanding practice of freedom in modernity. For now, however, I will let it suffice 
to emphasize that revolution, while certainly important as an agent of social and political 
change, is hardly the sole source of the development of freedom within the western 
philosophical tradition. 
 
A Note on Free Will 
 
Political freedom, as such, should not be confused with topics of free will and 
determinism. Questions on human agency have been pondered by thinkers since at least Late 
Antiquity. Epicurus, in asserting that humans can transcend the physical, causal phenomena of 
the natural world – “he acquires responsibility which proceeds from himself” – became, per 
Long and Sedley, “the first philosopher to recognize the philosophical centrality of what we 
know as the Free Will Question.”197 Whether humans as individual actors have free will, and 
indeed how this perceived agency, writ large, coalesces into larger historical movements, is a 
fascinating question and one worth exploring.198 One considers as just one example Leo 
 
197 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 102, 107. 
198 This is perhaps a topic for another paper. The impact of modern neuroscience and quantum physics on 
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about the rise and fall of civilizations based upon mathematical modeling of the past 10,000 years. He 
takes special interest in the preconditions of revolution and their role in hastening historical change. As a 




Tolstoy’s War and Peace, and how Tolstoy juxtaposes through its narrative the massive 
movements of nations (as in the Napoleonic wars and social displacement thereof) against that 
of the private lives of ordinary individuals who were swept up into these greater historical 
events. To what degree did Tolstoy’s characters actually have agency over their lives, and how 
did their individual decisions aggregate into the movements of nations?199 For that matter, how 
much agency do we have in our own lives; how determined are we? However one answers these 
questions, individual free will – and whether it is illusory or not – is a topic that is largely 
unimportant to this particular study. What is important, however, is that, based on human 
experience, there continues to be an innate sense within most individuals of their freedom to 
choose, and that this perceived agency might thus be applied toward the struggle for political 
liberty for oneself and for others. Consider: were it impossible to entertain the thought of 
novelty for an indeterminate future – to presuppose that one's actions toward that 
indeterminate future might have been otherwise – would that not necessarily preclude the very 
idea of fighting for an ideal of freedom, of struggling to overturn systems of oppression and 
illiberalism? Moreover, without implicit free will, an entire system of normative ethics would be 
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swiftly made irrelevant. For what indeed is the vision of an indeterminate future if not at least in 
part for the chance to change it, and mold from it a better world for oneself, one’s loved ones, 
or even for society at large?  
Experience seems to suggest as much: we humans have a canny, ingrained ability to 
sense our own freedom, and to act therefore within a seemingly free experiential and 
phenomenological framework, within what some libertarian free will and compatibilist 
philosophers term the “the garden of forking paths.”200 I turned left at the last intersection, we 
tell ourselves, but I could have chosen otherwise. Or perhaps more precisely, we create 
narratives, ex post facto, to justify the decisions that we make: I always turn right, so this time I 
chose to turn left. Samuel Johnson observed as much when he reportedly stated, "We know our 
will is free, and there’s an end on’t.”201 The impact of this sense of freedom is far-reaching. It 
touches upon the political, moral, and legal foundations of much of human existence, at least 
within the Western historical tradition. Hannah Arendt gets at the crux of the problem of free 
will when she observes: “In all practical and especially in political matters, we hold human 
freedom to be a self-evident truth, and it is upon this axiomatic assumption that laws are laid 
down in human communities, that decisions are taken, that judgements are passed.” She 
continues, “In all fields of scientific and theoretical endeavor, on the contrary, […] freedom turns 
out to be a mirage[.]”202 Modern physics and neuroscience seems to suggest that which 
philosophy has long postulated. In this vein, Pierre Simon LaPlace summarizes the materialist 
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axiom that, were an individual to have complete omniscience vis-à-vis the current state of the 
universe, that is, were able to ascertain all prior causes arising from all previous states of being, 
this omniscient being could subsequently predict with certitude all future states of the universe 
as well. In this manner, past, present, and future are all derivative of one, single, determined 
state of existence: 
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the 
cause of its future. Any intellect which at a certain moment would know all 
forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is 
composed […] would embrace in a single formula the movements of the 
greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an 
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be 
present before its eyes.203 
 
Lacking such omniscience, humans are left with only their own senses surrounding states of 
consciousness, and many, perhaps the vast majority of us, are compelled by the sense of our 
free will. Mirage or not, free will simply captivates us. Yet outside of this debate, and regardless 
of the neurological or psychological realities of cause and effect underpinning human 
consciousness, violent revolution has been employed by humans throughout history. Surely 
many, if not most, of these revolutionaries were individuals who viewed themselves as free 
agents within the world; and as such they fought and struggled through the centuries toward an 
indeterminate future: to change the world and move their society ever-incrementally toward 
the goal of greater human freedom.204 
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A Radical Enlightenment? Rationale and Chapter Outline 
This chapter is largely interested in exploring the intellectual roots of liberal revolution 
in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – all those political actions which, in 
sum, underpin a corresponding expansion of political and social freedom during these eras. I am 
drawing partly here upon Jonathan Israel’s scholarship on Radical Enlightenment. Israel’s grand 
thesis is not without its problems, but I am compelled by his assertion that the revolutions 
across the transatlantic world – the American, French, and Haitian in the eighteenth century, 
and the Latin-American and European revolutions of the nineteenth – were of one and the same 
revolution.205 Like ocean waves crossing the Atlantic, the ideas of revolution intersect, grow and 
crescendo into a greater form. Israel’s chosen metaphor for revolution is a forest fire: in The 
Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, he writes: “Both the American 
and French revolutions, and all the other supposedly ‘national’ revolutions, were … variants of a 
single Atlantic revolution.”206 Moreover, these “national” revolutions all looked toward and 
found inspiration from one another, and were equally guided by the intellectual currents and 
rhetoric of Radical Enlightenment. It is worth quoting Israel’s definition of Radical 
Enlightenment, as we will return to many of these points in this chapter. Per Israel, 
Radical Enlightenment is a set of basic principles that can be summed concisely 
as democracy; racial and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; full 
freedom of thought, expression, and the press; eradication of religious authority 
from the legislative process and education; and full separation of church and 
state. It sees the purpose of the state as being the wholly secular one of 
promoting the worldly interests of the majority and preventing the vested 
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minority interests from capturing control of the legislative process. Its chief 
maxim is that all men [and women] have the same basic needs, rights and status 
irrespective of what they believe or what religious, economic, or ethnic group 
they belong to, and that consequently all ought to be treated alike, on the basis 
of equity, whether black or white, male or female, religious or nonreligious, and 
that all deserve to have their personal interests and aspirations equally 
respected by law and government. Its universalism lies in its claim that all men 
[and women] have the same right to pursue happiness in their own way, and 
think and say whatever they see fit, and no one, including those who convince 
others they are divinely chosen to be their masters, rulers, or spiritual guides, is 
justified in denying or hindering others in the enjoyment of rights that pertain to 
all men and women equally.207 
 
It should be acknowledged that not all are compelled by Israel’s grand model of revolution. Gary 
B. Nash is one who is not. His argument rests in part on a differentiation between the American 
War of Independence, which did inspire many to attempt revolts and uprisings in the years that 
followed it, and the American Revolution, which set out to remake America’s body politic with a 
brand-new expression of self-government. He asserts:  
The American War for Independence, in sum, considered as an overthrow of 
colonial masters, would have much more influence … than the American 
Revolution, an internal struggle to remake America along very different lines 
than had previously existed. […] Thus, we need to be cautious about overstating 
the aftershocks of the American Revolution, particularly about its internal 
struggles to restitch the social fabric of its peoples[.]”208 
 
As scholars of history, we should, as Nash cautions, resist overstating the case. The 
revolutionaries themselves are, not surprisingly, sometimes guilty of overstatement. Thomas 
Paine may have thrown caution to the wind in declaring in Common Sense, “The cause of 
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America is in great measure the cause of all mankind.”209  Nevertheless, we might also recognize 
that something important happened in the events of 1776, and the impacts of America’s 
experiment in self-government would certainly come to reverberate and inspire future 
revolutionaries, particularly those in Europe, and particularly during the following century. My 
own intellectual interest being the nineteenth century, I wish to situate the 1848 revolutions 
within a wider framework of freedom in the Western tradition, drawing as it does upon this idea 
of Radical Enlightenment and spanning temporally from Antiquity to the modern era, and 
geographically across the Atlantic World, from Eastern Europe to the Americas. In so doing, I will 
draw upon the philosophical works of several important thinkers. Among them, I will focus on 
Baruch Spinoza, Arthur Schopenhauer, Hannah Arendt, Erich Fromm, and F.A. Hayek.  
Indeed, many philosophers and political theorists in the Western tradition have 
grappled with ideas of free will, human agency, and freedom. But few have articulated such a 
comprehensive study of the history of the philosophy of freedom in the manner that Hannah 
Arendt has. It is with Arendt that I will begin my exploration of the intellectual history of 
freedom; thereafter I will return to some of the other important thinkers who preceded her for 
a more comprehensive study on their individual philosophies on freedom of the will, human 
agency, historical contingency, and political freedom broadly. Arendt will thus provide the broad 
contours of this intellectual history, and Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Fromm, and Hayek will each 
add their own crucial elements to the whole. This chapter will conclude with a section on the 
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transatlantic roots of abolitionism that came to define transatlantic freedom movements of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
Hannah Arendt: Of Freedom and Novelty 
Hannah Arendt has approached freedom in several of her important philosophical 
works, among them On Revolution, The Life of the Mind, The Human Condition and The Origins 
of Totalitarianism.210 I will draw on each of these works in my discussion of Arendt’s philosophy 
on freedom, but of primary interest is an essay Arendt wrote in 1961 from her book Between 
Past and Future, called, appropriately enough, “What is Freedom?”211 Arendt was loath to call 
herself a philosopher, and she rejected this categorization on multiple occasions, instead calling 
herself a political theorist.212 Indeed, on face value, her philosophical work evades 
categorization of any kind. She tackles myriad and diverse topics in her writing, and though she 
studied philosophy under Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl and Karl Jaspers at the Universities 
of Marburg, Freiburg and Heidelberg, respectively, she could neither be pigeonholed as an 
existentialist, or for that matter, as member of any other philosophical school or movement. She 
was perhaps one who was lucky enough to follow her intellectual interests wherever they 
ranged and thus made a successful career of being a writer and academic. If one could state 
anything comprehensively about Arendt and her work, it was that she was eternally fascinated 
with the human condition; more than any other theme, this thread unites her work. She wrote 
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on love, the history of philosophy, the human mind, consciousness, language, labor and human 
activity, civil disobedience, revolution, modernity, morality, the problem of evil, 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism, citizenship, human rights, and more. She was incredibly 
prolific, publishing some twenty-two major philosophical works during her lifetime. The vast 
majority of these were published in English, her third language. In spite of her protestations to 
the contrary, her work in political philosophy, especially that on human agency, freedom and 
revolution, is among the most erudite and important thinking on the topic written by anyone in 
the twentieth century.213 
Much of her scholarship was undergirded by Arendt’s fascination with and devotion to 
classical Greek texts and ideas, to which she returns repeatedly in her work. She had special 
affinity for Aristotle and Socrates. The Greek polis – or at least an updated republican version of 
it – with its marketplace of ideas and active political engagement, became for her a model for 
how society might repair itself in the aftermath of the torn social fabric, mass displacement, 
death, and destruction of two world wars. The polis was characterized by public engagement 
and a sharing of ideas among one’s fellow citizens, that which Aristotle and Augustine after him 
deemed bios politikos or vita negotiosa/actuosa. The active life for Arendt was thus defined as 
“a life devoted to public-political matters.”214 Moreover, this political-public discourse for Arendt 
was the prerequisite for a shared understanding of reality. “Only where things can be seen by 
many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that those who are gathered 
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around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably 
appear.”215 This vita activa is distinct from vita contemplativa, the life of contemplation as 
practiced by philosophers and ascetics from Plato onward.216 What we today might call the 
public commons were thus a hallmark of freedom for the Greeks and early Christians.217 Arendt 
describes this as an open forum for a pluralistic, democratic body politic, and one wherein 
oftentimes dissenting and robust exchanges of ideas might occur within the public square.218 
Equally important for Arendt, this style of public commons was something that had been 
steadily on the decline across much of the Western world. Though this recession of engaged 
democracy and public discourse had been occurring across much of the modern era, it was 
particularly pronounced in the post-war years in which she wrote. For Arendt, the paradigm of 
an engaged, active citizenry was thus replaced by the increasing atomization of individuals and 
an expanding capitalistic consumerism which had become endemic across much of the West. In 
this model, modern people were no longer viewed as citizens of a collective, interested in and 
engaged with others in their communities, but rather as individual consumers.219 This transition 
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was well underway in the mid-twentieth century United States, her new home, when Arendt 
wrote the following in 1963: 
The reason for this insistence on the interconnection of freedom and equality in 
Greek political thought was that freedom was understood as being manifest in 
certain … human activities, and that these activities could appear and be real 
only when others saw them, judged them, remembered them. The life of a free 
man [in Ancient Greece] needed the presence of others. Freedom itself needed 
a place where people could come together – the agora, the market-place, or the 
polis, the political space proper.220 
 
Similarly, in “What is Freedom?” Arendt posits the importance of the pois to understanding 
freedom’s origin. She writes: 
If, then, we understand the political in the sense of the polis, its end or raison 
d’être would be to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as 
virtuosity can appear. This is the end where freedom is a worldly reality, 
tangible in words which can be heard, in deeds which can be seen, and in events 
which are talked about, remembered, and turned into stories before they are 
finally incorporated into the great storybook of human history.221 
 
Fundamental to Arendt in this framework is the importance of engaged pluralism within the 
political space, that which by definition finds problematic an individual’s retreat into an 
atomized, private, personal sphere. When citizens are isolated in this manner, the conditions for 
tyranny’s flourishing are set.222 This movement from public to private mirrors Arendt’s oft cited 
position on Plato. Plato famously was so fundamentally shaken by the death of his teacher, 
Socrates, that he considered all future engagement between philosophy and public affairs to be 
deleterious – that which Arendt terms “the conflict between the philosopher and the polis.”223 
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Per Arendt in The Human Condition, Plato withdrew from the active life and moved instead into 
the contemplative life, eschewing political engagement for presumably more lofty ideals of 
apolitical, higher thinking. Arendt scholar Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves writes, 
The remedy which the tradition of Western thought has proposed for the 
unpredictability and irreversibility of action has consisted in abstaining from 
action altogether, in the withdrawal from the sphere of interaction with others, 
in the hope that one’s freedom and integrity could thereby be preserved. 
Platonism, Stoicism and Christianity elevated the sphere of contemplation 
above the sphere of action, precisely because in the former one could be free 
from the entanglements and frustration of action.224 
 
By contrast, D’Entreves continues, “Arendt’s proposal … is not to turn one’s back on the realm of 
human affairs, but to rely on two faculties inherent in action itself, the faculty of forgiving and 
the faculty of promising.”225 These faculties, by definition, focus on the relational interactions 
between humans, particularly in their emphasis on mutual trust and understanding. Similarly, 
per Frisbee Sheffield, Arendt wishes through her work to “re-throne” the political space as a 
rejection of its diminishment under the Platonic and Christian traditions. Thus, relying on a 
Christian sense of novelty, Arendt maintains a distinct sense of optimism about the chance to 
create a better social reality through a pluralistic and engaged political process.226 So then for 
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Arendt, a mature and healthy political system provides for a plurality of viewpoints, an 
opportunity for dissent, a means for a communitarian and active engagement of the citizenry, 
and political processes which allow for evolution and non-violent change as a means for 
addressing inequality.  
But beyond all of this is for Arendt is an emphasis on natality, the perceived ability of 
humans to create something novel and new within the political space. This idea animated much 
of Arendt’s thinking on freedom and revolution. In The Origins of Totalitarianism she writes, 
“Freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as 
a political reality is identical with a space of movement between men.”227 Later, in the final 
paragraph of the book, she returns again to novelty, presenting images of beginning and new 
birth, and signifying these as symbols of freedom: 
But there remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a 
new beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only ‘message’ which the end 
can ever produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the 
supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man’s freedom. Initium 
ut esset homo creatus est – ‘that a beginning be made man was created’ said 
Augustine. This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every 
man.228 
 
Arendt’s turning to Augustine in this penultimate sentence of the book is significant. Indeed, she 
returns often to early Christian and neo-Platonic thought throughout her work. But what is 
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critical here is that within an early Christian worldview, as espoused by Saints Paul and 
Augustine, there is a necessary overturning of the existing philosophical paradigm of the Ancient 
Greeks. Nowhere is this more evident than in the changing time conception that followed in the 
wake of Christianity’s adoption by large portions of the Mediterranean world. Per Arendt, 
Christianity replaced the cyclical worldview of the Ancient Greeks with a new, rectilinear time 
concept, one which stressed a particular deterministic, providential and apocalyptic movement 
to history.229 The ancient Greeks, and indeed all of the ancients, “identified temporality with the 
circular movements of the heavenly bodies and with the no less cyclical nature of life on earth: 
the ever-repeated change of day and night, summer and winter, the constant renewal of animal 
species through birth and death.”230 This paradigm for the natural world extended equally into 
the “realm of human affairs,” for “even opinions (doxai) ‘as they occur among men, revolve not 
only once or a few times but infinitely often.’”231 If this worldview of the Ancients had lasted for 
centuries, a newly formed Christian teleology changed everything. Christ’s resurrection became 
in this way the first novel event in all of human history. Arendt writes, “The story that begins 
with Adam’s expulsion from Paradise and ends with Christ’s death and resurrection is a story of 
 
229 On the rectilinear time concept of the early Christians, see Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 18-
19; Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind / Willing, 47-9; Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind / Thinking, 202-3. 
Consider also R.G. Collingwood’s assertion that Christian historiography, as distinct from secular or 
ancient historiography is “by necessity universal, providential, apocalyptic, and periodized.” R.G. 
Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 49. 
230 Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind / Willing, 16. See again my paper: Matthew Long, “Free Will, 
Determinism, and Human Agency in Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace,” (unpublished paper, Clemson 
University, May 3, 2019), 4-15, accessed March 20, 2021, 
https://www.academia.edu/45586044/Free_Will_Determinism_and_Human_Agency_in_Leo_Tolstoys_W
ar_and_Peace/. Long and Sedley: “Aristotelian doctrine … allowed that the circular movement of the 
heavens could be temporally infinite. In Stoicism the infinite extension of time is a function of the 
everlasting cosmic cycles.” A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 307. 





unique, unrepeatable events. ‘Once Christ died for our sins; and rising from the dead, He dieth 
no more.’ […] it has a definite beginning, a turning-point – the year One of our calendar – and a 
definite end.”232 
Her ideas on revolution are thus hugely informed by this idea of invention, creation, and 
novelty. Quite simply, revolution requires newness. Without it, indeed without a prevailing 
paradigm wherein modern man could actually conceive of and create something novel in an 
indeterminate future, there can be no revolution in its traditional, political sense. But it goes 
even further than this for Arendt. The very ideals of freedom, and freedom’s expression, are 
themselves fundamental to all political life. All political activity rests upon this primal, human 
concern. She asserts: “Freedom … is not only one among the many problems and phenomena of 
the political realm … freedom … is actually the reason that men live together in political 
organization at all. Without it, political life would be meaningless. The raison d’être of politics is 
freedom, and its field of experience is action.”233 We see therefore, that even as humans 
evolved into modern beings with an innate sense of freedom of the will – that which was 
postulated by Augustine and which defines human agency within a rectilinear time concept and 
an indeterminate future, i.e. that “experience of man’s faculty to begin something new,” – so, 
too does a sense of progress, of the ability to change that indeterminate future for the better 
emerge.234 These changing notions of personal liberty, defined in late Antiquity, can thus be 
seen as directly tied to the liberal revolutionary traditions that took active form during the 
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eighteenth century. In this way, the American and French Revolutions are foundational events. 
Referring to these transformative events, Arendt writes: “The modern concept of revolution, 
inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an 
entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold, was unknown prior to 
the two great revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.”235 These both then set the 
stage and formed the template for myriad revolutions to follow, 1848 inclusive. If Arendt’s 
insightful analysis is helpful for understanding revolution’s connection to natality, particularly 
with its roots in Antiquity, it becomes equally important to examine early Enlightenment 
thought and its impact on freedom. Thus, we turn to Spinoza and his thinking on democracy. 
 
Spinoza: An Early Enlightenment Framework for Modernity 
Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza's philosophy is fundamental to the early Enlightenment. 
Based upon rationality, egalitarianism, tolerance and radical democracy, it proved foundational 
to the emergence of liberal revolution and democratic self-government in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Born in Holland in 1623 to Portuguese Jews, he was steeped in the Judaic 
tradition and may have even been groomed to become a Rabbi; this was before he abruptly 
faced excommunication by writ of herem in 1656 from his Sephardic community. By most 
accounts, this was the harshest and most forceful such expulsion that the Amsterdam 
community of Jews had ever pronounced upon one of its members. There would be no going 
back to Judaism for Spinoza after this (if indeed, he had any inclination to do so). Intellectually, 
he was influenced heavily by Greek Stoicism and Descartes' mathematics and dualism. He would 
 




prove his own merit as among the most impressive and influential philosophers of early 
modernity. His seminal works were all published either posthumously or anonymously. Even in 
seventeenth century Amsterdam, among the most cosmopolitan, liberal, and progressive cities 
in the world at that time, Spinoza's skeptical views on the nature of God, particularly that of the 
monotheistic God of the Judeo-Christian tradition, was incredibly controversial. Nadler posits 
that his strongest views against the core tenets of Judaism came into circulation after his death 
– for example, his forceful denial of “the immortality of the soul,” and rejection of “the notion of 
a transcendent, providential God,” or in his following claim that the Law “was neither literally 
given by God nor any longer binding on Jews.” It is likely that formative versions of these ideas 
expressed to Rabbis at Synagogue may have been the cause of his excommunication as a young 
man. Still, in spite of this, his scholarship found great purchase in the years after his death, 
proving durable enough, and of high enough philosophical import, to heavily influence 
generations of thinkers (most notably Schopenhauer and Hegel) who would follow in his 
wake.236 
Causation and free will were of deep interest to Spinoza. Quite simply, he believed in 
the fundament of an interconnected and deterministic universe. If Descartes famously posited a 
dualistic notion of consciousness for the individual within a materialistic universe, Spinoza 
guided this idea to its next logical conclusion; in the process he broke the Cartesian paradigm of 
subjective consciousness. Cogito ergo sum, said Descartes in his Discourse on the Method. 
Spinoza saw instead in the human mind something that is just as determined by the laws of 
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physics as a stone’s fall toward Earth, or the ripples produced as the stone strikes a pond’s 
surface. On this determinism of the mind, he writes in Postulate 48 of Part II of The Ethics: “The 
Mind is a certain and determinate mode of thinking, and so cannot be a free cause of its own 
actions, or cannot have absolute faculty of willing and not willing. Rather, it must be determined 
to willing this or that by a cause which is also determined by another, and this cause again by 
another, etc. [and so to infinity].”237 In this model, everything in the universe is of one 
substance, and everything therefore interdependent upon everything else. The human mind and 
its consciousness are also part of this universal community of existence, and just as causally 
determined as anything else. This topic of human consciousness had proved elusive for 
Spinoza’s predecessors. But for Spinoza, it was quite simple: the mind, like anything else, was 
itself guided by the physical principles which governed the laws of Nature. This was something 
of a radical departure from the views of most of his contemporaries.238 
Spinoza’s theology thus comes to center stage. He continually attached the Natural 
world and everything in it to that which he called “God, or Nature,” a term which would be 
employed in the following century within decidedly revolutionary pursuits.239 God, or Nature, 
plays for Spinoza a fundamental role. If each thing in existence is connected to each other, and 
all things exist therefore in relation to one another, each striving in perseverance and for its own 
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fulfillment of potentiality, then the entirety of all existence is a manifestation of God.240 More 
than this, the aggregate of striving among all things in the universe is the very essence of God. 
Postulate 6 of Part III of his Ethics clearly states Spinoza’s position: “Each thing, as far as it can 
by its own power, strives to persevere in its being. … For singular things are modes by which 
God’s attributes are expressed in certain and determinate ways, i.e. things that express, in a 
certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts.”241 All creation is thus 
inextricably bound and determined in existence through the express will of God.242 So that while 
it is correct to assert that Spinoza was no theist in a traditional sense, he was neither an atheist. 
If he fully rejected a separate, omnipotent and monotheistic deity in the form of the God of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, he embraced instead a concept that God is everywhere, and in all 
things.243 On this, the will of God as expressed through the determined interconnectedness of all 
things, Spinoza writes in Part II of Ethics: 
For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which 
is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different 
attributes. Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of 
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Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we 
shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, 
i.e., that the same things follow one another.244 
 
Spinoza traces the causal connection between all natural phenomena within the 
universe, including among them the thoughts, decisions and judgements of man. Humans, in the 
entirety of their being, are subject to these same phenomenological constraints as everything 
else in a materialistic universe, are themselves the expression of a primordial urge to vitality 
underwritten by their natural design. Spinoza asks, why should it be otherwise? Many thinkers 
who preceded Spinoza asserted a dichotomy between the laws of Nature and the world of man. 
Spinoza rejects this in the Preface to Part III of Ethics, wherein he asserts that the domain man is 
not separate from the natural world surrounding him: 
Most of those who have written about the Affects, and men’s way of living, 
seem to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, 
but of things that are outside nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in 
nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs, 
rather than follows, the order of nature, that he has absolute power over his 
actions, and that he is determined only by himself.245 
 
The universe is, not, as in Kant, separated into natural laws governing the physical realm and 
spiritual laws guiding the soul. Kant referred to this dichotomy as the laws of the natural, 
empirical world versus those of the “supersensible” world, all that which occurs outside of 
nature, experience and the senses, and which, by definition, contains the human soul. “Of far 
more importance … is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the 
sphere of possible experience […] And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where 
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experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of Reason.”246 The 
philosophy of theists resides in a similar intellectual space. For them, humans are made in the 
image of God and formed therefore separate from, and in dominion over the rest of creation.247 
Further, Christian doctrine since at least Augustine held firmly to the notion of freedom of the 
will for the individual. Made in the image of God, and thus endowed with certain creative 
liberties – that is, the ability to think, choose and create, to bring novel thought and action into 
the world – humans are equally subject to a simple choice: that of either acceptance or rejection 
of God’s offer of salvation through Christ’s death and resurrection incarnate. Built into this 
Augustinian framework is a presupposition of human freedom. But not all Christian theologians 
would embrace this view. Luther famously stated, “Here I stand, I can do no other.” This is fitting 
shorthand for his entire philosophy on freedom. Luther terms this as a “bound choice,” and he 
expanded on the concept in his debate with Erasmus on the topic: “For if we believe it is true 
that God foreknows and foreordains everything and that he can be neither deceived nor 
hindered in his foreknowledge and foreordination, and then if we believe that nothing happens 
unless he wills it – which even reason is forced to concede – then reason itself likewise testifies 
that there is no free will, whether in man, angel, or any creature.”248 Hume and Kant would 
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similarly embrace this Lutheran precept.249 But in Spinoza’s day, Luther’s surety on determinism 
was a rare sentiment. Even secular thinkers were prone to belief in freedom of the will through 
consciousness, based upon, in Arendt’s words, “a mere illusion, a phantasm of consciousness, a 
kind of delusion inherent in consciousness’ very structure.”250 Spinoza rejects this dichotomy of 
mind and nature completely: there is no dominion of man that is separate from nature, in spite 
of common perception to the contrary; man’s thoughts and decisions are as causally determined 
as anything else in nature. Again, in Part III of Ethics: “So experience itself, no less clearly than 
reason, teaches that men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own 
actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined, that the decision of the Mind 
are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary as the disposition of the body 
varies.”251 The ultimate conclusion for Spinoza: “In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, 
but the Mind is determined to will this or that by a cause that is also determined by another, and 
this again by another, and so to infinity.”252 
True freedom for Spinoza is therefore not based upon free will as such, but rather upon 
an individual’s use of rational thought toward self-knowledge and understanding, and toward 
mastery of his or her passions, those what Spinoza terms “affects.” One is free inasmuch as one 
lives his or her life in accordance with the natural laws surrounding one’s being, and to the 
extent that one is able to obtain his or her potential. This again harkens back to Aristotle’s 
potentia. Freedom is tapping into one’s inner logic to find self-actualization within the natural 
world, to become all that one might be able to become. The mind is determined for Spinoza, but 
 
249 See, for example, Arthur Schopenhauer, Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, ed. Günter Zöller, 
trans. Eric F.J. Payne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 63-4. 
250 Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind / Willing, 23. 
251 Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1, 496-7. See also Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind / Willing, 23-4. 




humans still have a choice: they may choose those thoughts and actions which either enhance 
their striving in perseverance, or choose those which are deleterious to it.  Choosing the former 
is for Spinoza the essence of freedom. One notices here a certain symmetry to the Stoicism of 
Antiquity, especially from that of Marcus Aurelius and his emphasis on seeking virtue through 
mastery of the self and one’s impulses. One can also see echoes of Spinozism in the philosophies 
of both Schopenhauer and Hegel. Spinoza would come to exert great influence on both 
nineteenth century philosophers with his thoughts on determinism, freedom and human 
consciousness. 
 
Schopenhauer: Freedom, Agency, and the Will to Life 
By the nineteenth century, human agency and the concept of will had been evolving as a 
philosophical construct for centuries. Arendt emphasizes this aspect of modernity – a sense of 
the human will – and its connections to an equally modern construct, a notion of “Progress as 
the ruling force of human history,” which had similarly developed and become intellectually 
endemic during this era. Arendt positions these two concepts together to contrast modernity 
with previous historical eras. The upshot is that, unlike previous humans, the Moderns placed 
incredible import onto the future.253 Gone were the repetitive cycles of existences ad infinitum 
of the Ancient Greeks, as was gone the static social condition of humans throughout the Middle 
Ages. Both were replaced by a “notion of the faculty of the Will, our mental organ for a future 
 
253 See Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind / Willing, 19-23. Hayden White similarly positions progress and 
optimism as hallmarks of historical imagination of the nineteenth century – and both as holdovers from 
an Enlightenment-based, positivist theoretical framework from the preceding century. See Hayden White, 





that in principle is indeterminable and therefore a possible harbinger of novelty.”254 An 
indeterminate future, and the chance to enact progress, to improve social and political 
conditions, thus gave humans by the nineteenth century a greater sense of agency in their 
quotidian lives, and similarly created social and political conditions which allowed people to 
think seriously about utopias, reform, and even altogether new forms of government. It is 
significant that a human sense of libertarian free will to create something new combined with a 
more deterministic, providential, or even fatalistic meta-historical outlook, that of Progress as 
the driver of human history. Yet despite the seeming contradictions, they combined to great 
effect. Not surprisingly, most all the great thinkers of this period, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche 
inclusive, all focused their attention onto this modern concept of will within their philosophies. 
But few dealt as exhaustively with it as did Arthur Schopenhauer, especially in his detailed 
exploration of it in Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will.255 
Central to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is the concept of what he terms Wille zum 
Leben, or will to life. Human freedom, as such, cannot be understood as separate from 
Schopenhauer’s concept of will, so fundamental is it to his entire philosophy. For Schopenhauer, 
all existence in the universe is dependent upon this will to life, an instinctual and striving urge 
toward existence, or a “mindless, aimless, non-rational impulse at the foundation of our 
instinctual drives, and at the foundational being of everything.”256 Some of his contemporaries 
and predecessors had considered the will as such within their philosophical and 
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ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed March 20, 2021, 




phenomenological systems, but Schopenhauer is distinct among Continental philosophers of his 
era in his positioning of will as being completely independent of a subject’s rationality or 
intellect. Within this framework, even consciousness is not necessary for the expression of will. 
More fundamental still is that the will to existence is the quintessence of a thing’s being: the 
expression of will is that which fundamentally makes all things what they are. Schopenhauer 
termed this the “thing-in-itself,” that which captures the noumenal essence of being for all 
things outside of the subjective observations of others.257 Will to life makes us, for example, 
human beings; it is equally what comprises the essence of deer, or maple trees, or even 
minerals, that which all things are, each in their own particular ways of being. All things are 
manifestations of this will to existence, and all things are restlessly striving in a perpetual state 
of discontent.258 This striving is for Schopenhauer infinite and occurs outside of consciousness. 
“[T]he world as it is in itself,” summarizes Wicks, “is an endless striving and blind impulse with 
no end in view, devoid of knowledge, lawless, absolutely free, entirely self-determining and 
almighty.”259 Everything in the universe operates under these conditions.260 Schopenhauer thus 
rejected any concept of progress or meaning within history’s movement, a position which set 
him decidedly at odds with his nineteenth century coevals, the German Idealists, among them 
Fichte, Schelling, and Schlegel. Perhaps most famously, Schopenhauer considered Hegel a 
 
257 Schopenhauer takes this thought directly from Kant. See Melvyn Bragg, host, “Schopenhauer,” In Our 
Time (podcast), BBC4, October 29, 2009, accessed April 15, 2021, 
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charlatan, and timed his lectures at the University of Berlin to occur just as Hegel’s own lectures 
were starting.261 
To understand Schopenhauer on freedom, then, necessitates the foundation that all 
things in the universe are interconnected, and all are striving toward their own goals and 
purposes within existence. This is for Schopenhauer most apparent among certain living beings 
– animals and humans, namely – in which Schopenhauer takes special interest in his discursive 
analysis of freedom, but which he applies equally to all things in existence.262 Animals and 
humans are the obvious point of departure for Schopenhauer in his discussion on will because 
of their easily observable motivations and goal-oriented behaviors. Plants and lower lifeforms, 
let alone all other unconscious things in the universe, equally have their own urge toward 
existence, but many are inert, or otherwise non-responsive to motivation outside of stimuli. 
Consciousness is therefore paramount as a distinctive precursor for motivational behavior, and 
he connects this directly to will. He writes: 
It is well known that the basis of animal life is a plant life that as such takes 
place only on stimuli. But all movement performed by an animal as an animal, 
and hence depending on what physiology calls animal functions, occur in 
consequence of a known object, and hence on motives. Accordingly, an animal 
is any body whose external movements and changes, peculiar and appropriate 
to its nature, always ensue on motives, i.e., on certain representations that are 
present to its here already presupposed consciousness. However infinite 
graduations there may be of the capacity for representations and thus for 
consciousness in the series of animals, there is nevertheless in every animal 
enough of it for the motives to present itself to it and cause it to move. Here the 
inner moving force [the Will] whose particular manifestation is called forth by 
the motive proclaims itself to the now-existing self-consciousness as that which 
we denote by the word will.263 
 
 
261 See again, Melvyn Bragg, host, “Schopenhauer.” Hegel still drew remarkable crowds to his lecture; 
Schopenhauer wouldn’t remain in the academy long thereafter, but his thinking would be nearly as 
important as Hegel’s in the longer term. 
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Early Enlightenment thought emphasized the essence of man as that of a rational, thinking 
being, and set man apart from the rest of nature, and particularly, as we have seen, as separate 
from animals. Schopenhauer sought to undermine this precept. All things in being in the 
universe are of the same, substance, all are part of the same interconnected web of existence. 
Existence may in itself have no greater meaning for Schopenhauer, but yet we humans are 
nevertheless part of a harmonious whole. This is not to suggest that life is free from death and 
suffering; on the contrary, these things are foundational manifest in living. Yet to harm or 
destroy another living being, to interfere with its expression of its own will, is in fact to harm or 
destroy part of oneself. Schopenhauer therefore wished to abolish hierarchies of all kinds – 
hierarchies of some humans over other humans, of humans over animals, or indeed of humans 
over the natural world generally. The similarities and influence of Buddhist and Indian 
philosophy are clear. Also similar is Schopenhauer’s presentation of a certain form of self-denial 
for one’s own aspirations and appetites within view of this larger framework of the 
interconnectedness of being. Indeed, Schopenhauer’s entire system of ethics arises from the 
simple practice of compassion. Famously, he asserted that compassion for other beings is the 
basis for all morality. On the surface, this seems hardly the stuff of transformative, world-
changing, revolutionary rhetoric. Yet when one digs deeper, there is yet something of freedom 
to be found in his philosophy. Though it is seldom attributed to Schopenhauer, one sees in this a 
guiding principle for, among other things, the Radical Enlightenment.264 
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Erich Fromm: Freedom, Enlightenment, and the Seeds of Authoritarianism 
For Erich Fromm, psychoanalyst and social philosopher of the Frankfurt School and 
disciple of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, the history of the western world is almost singularly 
focused on the pursuit of freedom. The opening paragraph of his classic text, Escape from 
Freedom, begins on this exact thought: 
Modern European and American history is centered around the effort to gain 
freedom from the political, economic, and spiritual shackles that have bound 
men. The battles for freedom were fought by the oppressed, those who wanted 
new liberties, against those who had privileges to defend. While a class was 
fighting for its own liberation from domination, it believed itself to be fighting 
for human freedom as such and thus was able to appeal to an ideal, to the 
longing for freedom rooted in all who are oppressed.265 
 
An exploration of freedom and its pursuit in the western tradition thus casts a long shadow 
across human history, looking back as it does to the Ancients who first grappled with its ideals, 
and remaining intellectually salient through to the turn of the twenty-first century and beyond. 
But more important to Fromm than the longevity of freedom as rhetoric, is that the course of 
western history, especially within the last 400 years since the Renaissance, has created distinctly 
modern people. Rebelling against the powers of domination and cutting themselves free from 
the bonds that had confined them for millennia, the Moderns discovered a new sort of 
individualism and self-empowerment. They asserted their individuality in what Fromm describes 
as an epochal struggle for freedom: “Despite many reverses, freedom has won battles. Many 
died in those battles in the conviction that to die in the struggle against oppression was better 
than to live without freedom. Such a death was the utmost assertion of their individuality.”266 
The idea of sacrificing oneself for an higher ideal is not fundamentally new; but that an 
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individual could sacrifice his or her life in order to create something novel – to die for a 
revolutionary ideal, is itself something novel.267 Even less than revolutionary self-abnegation, to 
simply take up arms and fight for one’s freedom becomes in this way a trope of modernity, an 
animating, creative force propelling political movements at least from the seventeenth century 
onward. Revolution to revolution, the struggle for freedom is the stuff of history. 
Fromm describes this process at immense scale: 
One tie after another was severed. Man had overthrown the domination of 
nature and made himself her master; he had overthrown the domination of the 
Church and the domination of the absolutist state. The abolition of the external 
domination seemed to be not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition to 
attain the cherished goal: freedom of the individual.268 
 
This process of creating radical individuality, unleashed by the Enlightenment, might not 
necessarily recoil and neatly end itself upon the securing of self-determination and the Rights of 
Man for all citizens. Radical individuality, to Fromm, cuts both ways. He posits that these forces, 
left unchecked, end instead at the complete individuation and atomization of all humans, that 
state which Arendt was lamenting in the post-war years. He attributes this development to the 
rise of Protestantism, especially Lutheranism and Calvinism, and to an expanding capitalism. But 
more than a socio-political, religious, and economic phenomenon, this modern individuation is 
also necessarily tied to the modern inner landscape of humans, making it a distinctly 
psychological and personal affair. Living as modern humans means freedom from the vagaries 
 
267 Christ’s salvific death on the cross for was itself a novel, revolutionary and universal moment in human 
history. The death and resurrection become a symbol for the creation of a new covenant between God 
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with Adam’s expulsion from Paradise and ends in Christ’s death and resurrection is a story of unique, 
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and constraints of the natural world, freedom from religious dogma, and freedom from other 
coercive and authoritarian measures. But this condition has also increasingly created humans 
who are atomized consumers in a system that stresses individual choice. Perversely, modernity 
has wrought the most inward gazing, disconnected and alienated humans in all history.  
Through struggle and revolution, the moderns ushered in an age of economic liberalism, 
political democracy, and religious autonomy, wherein they might have created lives of their own 
making. Given this unprecedented positive freedom, individual humans, on balance, choose 
instead to adopt hierarchical roles established external to them – roles of servant, worker, 
consumer, user – eschewing in this process the opportunity to build intrinsic value, self-
determined paths, and authentic relationships with one another. Simply put, given this 
newfound freedom, the Moderns rejected it for the safety of subservience and conformity. The 
common experience of individuals in a late capitalistic system is for Fromm thus defined by 
alienation, a lack of authenticity, and little intrinsic meaning in a system that provides few 
absolute rules for living. Fromm observes that this condition is largely stable during prosperous 
times; but when it appears during times of economic insecurity, the end result is a society of 
humans unmoored and susceptible to authoritarianism and destructiveness. Escape from 
Freedom was first published in 1941. Drawing upon the very recent history of the rise of fascism 
in Europe, Fromm observes that, “millions … were as eager to surrender their freedom as their 
fathers were to fight for it; that instead of wanting freedom, they sought for ways of escape 
from it; that other millions were indifferent and did not believe the defense of freedom to be 
worth fighting and dying for.”269 Given the chance to break free permanently from their bonds, 
 




modern humans – for Fromm, specifically his fellow Germans – instead sought out and assumed 
hierarchical roles in an illiberal, National Socialist death cult.  
Fromm ultimately escaped the Nazis and took a professorship at Columbia. Though 
manifest in different ways, he nevertheless recognized some of the same societal impulses in his 
new home, the United States, which he had observed so clearly in 1930s Europe. Perhaps 
because of this, his ideas, along with those of his contemporaries in the newly relocated 
Frankfurt School, continued to spread and gain influence within the American academy. In the 
intervening years, his has been well-trod intellectual terrain. Many thinkers of the twentieth 
century have touched upon the tragic human urge to reject, or simply ignore, the freedom that 
is presented to them, to embrace rather a life of alienation, consumerism and atomization. 
James Baldwin was a contemporary of Fromm’s, but one wonders how influential the latter’s 
writing may have been to the former. In his collection of essays, “Nobody Knows My Name,” 
Baldwin plainly and neatly summarizes these ideas on what he might dub a modern, American, 
urge toward unfreedom: 
The myth, the illusion, that this a free country … is disastrous. Let me point out 
to you that freedom is not something that anybody can be given; freedom is 
something people take and people are as free as they want to be. One hasn’t 
got to have an enormous military machine in order to be unfree when it’s 
simpler to be asleep, when it’s simpler to be apathetic, when it’s simpler, in fact, 




[W]e have some idea about reality which is not quite true. Without having 
anything whatever against Cadillacs, refrigerators, or all the trappings of 
American life, I yet suspect that there is something much more important and 




produces it, after all, is something which we don’t seem to want to look at, and 
that is the person.270 
 
Baldwin’s critique of modern, late capitalistic American society seems drawn from the same 
cloth as Fromm’s own assertions on capitalism, particularly vis-à-vis its dehumanizing aspects. 
Consider Fromm: 
In capitalism economic activity, success, material gains, become ends in 
themselves. It becomes man’s fate to contribute to the growth of the economic 
system, to amass capital, not for purposes of his own happiness or salvation, but 
as an end in itself. Man became a cog in the vast economic machine – an 
important one if he had much capital, an insignificant one if he had none – but 
always a cog to serve purposes outside of himself.271 
 
In his next move, Fromm connects the subservience of human beings under capital to the 
subservience of human beings to the gods of Luther and Calvin: 
Thus Luther and Calvin psychologically prepared man for the role which he had 
to assume in modern society: of feeling his own self to be insignificant and of 
being ready to subordinate his life exclusively for purposes which were not his 
own. Once man was ready to become nothing but the means for the Glory of a 
God who represented neither justice nor love, he was sufficiently prepared to 
accept the role of the economic machine – and eventually a “Führer.”272 
 
Freedom leads, perversely enough, back to tranny, authoritarianism, and finally, if conditions 
allow, to totalitarianism. The success of the rise of the National Socialists in 1930s Germany had 
much to do with the acquiescence of the German people to authority. They need not have all 
been party members for this to have worked. Instead, enough people needed only to have 
rejected the positive freedom that they might have employed otherwise to form their own 
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values and judgements, to have rejected the chance to form their own intrinsic meaning about 
life and their relationships to each other. A shocking number were therefore prepared to 
embrace political domination from without and to allow themselves to become 
instrumentalized in the pursuit of the national interest. Summarizes Deslandes, “[O]bedience to 
conventions, mimetism and loss of autonomy are instruments of submission which prevent us 
from constructing our own ethical judgements … and nurture our sadistic and masochistic 
tendencies.”273 Freedom, born of the Enlightenment, need not have moved inexorably toward 
authoritarianism, but it did in 1930s Germany, and, as Fromm warns, it could do so again. 
A slight detour into nineteenth century thought may be useful here. If hindsight from 
very recent events had led Fromm and his contemporaries to posit that modern, egalitarian 
Enlightenment thought was at least partly responsible for the rise of authoritarianism in 
twentieth century Europe, some recognized beforehand a distinct possibility that the mid-
nineteenth century German milieu was fertile ground for the National Socialism that was later 
to come. Indeed, Fromm’s twentieth century assertions had echoes in that which was previously 
promulgated in the preceding century by Heinrich Heine. It may appear to a current reader an 
act of reductivism to suggest that someone might have actually foreseen the terrible events 
arising in Europe that precipitated two world wars and the Shoah. Heine stands apart, however, 
for his prescience, for his prophecy even, on this singular point. Having spent many years of exile 
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in France and his work heavily censored by the Prussian regime, Heine lamented in the wake of 
the 1848 revolutions that the German middle and working classes were simply untuned to the 
political rights and aspirations that were theirs for the taking, that, as in Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
prediction, “the peasants, freed from their feudal overlords and given the vote, would become 
the most conservative of all classes.”274 Like much of his political poetry, he wrote in obliquely 
coded verse in 1849, about the quiet death of liberal revolution in Germany:  
Gelegt hat sich der starke Wind, 
Und wieder stille wird’s daheime; 
Germania, das große Kind,  
Erfreut sich wieder seiner 
Weihnachtsbäume. 
 
Wir treiben jetzt Familienglück –  
Was höher lockt, das ist vom Übel –  
Die Friedenschwalbe kehrt zurück, 
Die einst genistet in des Hauses Giebel.275 
 
If Heine’s verse was circumspect, his prose was direct, powerful and clear. As early as 
December 1834, almost a century before the National Socialists came to power, he wrote a 
warning to his French colleagues. It is worth quoting in the original German at length: 
Das Christentum … hat jene brutale germanische Kampflust einigermaßen 
besänftigt, konnte sie jedoch nicht zerstören, und wenn einst der zähmende 
Talisman, das Kreuz, zerbricht, dann rasselt wieder empor die Wildheit der alten 
Kämpfer, die unsinnige Berserkerwut, wovon die nordischen Dichter so viel 
singen und sagen. Jener Talisman ist morsch, und kommen wird der Tag, wo er 
kläglich zusammenbricht; die alten steinernen Götter erheben sich dann aus 
dem verschollenen Schutt, und reiben sich den tausendjährigen Staub aus den 
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Augen, und Thor mit dem Riesenhammer springt endlich empor und zerschlägt 
die gotischen Dome. Wenn Ihr dann das Gepolter und Geklirre hört, hütet Euch, 
Ihr Nachbarskinder, Ihr Franzosen, und mischt Euch nicht in die Geschäfte, die 
wir zu Hause in Deutschland vollbringen. […]  
 
Der Gedanke geht der Tat voraus, wie der Blitz dem Donner. Der deutsche 
Donner ist freilich auch ein Deutscher und ist nicht sehr gelenkig und kommt 
etwas langsam herangerollt; aber kommen wird er, und wenn Ihr es einst 
krachen hört, wie es noch niemals in der Weltgeschichte gekracht hat, so wißt, 
der deutsche Donner hat endlich sein Ziel erreicht. Bei diesem Geräusche 
werden die Adler aus der Luft tot niederfallen, und die Löwen in der fernsten 
Wüste Afrikas werden die Schwänze einkneifen und sich in ihren königlichen 
Höhlen verkriechen. Es wird ein Stück aufgeführt werden in Deutschland, 
wogegen die Französische Revolution nur wie eine harmlose Idylle erscheinen 
möchte.276 
 
Perhaps most startlingly was Heine’s line, from his 1821 play Almansor. In response to the 1817 
burning of anti-nationalist and reactionary books by pro-unification student groups in Wartburg, 
Heine penned the now incredible line: “Dort, wo man Bücher verbrennt, verbrennt man am Ende 
auch Menschen,” or “There, where they burn books, they will also in the end burn people.”277 
There is a certain deterministic fatalism to this idea, especially as expressed by some 
historians of modern Germany in the so-called Sonderweg thesis. That modern Germany was 
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somehow intrinsically deficient in its ability to express democratic self-governance is 
increasingly unfashionable. One can attempt ex post facto to delineate a trajectory from Martin 
Luther in the sixteenth century, to the French Revolution and Enlightenment in the eighteenth, 
to the “failed” revolutions of the mid-nineteenth, and finally the rise of authoritarianism in the 
late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – and indeed, there is no shortage of historians 
and thinkers who have expressed this very sentiment.278 Much more in recent years has 
appeared in the literature in refutation of Sonderweg.279 It nevertheless remains largely 
mysterious how the political and social revolutionary gains that were fought for and 
accomplished by generations prior were so quickly discarded by following generations, in 
Germany and elsewhere. Fromm’s analysis notwithstanding, it continues to be a perplexing 
problem into our own era: what is the continuing allure of illiberalism and the interests that 
support it? This is perhaps the ultimate paradox of political freedom: that when humans are 
finally granted it, they instinctively turn to, as Fromm posits, automaton conformity and 
dominant and submissive roles within established hierarchies, allowing for the abandonment of 
their individuality and loss of positive self-expression. They allow themselves to become 
instrumentalized by those whom Jonathan Israel warns against, the self-styled “masters, rulers, 
or spiritual guides” who might “[deny or hinder] others in the enjoyment of [their] rights.”280 
 
278 Among those important works include A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History: A Survey of 
Germany since 1815, First American Edition (New York: Coward-McCann, 1946), 7-33; and Fritz Fischer, 
Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967), 3-49, 608-38. 
279 See Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections, trans. Sidney B. Fay 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 1-7; 102-121; and David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The 
Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 1-35. For additional context see Jürgen Kocka, “German History before 
Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg,” Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (January 
1988): 3-16, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/260865/.  




That we should be on watchful for this en masse rejection of positive freedom is perhaps self-
evident. 
 
F.A. Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty 
We turn now, and perhaps most importantly, to F.A. Hayek’s groundbreaking work The 
Constitution of Liberty. His articulation of freedom, a term which he also uses interchangeably 
with liberty, is at least a partial refutation of all those thinkers who preceded him on the topic. If 
Berlin, in his attempt to simplify the thinking around freedom, posits two notions of liberty – 
positive and negative – Hayek maintains that the model should be quite a bit simpler than this. 
Freedom, at its essence is simple: 
In this sense “freedom” refers solely to a relation of men to other men, and the 
only infringement on it is coercion by men. This means, in particular, that the 
range of physical possibilities from which a person can choose at a given 
moment has no direct relevance to freedom.281 
 
Hayek dismisses the multitudinous definitions of freedom which preceded him, and posits that 
his is the most common, and most clear version of it. Freedom in this sense is no more than an 
absence of coercion by others. It is also entirely negative in its construction:  
It is often objected that our concept of liberty is merely negative. This is true in 
the sense that peace is also a negative concept or that security or quiet or the 
absence of any particular impediment or evil is negative. It is to this class of 
concepts that liberty belongs: it describes the absence of a particular obstacle—
coercion by other men.282 
 
Moreover, his definition serves equally as a basis for all forms of political freedom. He asserts, 
The first meaning of ‘freedom’ with which we must contrast our own use of the 
term is one generally recognized as distinct. It is what is commonly called 
“political freedom,” the participation of men in the choice of their government, 
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in the process of legislation, and in the control of administration. It derives from 
an application of our concept to groups of men as a whole which gives them a 
sort of collective liberty. But a free people in this sense is not necessarily a 
people of free men; nor need one share in this collective freedom to be free as 
an individual.283 
 
This sense of freedom can very well be applied to large groups – entire nations, even – as it was 
in the liberal revolutions of the eighteenth century. Freedom from coercion in the form of 
taxation from the British Crown, as in the American Revolution, or freedom from infringement 
of King Louis XVI into the economic and political rights of the bourgeoise in the French 
Revolution. But even at these, larger, collective scales, it is still the most common notion of 
freedom that is being employed by Hayek.  
This particular expression of freedom had a its own particular resonance in the liberal 
revolutions that often coincided with the nationalist aspirations of entire nations, of those 
groups of people, like the Germans and Italians, who shared a common language and cultural 
heritage, but lacked a national identity through the expression of a nation-state. Hayek 
comments on this “uneasy alliance” between liberal revolution and nationalist agendas during 
the nineteenth century: 
The application of the concept of freedom to a collective rather than to 
individuals is clear when we speak of a people’s desire to be free from a foreign 
yoke and to determine its own fate. In this case we use ‘freedom’ in the sense of 
absence of coercion of a people as a whole. The advocates of individual freedom 
have generally sympathized with such aspirations for national freedom, and this 
led to the constant but uneasy alliance between the liberal and the national 
movements during the nineteenth century. But though the concept of national 
freedom is analogous to that of individual freedom, it is not the same; and the 
striving for the first has not always enhanced the second. It has sometimes led 
people to prefer a despot of their own race to the liberal government of an alien 
majority; and it has often provided the pretext for ruthless restrictions of the 
individual liberty of the members of minorities. Even though the desire for 
liberty as an individual and the desire for liberty of the group to which the 
 




individual belongs may often rest on similar feelings and sentiments, it is still 
necessary to keep the two conceptions clearly apart.284 
 
Equally important to the liberal revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is an 
expression of freedom that has its own roots in Antiquity. Hayek, like Arendt, finds important 
context for his discourse on freedom in this ancient model. 
[M]anumission decrees [in Ancient Greece] normally gave the former slave, 
first, “legal status as a protected member of the community,” second, 
“immunity from arbitrary arrest,” third, the right to “work at whatever he 
desires to do,” and, fourth, the right to “movement according to his own 
choice.” […] This list contains most of what in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries were regarded as the essential conditions of freedom. It omits the 
right to own property only because even the slave could do so. With the 
addition of this right, it contains all the elements required to protect an 
individual against coercion. 
 
Hayek ends his chapter, “Liberty and Liberties,” on what he perceives to be so far lacking: a 
definition of coercion, which is increasingly important if one is to understand freedom defined 
as its absence. 
By “coercion” we mean such control of the environment or circumstances of a 
person by another that, in order to avoid greater evil, he is forced to act not 
according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another. Except 
in the sense of choosing the lesser evil in a situation forced on him by another, 
he is unable either to use his own intelligence or knowledge or to follow his own 
aims and beliefs. Coercion is evil precisely because it thus eliminates an 
individual as a thinking and valuing person and makes him a bare tool in the 
achievement of the ends of another. Free action, in which a person pursues his 
own aims by the means indicated by his own knowledge, must be based on data 
which cannot be shaped at will by another.285 
 
Hayek ends with one particularly salient thought, and one that also helps us to return to the 
topic of revolution. Namely, coercion among individuals can only be held at bay with the threat 
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of further coercion, and, moreover, this threat of coercion in a free society becomes necessarily 
a monopoly of the state. One hears echoes of Hobbes in Hayek’s pronouncement: “Coercion, 
however, cannot be altogether avoided because the only way to prevent it is by the threat of 
coercion. Free society has met this problem by conferring the monopoly of coercion on the state 
and by attempting to limit this power of the state to instances where it is required to prevent 
coercion by private persons.”286 
 
 
On Freedom and Radical Abolitionism 
 
[Christ’s Atonement] should [not] allow his Followers in the most arbitrary and 
Tyrannical Oppression that Hell has invented on this Globe. 
 
   –Ralph Sandiford, 1729287 
 
If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom 
and yet deprecate agitation are men who want crops without plowing up the 
ground; they want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean 
without the awful roar of its many waters. 
 
This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be 
both moral and physical; but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing 
without a demand. […] The limit of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of 
those whom they oppress. 
 
     –Frederick Douglass, 1857288 
 
As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of 
democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is no 
democracy. 
 
   –Abraham Lincoln, 1858 
 
286 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Freedom, 71-2. 
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The rise of the modern Republican Party, and with it an increasingly radical abolitionist 
movement, had its roots in the political aftermath of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. Indeed, 
the Bleeding Kansas episode of the mid-1850s, which pitted Free Soil partisans against their 
southern Democrat adversaries, might be well attributed to the bill proposed by Stephen A. 
Douglas. Douglas attempted in it to find common ground on the question of slavery in the 
western territories through the establishment of popular sovereignty; by so doing, he also 
helped overturn established Constitutional precedent grounded in the Missouri Compromise of 
1820, which had kept slavery out of the northern territories situated above the longitude of 36 
30’ north (i.e., Missouri’s southern border). The passage of Douglas’s bill and establishment of 
popular sovereignty vis-à-vis the slavery question in the western territories set in motion a 
series events which lead of the relocation of many thousands of partisans from North and South 
alike into the Kansas and Nebraska territories. Samuel C. Pomeroy, a Free Soil partisan from 
Southampton, Massachusetts, is emblematic of this migration. Reportedly on hand when 
President Franklin Pierce signed the Kansas-Nebraska Act into law, he is said to have remarked 
to the President, “Your victory is but an adjournment of the question from the halls of 
legislation at Washington to the open prairies of the Freedom-loving West, and there, sir, we 
shall beat you.” Pomeroy would subsequently travel to Kansas some 200 fellow citizens from 
New England dedicated to the Free Soil cause.289 Similar migration from the pro-slavery South 
was equally animated As Southern slaveholders asserted both their personal honor and the 
honor of the institution of slavery, both sides became increasingly radicalized in tit-for-tat 
violence. The Kansas-Nebraska Act was of course not the sole source of an increasingly hostile 
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sectional conflict; but it played perhaps the foundational role in a series of violent events and 
reprisals that spun out from it, both on the western frontier and in Washington, DC, including 
the burning of Lawrence, Kansas, the caning of Charles Sumner by Preston Brooks on the floor of 
the U.S. Senate, and the slaughter by John Brown and his sons of five pro-slavery settlers in 
Pottawatomie, Kansas. John Brown murdered thus, “in the name of freedom and equality.”290 
By the mid-nineteenth century, chattel slavery in the American South had become 
emblematic for illiberalism and tyranny the world over. Serious political efforts to overturn 
slavery in the Atlantic world had by then been underway for more than a century. Jeffrey Stout 
describes and analyzes this intellectual history compellingly. Over the course of six days during 
his 2017 contributions to the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh, Stout elucidates 
the rather enormous topic of freedom in the Western philosophical tradition at its intersection 
with religion, under the title “Religion Unbound: Ideals and Powers from Cicero to King.”291 In his 
fourth lecture, “Abolitionism, Political Religion, and Secularism,” Stout argues convincingly that 
abolitionism was an eclectic and diverse movement, and one whose very success was rooted in 
the convergence of pluralistic voices, comprised as they were of the myriad political, secular and 
religious interests it contained. Stout compares the religious ideas on slavery to the secular ones 
in this era and posits that which is sometimes overlooked: the distinctly moral and quasi-
religious dimension of the anti-slavery argument. As some religious thought leaders upheld the 
standard view that slavery was condoned in the Bible, and thus an appropriate institution for 
the present day, others like Ralph Sandiford, Elizabeth Heyrick, Benjamin Lay, William 
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Wilberforce and Frederick Douglass all wrapped their abolitionist arguments in decidedly 
Christian terminology. Wrote Douglass in his autobiography, Narrative of the Life of Frederick 
Douglass, an American Slave, “[B]etween the Christianity of this land [the United States], and 
the Christianity of Christ, I recognize the widest possible difference – so wide, that to receive the 
one as good, pure, and holy, is of necessity to reject the other as bad, corrupt, and wicked.”292 
Some Enlightenment arguments for egalitarianism and against slavery were subdued by 
comparison. Stout asserts that such luminaries as David Hume and Voltaire argued for the end 
of theism, or the formation of its replacement with an ecumenical “secular religion.” But non-
religious arguments about the equality of all men and women swayed neither Hume nor 
Voltaire. Instead, their version of Enlightenment allowed for strict social hierarchies, an innate 
inequality between the races, and even a continuation of the slave trade during a time when its 
darker side was becoming more and more tangible within the public imagination. (One 
considers Hume and Voltaire in this sense as members of the conservative Enlightenment, as 
opposed to Jonathan Israel’s Radical Enlightenment.)293 
As we have already seen, transatlantic Anglo-American abolitionism had already begun 
to emerge by the middle of the eighteenth century, largely in the form of Quaker and Anglican 
cooperation. But contemporaneous to this were similarly emergent intellectual currents in the 
German-speaking world. By the turn of the nineteenth century, some fifty years later, 
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abolitionism and a call to ameliorate the conditions of African slaves in the Americas had been 
well defined in the popular consciousness across German-speaking lands. August von Kotzebue 
is today (at least in the English-speaking world) a largely forgotten German playwright, but his 
Sklavenstücke (literally “slave plays”) were incredibly popular in Weimar. Beyond Kotzebue, the 
genre was clearly successful from an economic standpoint; Goethe, who was highly attuned to 
matters of audience taste and theater economics, staged many such plays in Weimar (while 
interestingly, neglecting to stage many of his own).294 Kotzebue himself outpaced both Goethe 
and Schiller in the metric of “number of plays performed at theaters across German-speaking 
states.”295 Obenewaa Oduro-Opuni, in her excellent essay on Kotzebue and the Sklavenstücke 
genre references the “visible rise in German-speaking theater plays between 1775 and 1815 that 
address slavery, the transatlantic slave trade [and] abolition.”296 She asserts further: “The last 
decades of the eighteenth century heralded a significant, powerful transnational social 
movement that cut across classes, races, and nationalities, as well as genders.”297 Oduro-Opuni 
connects Kotzubue’s abolitionism to his formative experiences “with the predicament of 
Estonian peasants who served German aristocrats in a bondage relationship called 
Leibegenschaft,” or serfdom.298 Serfdom would be largely abolished across much of Europe in 
the wake of the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century, while slavery in the Americas 
 
294 Personal email correspondence, Johannes Schmidt (Professor of German, Clemson University) to 
Matthew Long, January 27, 2020. 
295 Obenewaa Oduro-Opuni, “German Abolitionism: Kotzebue and the Transnational Debate on Slavery,” 
Journal of Transnational American Studies 10, no. 1 (2019): 240, accessed April 10, 2021, 
https://escholarship.org/content/qt8rm531sh/qt8rm531sh.pdf?t=qduws8&v=lg/.  
296 Ibid., 252. 
297 Ibid., 237. 




would continue unabated for another fifty years.299 It is this continuation of the subjugation of 
African slaves in the Americas, especially after Haiti’s revolution and independence by 1804, 
that became center in the consciousness of Europe’s intelligentsia and all those interested in 
transnational freedom more broadly. The increasingly radical urge toward freedom by the mid-
nineteenth century thus mirrors liberal and democratic revolutionary development across the 
Atlantic world which was occurring contemporaneously to it. 
Violence would become integral to both. Indeed, the story of political freedom, 
especially within the context of revolution and abolition, is necessarily a story of violence. When 
it became apparent to those who were agitating for more egalitarian social structures that the 
political processes available to them were ill-prepared to enact the changes they saw as 
necessary, radicalism and violence became their primary tools to enact these changes. Thus, we 
see the emergence of figures like John Brown. David Blight describes Brown in coming to believe 
“that violence in a righteous cause was like a rite of purification.”300 Abolitionism in America 
came to embrace revolutionary ideology, rhetoric and means in the years subsequent to The 
Kansas-Nebraska Act and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision. So too did the struggle 
take on an apocalyptic tenor. Men and women both began to struggle, to agitate, to fight for the 
cause of freedom, and when doing so took on the mantle of sacred duty, they increasingly risked 
their lives, and even became willing to kill, in freedom’s pursuit. 
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What is at stake?301 Stated differently, what is the relevance of the topic of transnational 
freedom in the nineteenth century to us – scholars, students, lay people alike – from our 
vantage point in the twenty-first century? Ours is surely an era of continued inequality for many. 
The year 2020, with its pandemic reminder that we are all still living in history, also surely 
exacerbated these ingrained inequalities. Moreover, 2020 featured a resurgent message of 
egalitarianism and civil rights, begun centuries ago but not yet completed, in the form of Black 
Lives Matter (BLM). Langston Hughes famously wrote, some eighty-six years after the end of the 
American Civil War, about a “a dream deferred.” I quote the entirety of his poem “Harlem” 
below: 
  What happens to a dream deferred? 
    
   Does it dry up 
   like a raisin the sun? 
   Or fester like a sore –  
   And then run? 
   Does it stink like rotten meat? 
   Or crust and sugar over –  
   like a syrupy sweet? 
 
   Maybe it just sags 
   like a heavy load. 
 
   Or does it explode?302 
 
“Or does it explode?” is telling. Hughes wrote “Harlem” in 1951, only years after Americans had 
fought and died for freedom against illiberalism across the oceans during World War II, and just 
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as the American Civil Rights Movement was coming into full force. Within fifteen years of his 
writing, by the mid 1960s, calls to revolution, endemic social unrest, and the struggle for civil 
rights for all would coalesce into another moment of great upheaval across the Atlantic world. 
The question remains unsolved, however: if freedom from fascism had been completed abroad, 
what of freedom and equality for African Americans at home? This idea, as expressed through 
BLM, remains salient to us in the twenty-first century. It is perhaps a truism, but it is worth 
repeating: if freedom is at stake for some of us, if it is actively being denied for some Americans, 
should it not also be considered under threat for all of us? Arguably, the ultimate effect of the 
American Civil War and abolitionism was in an expansion of freedom to those previously denied 
it, those enslaved Americans who won their freedom and who saw the codification of that 
freedom in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. Freedom was in 
fact expanded through this struggle, but continually, subsequently, that freedom has proven 
capable of retracting in equal measure. In light of this, what are we to make of this current 
moment of the American experience? What does an ideal of freedom for all, begun centuries 
ago in the Radical Enlightenment and yet still lacking final completion – a dream deferred, per 
Hughes – mean to us today? 
 Another hallmark of our current moment is the continued flight of migrants into our 
country, many of whom, like Bondi and his fellow 1848ers, are fleeing political violence in their 
places of origin. I hope that this paper has in large part enunciated the import of immigrants to 
the American experience, as indeed, our country would not be what it is today were it not the 
contributions of our immigrants. But still, centuries on, we in the United States continue to 
struggle with what it means to be American, and how immigrants fit into this larger question of 




is so clearly described by Vecoli and which has been manifest since the earliest days of the 
Republic.303 We still fail to recognize that which Hannah Arendt postulated so powerfully in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, on the inherent rights of all humans, regardless of their immigration 
status, of the inherent worth of all humans. She writes, on those refugees who were displaced 
and fleeing from World War II, and who were thus considered legally stateless and without 
rights: 
The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human 
being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to 
believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost 
all other qualities and specific relationships – except that they were still human. 
The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.304 
 
Perhaps more than any, this sums up what is meant by Jonathan Israel in his definition of 
Radical Enlightenment: that all people, based simply on their being human, have rights that are 
inherent and irrevocable, rights that no one might hinder, deny, or curtail.305 Israel continues by 
quoting d’Holbach: “[I]f error and ignorance have forged the chains which bind peoples in 
oppression, if it is prejudice which perpetuates those chains, science, reason and truth will one 
day be able to break them.”306 
 Freedom and an instinctual urge toward it still compels many of us. It continues to be an 
animating force of history. How we continue to enact, perform, and practice that freedom will 
be instructive. Indeed, with the correct outlook, we might eventually break d’Holbach’s chains 
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